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ART. I.—*Principii di Filosofia Sopranaturale*. 1. Libri
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THIS is a work, so to speak, on the philosophy of Christianity, designed to present the three orders which, according to the author, it embraces,—the rational, the revealed or faith, and the palingenesiac, —in their dialectic principles and relations. It consists of three books, of which the first and part of the second are published in the three volumes before us. The remainder of the work, though completed, as we understand, is not yet published. We cannot better introduce the work to our readers, or more clearly state its purpose and method, than by translating and copying the author's preface.

“This little essay is not a scientific exposition, but a mere sketch of supernatural philosophy,—a simple attempt to reconcile Christianity in its several intellectual, moral, and eudæmonic elements, with civilization, *civiltà*. The chief problems relating to existence, science, liberty, and society, in their origin, progress, and palingenesia, are touched upon under their principal heads, and, perhaps, radically solved. The work is divided into three books, which are connected in the following manner:—

The first book, as introductory to the other two, sets forth the first principles of rational knowledge in their general relations with the revealed and palingenesiac orders. It takes the intelligence in its very first and most evident principles, and conducts it, step by step, to the borders of the supernatural and revealed orders, and shows successively in the rational, the possibility, accord, and necessity of

these orders, and briefly delineates the generic ideal with its internal and external organization.

"Here the first book ends, and gives place to the second, which treats of revealed knowledge in its specific relations with the rational, on the one hand, and with the palingenesiac, on the other. It turns on the study of the supernatural and revealed elements which concrete the generic ideal of reason, and adumbrate its complete ultra-mundane actualization; and by a continuation and divine perfection of intellectual knowledge on the superintelligible side of reason, gives at once a prelude and foretaste of the palingenesia. By its perception of the generic ideal order reason is rendered capable of receiving and recognizing the specific supernatural order, which is its divine elevation and complement. No sooner is this duly beheld by the light of faith, than its elements are seen to correspond to the generic ideal, and to concrete and fulfil it: whence its truth is recognized.

"But this revealed and specific type, while, in respect to the generic superintelligible of reason, it has the relation of complement or perfection, is only incipient or initial in regard to the palingenesia. The palingenesia, as the end and crown of the two antecedent orders, is in some manner brought down and reflected and incorporated in the revealed, and coming forth from its futurity it raises and exalts the rational, by removing its generality and vagueness. But the preëxistence and transparency of the palingenesiac order in the revealed are still only analogical relatively to cognition, and initial in respect to reality. Wherefore they do not satisfy either the mind or the heart, which tends and aspires to immediate and full possession. Reason, it is true, by the aid of the supernatural light of faith and reflected revelation, begins to preoccupy and to foretaste the palingenesiac world; but this enigmatical precession and initial prelibation, not fully corresponding either to the nature or the tendency of the soul or to the infinitude of its desires, do not extinguish their ardor, but still more inflame it, and make it rush forward with greater impetus to the ultra-mundane order, so as to grasp it in its immediate reality and concreteness.

"To these new aspirations (which, in the second book, are elevated and better determined) the third book, which develops the palingenesia in its relations to the natural and supernatural cosmic life, attempts to respond. In it are treated all the things which relate to the future state of man and the universe, in their relations with one another and with God as author of nature and of grace, in so far as the feeble lights of this present life permit. In it is shown that all the desires, wants, and tendencies of man find their full and perfect satisfaction in the palingenesia; that both the natural and the supernatural orders, with all their forces and virtues, combined and operating together, are only a grand progress or sublime march towards the immortality of the life beyond the

world; that this, in all its modes and evolutions, transitory as well as permanent, is nothing else than the final result and conclusion of the cosmic conditions and evolutions. Such are the beautiful and sublime questions which we shall find developed in this third book.

"The third book, as is seen, is only the continuation and complement of the second, as the second only continues and completes the first. The three orders treated are connected with one another, and are completed together. The first, without the second, would have no end nor means proportioned to an end, and would be unintelligible; the second, without the first, would lack a basis on which to rise, and would be impossible; the third, the palingenesia, which is the complete and final actualization of both the natural and the supernatural, cannot stand without them, nor they without it."—Vol. 1, pp. 7–11.

This the author understands of the real order, or reality, that is, as he adds in a note, contingent reality, which alone can be elevated from the natural order to the supernatural, and from the supernatural to the palingenesiac. What he says in respect to the order of reality, he contends must be said also in the order of knowledge:—

"The three types which represent the supernatural order, or the rational type, the revealed, and the palingenesiac, are only the manifestation and reflection of the various movements of the same order in the mind. Whence, if the first is necessary to conceive the second, the second is needed to attain the third; or, more clearly, as reason, through the perception of the superintelligible order, gives us the rational and generic type, by which, aided by grace—*gratia illuminans et gratia adjuvans*—we rise to the revealed and specific order, and recognize its truth; so faith, *mediante* the apprehension of the supernatural and revealed order, offers us the ideal and specific by which we apprehend the palingenesiac order, and are prepared to attain it. The three orders are therefore so connected among themselves, that the first demands the second as its complement, and the second, for the same reason, demands the third. Consequently, the reality and the truth of the first become determinate and concrete only in the second; and the reality and truth of the second are found full and complete only in the third, or palingenesia." *Ibid.* pp. 11, 12.

That is, the natural and rational order is fulfilled only in the supernatural and revealed order, and the supernatural and revealed order is fulfilled only in the palingenesiac order.

The principal novelty here, after the mode of connecting the rational with the revealed, or reason with revelation, is the

author's terminology. All theology aims, for that is its essence, to show the relations between the order known by reason, and the order known only by revelation, or the order of faith, and the order of palingenesia, that is, heaven or glory. That the first is fulfilled in the second, and the second in the third, which is the consummation and crown of the divine creative act, is taught us by all theologians of all schools. Theology is not a science yet to be created, is not a new science, nor a progressive science; but is a science, in substance, as old and as invariable as faith itself. Theologians cannot change the science from what it was in the hands of the great fathers and recognized doctors of the church, or carry it farther. They may change their method of treating it, the mode of demonstrating it, the order in which they arrange it, and the terms in which they express it; but it must always be the same science as well as the same faith, for neither its subject-matter, nor its principles or data undergo any change.

Our author does not design to present a new science of faith, but aims to present the old science in some respects with a new face, and in a new dress, and after a manner and method of his own, which he holds to be better fitted to bring out and present Catholic truth in its unity and integrity to the wants, if not the intelligence, of our age. He uses, in some respects, an unfamiliar language, at least unfamiliar to us, where the old from long use has partially lost something of its freshness and vividness, and fails to express the truth with the fulness and force it did, when first used. *Palingenesia* is in itself no better nor more expressive than *regeneration*; but, being less a word of routine, its use may excite the mind to greater activity, and set it to inquiring into its full meaning, and be to us more expressive, in point of fact, for the very reason that it is less familiar.

We are not competent, for our theological knowledge is too limited for that, to judge whether the author has succeeded or failed in presenting theological science in its invariability, as taught by the fathers and mediæval doctors. Many of the problems he treats lie in those higher regions of philosophy and theology into which we have not penetrated, and into which none but philosophers and theologians of the first order can penetrate. We have even read only the first of his three books, and barely looked into a chapter here and

there in his second book. We like his method, but we do not always like his terminology, nor greatly admire his style, perhaps because of our very imperfect knowledge of Italian. He evidently does not study the graces and elegancies of diction; and his terminology, to our understanding, often wants precision and exactness, and seems not always to conform to his own system of thought, but to be borrowed from a school to which he does not belong. He has many sympathies with Gioberti, but studiously avoids Gioberti's terminology, even when he appears to agree with him in thought. This, we think, is a mistake; for Gioberti is a master of language, and his terms are always selected with great care and niceness, are always precise and exact, and can never be changed without disadvantage.

The author has been represented as a disciple of the Giobertian school, and has suffered somewhat in consequence; but he is an original and independent thinker, and has his own method and manner of considering and presenting the Christian theology. Only up to a certain point, however, can we regard it as no discredit to a philosopher or a theologian to agree with or to borrow from Gioberti, who, it cannot be denied, was a man of rare philosophical genius and learning. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find in those of his works finished and published during his life-time, except perhaps the last, a philosophical or theological proposition that a Catholic may not accept and defend. For a time, we confess, we were well-nigh mastered by him, and carried away in a direction that it is dangerous to follow: yet is there much in his writings that we highly prize, and we owe him not a little both in philosophy and theology; but, notwithstanding this, we regard the spirit and tendency of his writings as decidedly anticatholic, and have long since ceased to recommend or even to consult them. We may not accept, indeed do not accept, all the criticisms of some of the good fathers of the Society of Jesus on his writings, any more than we do his on them in his infamous *Gesuità Moderna*, for we do not understand him as they do, nor always agree with them in their own philosophy; but we object decidedly to his undeniable effort to press orthodoxy in philosophy and theology, if we may so speak, into the service of heterodoxy, and make it a tender to gentilism. To us, Gioberti is in spirit and tendency a great pagan, and his influence on

his countrymen has been bad, very bad. What predominated in him was nationalism, only another name for gentilism, and he sought to make philosophy and Catholic theology subservient to his favorite dream of securing the moral and civil primacy of the world to the Italian people, not by making them good papists, but by making the papacy thoroughly Italian. He aims to harmonize Catholicity and gentile civilization, by making Catholicity yield to and serve gentilism, not by making gentilism yield to and serve Catholicity. He would have the church devote all her divine powers to the work of civilization, and to the reproduction of a civilization of the Italo-Greek type, and leave the world to come to take care of itself.

The author of the work before us, as far as we have discovered, does not go so far in this direction as Gioberti went; but, from the design of his work, as stated in the preface we have cited, namely, to reconcile Christianity with civilization, we fear that he forgets, to some extent, the injunction of our Lord, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things [after which the heathen seek] shall be added unto you," St. Matt., vi, 33; and that, in some measure, he seeks the kingdom of God for the sake of the *adjicienda*. He certainly attaches more importance to direct labors for civilization than we do, and we confess that we are far from seeking to conciliate Christianity with *civiltà*, or civilization. Civilization is not something independent of Christianity, existing in accordance with, or in opposition to it. It is the creation of Christianity taken in the comprehensive sense in which the author takes it, as embracing the three orders of creation, the natural or rational, the supernatural or revealed, and the palingenesia or heaven, in their catholic principles, and in their unity and integrity; and whatever of civilization, properly so called, is found among the Gentiles is derived from Christian principles retained by them, by way of tradition, from the primitive revelation, or from the natural law, which is included in the Christian law. The political and civil organization of society should never be sought for its own sake, for it depends on religion, and should be subordinated and referred to the ultimate end of man, and sought only in its relation to what the author calls the palingenesia. That Christianity is to be conciliated with civilization, is the error of Gioberti and the whole herd of

liberal Catholics so called, and justly condemned in the Syllabus; but civilization is to be conciliated with Christianity, in which are the principles and the law of all real civilization.

The fatal error of modern society is in detaching civilization from Christianity and the church in which Christianity is concentered, not only to the peril of souls, but to the peril of civilization itself. The mechanical civilization which has taken the place of Christian civilization, and which is so loudly boasted by our sciolists and frothy declaimers, does not deserve the name of civilization; for it only multiplies commodities for the body, enhances the expense of living, greatly to the damage of the poor, enfeebles intellect, neglects or denies the soul, abases character, and extinguishes the spiritual life. It effaces all true manhood, and under it masculinity becomes a myth, and the race is rapidly falling to the condition of the most degraded of savage tribes, in which the women bear rule, and children are named and inherit from the mother, not from the father. Such is the inevitable result, when civilization is detached from the Church of God. If people could be induced to turn their back on civilization, fix their eyes on heaven, and live for the ultimate end of man alone, civilization might be left to itself. Religion is civilization; and no people that believes, understands, and practises the Christian religion with a view to eternal life alone, is or can be uncivilized, badly organized, or badly governed; and none can be well organized or well governed that rejects Christianity or the law of God, as proclaimed, declared, and applied by the Catholic Church. All we need do is to return to the church which God himself has founded, and to which he has given authority to teach and govern in his name all men and nations. The civilization will follow as an inevitable consequence. Do our liberal Catholics forget the injunction of our Lord, which we have just cited, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things [after which the heathen seek] shall be added unto you"? Do not they think it Christian to seek the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*, that is, follow Christ for the loaves and fishes? Does not every Christian in baptism renounce the world and its pomps, as well as the devil and his works?

We are not quite certain of the author's explanation of the dialectic relation between the rational order and the revealed order, or of the capacity of reason to receive and recognize the revelation of the supernatural. He says reason is rendered capable of receiving and recognizing the truth of the supernatural and revealed order, *mediante* its apprehension of the *generic ideal* of reason, or the superintelligible, which the supernatural and revealed order specificates or determines. But the generic, without the specific and concrete, is an abstraction, a pure nullity, and, consequently, no object of apprehension. We doubt if we understand what the author means by the "generic ideal." What does it generate? or of what is it the genus? We have been accustomed to hold, though admitting the reality of genera and species, that the genus is apprehensible only in the species, and the species only in the individual. The author seems to us to be much more of a Rosminian than a Giobertian. Nothing is apprehensible *in abstracto*, for nothing exists *in abstracto*; and his generic ideal, like Rosmini's *ens in genere*, or *ens indeterminatum*, is an abstraction, and therefore inapprehensible.

Then, again, how can reason apprehend the superintelligible? We hold, as well as the author, that we have intuition, as the first principle alike of the real and the knowable, by the creative act of being, of *Ens creans, l'Ente creante*, therefore of God and his creative act, but only in the respect that God is intelligible to us, or faces the human intellect; that is, as the ideal, or the universal and necessary ideas, without which there is and can be no fact of experience. We have no intuitive knowledge of God in his superintelligible essence, and can have none till we have the happiness to see him, as he is in himself, by the light of glory. The ideal is not generic, general, indeterminate, but is real and necessary being, universal, eternal, and immutable. We therefore can recognize no generic ideal; and to assume that we apprehend the superintelligible as ideal, is a contradiction in terms, for it assumes that the superintelligible is not superintelligible, but intelligible, since intelligible and ideal say one and the same thing. The author claims to be an ontologist; but, to our understanding, he, like Rosmini, talks and reasons as a psychologist. He is no disciple of Gioberti.

The problem the author undertakes to solve,—the dialectic and, therefore, the real relation between our rational knowledge or apprehension, and the revelation of the supernatural order, or reason and faith,—is one of the mysteries of life that we do not find ourselves able to explain. Certain it is that reason cannot rise above the intelligible and grasp the superintelligible, otherwise the superintelligible would be intelligible; yet we all are certain that the limits of the intelligible are not the limits of the real, and that there is more than we know, or by our natural powers can know; or that there is really existing what, for us, is superintelligible, what the cosmic philosophers term, less accurately, the unknowable. How do we know, not what the superintelligible is, but that it is? This is the problem.

Gioberti undertakes to solve it in his *Teorica sovrannaturale*, the first and best of his works, by asserting for the soul what he calls the faculty of superintelligence, a subjective faculty, which does not attain to its object, but turns wholly in the sphere of the soul itself. But all faculties are powers, and take hold of their object. It is not, then, properly a faculty, and Gioberti himself describes it not as such, but as the soul's consciousness of her own impotence, or of her own capacity of being more than she is, that is, of progress to the infinite. But this is not very satisfactory; for it is not easy to understand how *impotenza* can be *potenza*, nor is it true that the soul is progressive, or has the capacity of progress to the infinite, for she is progressive only by the aid of grace, and attains to the infinite only in the divine person of the Word made flesh. The author rejects this solution, and holds that the soul has a generic apprehension of the superintelligible as well as of her own limitation in her intuition or perception of the infinite. It is her generic apprehension of the infinite, or the infinite as generic and indeterminate. But our difficulty here is that we have no such apprehension of the infinite or the superintelligible. The author holds that the real and the knowable are identical, and nothing really exists in general, or in a vague and indeterminate manner. There is infinite being, but no infinite existing or cogitable distinct from being which is infinite. The intuition of the infinite is the intuition of real concrete being in whom is no vagueness, no indeterminateness, nothing generic, abstract, or possible. God is, as say the theo-

logians, most pure act, *actus purissimus*. He is, of course, incomprehensible, and he asserts himself intuitively only as the ideal or intelligible. We have intuition of him as the ideal, or universal and necessary ideas, which are the ideal or apodictic element of every fact of experience; but this intuition is not our act; it is the act of Being, presenting and affirming himself, and thereby creating or constituting the human intellect itself, and therefore must precede any act of apprehension by us. The author, affected by his psychologism, errs on this point, and seems to hold that the intuition is the act of the soul, and then that the soul has immediate cognition of God by its own intellectual power, which we take it is what is censured in the first of the seven propositions of the Louvain professors, and certainly is not true.

We agree with the author, that the natural and rational order has a real or, as we say, a dialectic relation with the supernatural and revealed order, that they are conjoined by a real *nexus* in the divine plan of creation; but we do not think that it lies within the sphere of philosophy to say what that *nexus* or relation is, subjectively considered. That man is capable of receiving a supernatural revelation, we know, because he has received such revelation; but we regard his capacity or aptitude to receive, or to be the recipient of a divine revelation, as something negative rather than positive on his part, or the part of natural reason. Knowing that God is and is infinite, he cannot compare himself with the divine ideal, without feeling that he is finite, restricted in his powers, and insufficient for himself; or that he has wants that demand more than reason is able to give, and that God, who is infinite, is able to assist him, if such should be his will. We know by reason that the supernatural is, for we know that God is; and he is necessarily supernatural, since he is the author and end of nature. We know, then, that a supernatural revelation is possible, and needed for the complement and fulfilment of our reason. Made by him who is the Author of reason, and therefore, though above it, necessarily in harmony with it, there is no difficulty, when made and duly accredited, in believing it.

This, I am aware, is very commonplace, but we cannot see that either Gioberti or the Genoese professor tells us any thing more. Revelation brings its own solution with it, and we doubt, if men had never had a supernatural revelation,

that they would ever have felt either its necessity, or seen its possibility. It is the fact of revelation that stimulates thought, quickens the faculties, and directs the mind to the facts which prove its necessity and possibility.

The point in the author's system we most value is not the subjective relation of reason to revelation, but the real relation of the rational order to the revealed order, as integral parts of the one divine creative act. It is this objective relation of the divine purpose and works, whether works of nature or of grace, as a uniform, consistent, and dialectic whole, that we regard as the chief value of his treatise on the principles of supernatural philosophy, showing that the order of grace and the order of glory are not after-thoughts, but are included with the natural order in one and the same creative act, and rest on the same universal and invariable principles. We should not name the three orders as the author does: we should name them generation, regeneration, and glorification. Palingenesia is simply regeneration, into which we are introduced in this life by faith received in the sacrament of baptism. Glorification is the reward and crown of regeneration, not simply the palingenesia or regeneration itself; for only such as persevere to the end are crowned, rewarded, or glorified.

For ourselves, we prefer to regard the creation as included in two orders, rather than in three, with the author; that is, the initial and the teleological. Generation belongs to the initial order, or procession of existences by way of creation from God as first cause; and regeneration is the birth into the teleological order, the order of their return, without the absorption of their individuality or personality in him, to God as their final cause. The order into which regeneration introduces us is founded by the Incarnation or Word made flesh, or Christ the mediator of God and men, who is the progenitor by grace of the regenerated race, as Adam was by nature of the generated. We take Christianity distinctively as the order which originates in the incarnate Word, the order of grace, and therefore regard it as distinctively teleological. In the teleological, or Christian order, we recognize two moments with the author, the order of faith, and the order of glory, in which perfection, the end, is reached, and the initial is fulfilled, consummated. The author makes generation initial in relation to the order

of faith, which he holds is its fulfilment; and the order of faith initial in relation to the palingenesia or glory, which is its fulfilment. Our objection is, as he himself shows in the passage cited from his preface, that faith does not fulfil the natural order, but simply initiates its fulfilment, while its complete fulfilment is reached only in glorification, which consummates the "new creation," as St. Paul calls it, or the teleological order.

The author calls the three orders Christianity, while we have been accustomed to restrict it to the teleological order, or new creation founded by Christ the incarnate Word, which, we think, is the case with theologians generally. But as all things are created *ad Verbum*, or for the honor and glory of the *Son*, and therefore *ad Christum*, and as the fundamental principles of the three orders are the same, and as Christ the incarnate Word has given him all power in heaven and in earth, in both the initial and in the teleological orders, the author may, without any impropriety, embrace the three orders under the term Christianity; but, if he does so, he must not talk of conciliating Christianity with civilization, and must refuse to accept the modern doctrine of his country, or on which its government acts, of the independence of the secular order on the spiritual order, and reject the civil marriage act it has passed, and defend the authority of the Vicar of Christ over temporal princes, whether Christian or non-Christian, which, if we are correctly informed, is somewhat more than he is inclined to do. For ourselves, we would as readily defend William of Occam as the theologian or priest that has any sympathy with the present so called Italian government, which is far worse than that of Louis the Bavarian, who claimed, against the papal authority, to be emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the West, though we have been accustomed to confine the papal authority and discipline to those princes who profess, or are bound by the tenure of their crown to profess, the Christian religion.

Theology, as we have said, is not a new or a progressive science. As there can be no new faith, so can there be no new theology or science of faith, though theologians may differ among themselves by a more or less perfect knowledge of it. Theologians hold their principles from faith and reason, both of which are invariable, universal, and the same

in all ages and nations. Reason was all in the first man that it is in us, or can be in his latest posterity, and there has never been but one revelation, according to St. Thomas, which was made in substance to our first parents in the Garden, and hence, says St. Augustine, faith does not vary; as believed the fathers, so believe we, only they believed in Christ who was to come, and we believe in Christ who has come. Hence whatever is permanent, invariable, and universal in the various religions, superstitions, and mythologies of the heathen, is either the dictate of reason, or derived by tradition from the primitive revelation made to Adam and Eve before their expulsion from the Garden. Our Lord did not come to make a new revelation, or to introduce a new faith, but to do and suffer those things which were promised and which were necessary to perfect the faith of the fathers; for if he had not come, and done and suffered what he did, their faith would have been vain as also would be ours. Theology is the science of faith, or the revealed order, in its logical relations with the rational order, of its several parts with one another, and of all its parts with the whole, in which they are integrated, and, so to speak, consummated, or of which, in the divine plan of creation, they are constituent parts.

Now in constructing theology, or reproducing in our theological science the divine plan of creation, as made known to us by reason and revelation, we may adopt, with one class of theologians, the analytical method, and treat the subject-matter in its parts in distinct questions and articles, without special attention to the relations of the parts to the whole or to one another; or we may adopt the synthetic method of the early fathers and treat the parts in their dialectic relations with one another, and with the whole which integrates them. But, whichever method we adopt, it must be one and the same theological science we draw out and present. We must also bear in mind that neither of the two methods ever is or ever can be pursued by itself alone. Analysis presupposes synthesis, for we cannot analyze what is not presented *in globo* or as a whole; and synthesis presupposes analysis, for we cannot treat parts in relation to one another, or in relation to the whole which integrates them, unless we have analyzed them, so far at least as to know that they are parts. The difference of the two methods is that, in the one,

synthesis predominates, in the other, analysis ; or that in the one we seek to draw out and present the truth, or the real, in its dialectic relations ; and in the other, we seek to study and present it in its analytic relations. The analytic theologian will, in treating of grace, treat it in its several divisions, as *gratia præveniens*, *gratia adjuvans*, *gratia sufficiens*, *gratia efficax*, *gratia habitualis*, *gratia actualis*, etc. ; the synthetic theologian, without denying these distinctions, will consider these several graces in their unity, and in relation to the church, their medium ; also the church in relation to the Incarnation, the source and fountain of all grace ; and, still further, the Incarnation in relation, on the one hand, to the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, and on the other, in relation to the eternal decree of creation and the teleological order.

The author adopts the synthetic method and gives us the three orders according to him, the two according to our preference, in their grand synthesis, and the creation in all its parts, orders, or moments, as an organic whole, which is what we call synthetic theology. St. Thomas and all theologians of the first order in reality do the same. The *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, if eminently analytic, is, to all who diligently study and understand it, also eminently synthetic, both in its philosophy and its theology. It is the very essence of theological science, as we have said above, to present the several mysteries, articles, dogmas, and propositions of faith in their synthetic or organic relations with one another, with the natural or rational order, and with the order of glory, as far as revealed: The orders are not all known in the same way. We know the natural or initial order by the light of reason ; in the supernatural and revealed order we know analogically by the light of faith ; in the final order, glorification or heaven, we know by the light of glory, or what the theologians call the *ens supernaturale* ; but these several orders are one created reality in its relation through the creative act to God as first cause and as final cause ; and these several lights are only different degrees of one and the same divine light consummated in glory, in which the glorified are made partakers of the divine nature, *divinæ consortes naturæ*, 2 Pet., i, 4. The design of all theology is to show this, and it is more especially the design of our author, and it is therefore that the author's design in the work before us must be cordially approved, though it is not

for us to go beyond our competency and to attempt to decide as to the degree of success or failure with which he has executed it.

There is no doubt that some meticulous theologians, while composing their theology from definitions of the church, which are necessarily analytic, because made only on occasion of insurgent errors, and consequently propose the faith only so far as necessary to condemn them, and to put the faithful on their guard against them, have failed to grasp the grand synthesis revealed by faith, and taught in the catechism. Some have maintained that nothing is *de fide* till defined by the church, and hence have concocted a theory of development, and maintained that the volume of faith is increased with each new definition, forgetting that the church, since she is infallible, can define nothing to be *de fide* which has not been of faith from the beginning, always and everywhere. Unbelievers and Protestants, not conceiving Christian faith presents creation as an organic whole, are led to deny it altogether, or to deny such or such parts as they may not happen to like. Heresy is choice, and accepts some articles or dogmas, and rejects others. Unbelievers reject the whole, or accept them only in a false sense. Pierre Leroux, one of the ablest anticatholic philosophers of our times, professes to accept, and perhaps believes he does accept all the articles, dogmas, and mysteries of Catholic faith; but explains them in his *l'Humanité* as symbols of facts and truths of the natural order only. The heterodox accept or profess to accept them or the chief portion of them, but only as isolated, detached, or mutually independent, or unrelated facts, or propositions, without any logical bond of connection, or relation with one another or with the real or ontological order, or as having any necessary bearing on practical life, and without any reason of being in the divine plan of creation as ascertainable by reason or made known by revelation. So far as reason is able to judge, the command to believe them is, on heterodox grounds, arbitrary, capricious, despotic, like the order said to have been issued by the Swiss governor, Gessler, that every one should bow to his hat which he had placed on a staff and set up in the market place. Thus Protestants have no science of faith, and have at best only a blind belief.

Against Pierre Leroux and the humanitarians, the author asserts the reality of the revealed and palingenesiac orders; each as real as the natural order itself, and without which the natural order could not exist, for it would have no meaning, and no reason of existence, no final cause. He asserts the supernatural as the origin, medium, and end of the natural, and the propositions, dogmas, articles, mysteries of faith, as the revelation, not simply of cosmological and humanitarian facts, but of the ontological principles and facts on which the entire real or created order depends for its existence, and for what it is, has, or can do. Against the heterodox, Protestants and all sectarians, he maintains that the Christian mysteries, the articles, dogmas, and propositions of faith, as well as the principles and dictates of reason, are all mutually related, dependent one on another, and in their dialectic union constitute a complete, uniform, and consistent organic whole, in relation to which every part has its logical place, purpose, and reason, so that the denial of any one mystery, article, dogma, or proposition, breaks the logical unity, or golden chain, and logically involves the denial of the whole, which has been so admirably shown by Möhler in his *Symbolik*. In other words, the learned and philosophical professor maintains that Catholic faith represents the real order in its unity and integrity, and proves by it that the real or created order is in the plan of the creator or the divine decree a dialectic whole, not as Pope sings,

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole
Whose body nature is, and God the soul,”

which is pure pantheism; but parts of one *created* whole united to God, not as the body to the soul, but as the creature to the creator, by the creative act of God, distinguishable from God, as the act is from the actor.

God is infinite in his freedom, because infinite in his power, and is free to create or not to create as he wills; and if he wills to create, he is free to create what and as he wills. To the question, “Why has he created the universe as he has, or as it is,” the only answer is, and it is sufficient, “Because he has so willed.” The vessel has no right to say to the potter, “Why hast thou made me thus?” The creator is not responsible to his creatures, nor bound to give them a reason for creating them. But God, though he can do whatever he

wills, cannot annihilate his own being, or contradict his own nature or essence, as the blessed apostle evidently implies when he says, "It is impossible for God to lie." In creating or willing, God must create or will according to his own intrinsic nature or essence. Since, then, God is, in his very essence, supremely logical, and creates all things by the Logos—logic in itself—who is God, all his works, his entire creation, are necessarily supremely logical; logical in all their parts and as a whole. Consequently, there must be always a reason in the created order for whatever exists in it. Every part must have its place and its *raison d'être*, and there can be in the universe no sophisms, no anomalies, no irregularities, no inconsistencies, no contradictions, or irreconcilable dualisms or opposites. So much follows necessarily from the revealed mystery of the Holy Trinity, and so much follows, also, from the character of God the creator, as cognizable by the light of nature.

The principal objections to Christianity, in our day at least, grow out of ignorance of this fact, and arise from the three orders being regarded as three distinct and mutually independent orders, and the mysteries, articles, and dogmas of faith being apprehended as isolated and unrelated facts or statements, independent one of another, without any logical connection between them as heterodoxy necessarily presents them, since heterodoxy is necessarily incomplete, illogical, or sophistical. Heresy never hangs together; its several parts never cohere, and never constitute a complete or organic whole. Take any form of Protestantism you please, and you will find that the articles and dogmas it retains from orthodoxy are for it anomalies, and have no systematic place or significance. It asserts the supernatural, but it has no place, no necessity for it in its conception of creation, or of the divine decree to create; and there is in its system no reason why the natural order alone should not suffice for itself, and be at once initial and teleological, and the more logical among Protestants are constantly struggling against tradition and formal creeds, to eliminate the supernatural and to assert the sufficiency of the natural. In no Protestant system has the assertion of the mystery of the Trinity or the mystery of the Incarnation any necessity, or serves any purpose recognized by the system itself. There is nothing in the divine order as conceived and presented by Protestant theologians, that cannot be explained

without as well as with the assertion of either mystery. The church, with Protestants, performs no office, has no function, no significance, and is either a self-constituted society, a voluntary association, or a state establishment. Even in the belief of Protestants themselves it is no essential medium of salvation or of the Christian life, and the most straight-laced among them hold practically that men can be saved without the church as well as with it,—if only distinguished for intellect or wealth; for we find them every day canonizing such, even before the last obsequies have been paid to their bodies. What better, according to the Protestant presentment of it, is Christianity than Greek and Roman philosophy? or why should sensible men trouble their heads about it, except to get rid of it?

Protestants, also, object to the church her constitution, doctrines, and worship, for the same reason. Having and seeking no logic in their own system, and knowing that Christianity, as they hold it, is made up of disconnected particulars and isolated doctrines, they fail to perceive that Catholicity is an organic whole, in which all the parts cohere and have their reason. They reject the authority and office of the church, but only because they isolate her from the Incarnation, and the mediatorial kingdom of Christ. If they held, with St. Paul, that she is the body of Christ, in which he carries on his work of mediation, and understood that the Holy Ghost dwells in her, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, who leads her into all truth, they would see that they could object neither to her office nor her authority without objecting to the Incarnation and to the "man Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men." Christianity is, as we have said more than once, concreted in the church, and without her would be to us only a naked and powerless idea, with which we could have no communion or relation. So as to the papal constitution, the church could have no unity or catholicity, no individuality, no visible personality, and therefore no visible existence without the pope. The pope, in the visible order, is the person of the church. To deny the visibility of the church is to deny the church herself; for the invisible church, or soul of the church, as some say, is simply Christ the Word incarnated by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the immaculate Virgin without any representation. They themselves have no church, for what they

call their churches are not a living organism, but either state establishments or voluntary associations living no life but what is brought to the establishment or association by its members, or what it derives from the secular order. They are not joined to Christ by a living union, and living his life. They have nothing of Christ but the name. If we, like them, held the church disunited with Christ, and composed of frail and erring mortals, we could attach no more importance to her, than they do to their purely human associations; but taken, as Catholicity teaches, as growing out of the Incarnation, her constitution and office are integral in the Catholic faith and theology, strictly dialectic, and the denial of any part of her teaching from the supremacy and infallibility of the pope down to the virtue of holy water or the blessing of asses, would logically involve the denial of the whole, not only because the denial of any proposition carries with it the denial of the authority on which the whole rests, but also because it would break the internal chain which binds all the parts into one organic whole, as we have already shown. The denial of the papacy denies the church; the denial of the church denies the Incarnation; the denial of the Incarnation denies the teleological order; the denial of the teleological order denies finality, that is, God as final cause; and the denial of God as final cause, denies him as first cause, and effaces alike nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, Christianity and creation, all being and existences.

Protestants object to the *cultus sanctorum* as authorized by the church and practised by Catholics; but for a similar reason, because they do not see its dialectic relation to the Incarnation, to the mediatorial principle, and to the communion of saints, and therefore do not see that, to deny it, would be to deny the whole Christian order, nay, creation itself. The mediatorial principle is universal, and enters into the very being and essence of God himself, in whom is the prototype of all created things. The three Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, indistinguishable from the Divine Being, are distinguished *inter se*, as principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son, or Word, is medium, and the Holy Ghost, the end or consummator. In all acts, *ad extra*, of creation or of providence, the three Persons equally concur, but in diverse relations, the Father as principle, the Son, or Word, as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end or con-

summator. The Logos, or Word, is the medium of creation. Hence, St. John, i, 3, tells us, *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est*: "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing which was made." So again in the palingenesia, or "new creation," founded by the Incarnation, or Word made flesh, the three Persons also concur, but in the same diverse respects; the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as consummator or sanctifier. Hence the Son was incarnated, *Verbum caro factum est*, *ibid.* 14, as "the one mediator of God and men," 1 Tim., ii, 5, not the Father nor the Holy Ghost. The Word, in the creation of the natural order, the cosmos, is the medium or mediator; and the Word Incarnate, "the man Christ Jesus," in the palingenesia, or new creation, redemption and glorification, is the medium, the mediator of God and men. The principle of mediation is therefore universal, and at the foundation of all orders, natural and supernatural.

In the Incarnation, God assumes human nature to be his own nature, without parting with his divine nature. So that the two natures, remaining for ever distinct, without confusion or intermixture, are for ever hypostatically united in the one divine Person of the Word. This one Person, the Word, who was in the beginning with God, and who is God, in whom are the two natures, is the one Christ, the mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus. But the saints are his brethren, and partake of his divine nature as well as of his human nature, and hence are said to be deificated. Gioberti says, in reference to the deification of human nature through the Incarnation, man is an incipient God, or a God who begins; and insinuates that the devil told the truth when he said to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods," though not in the way or in the sense in which they understood him. But this I am not prepared to accept. Men, to be gods in any intelligible sense, must be so in their own human personality; which they are not, and never can be. Human nature, by the hypostatic union, is deificated, as says Pope St. Leo Magnus, but in the divine personality of the Word, not in a human personality; and the blest in heaven, however closely united to God, retain for ever their human personality, which never becomes absorbed in the divine personality, as in the case of the human nature assumed by the Word.

Yet the saints are like unto Christ, as says the beloved apostle: "Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." 1 John, iii, 2. That is, the blest bear a higher likeness to God than that image and likeness to which Adam was created, or than that which is given us in the new birth even. They partake of the divine nature as well as of the human nature of their Lord, as St. Peter says: "He has given us very great and precious promises, that you may be partakers of the divine nature,—*divinæ consortes naturæ*." 2 Pet., i, 4. If we are led by the spirit of God, we are the sons and heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ even before we are glorified with him, Rom., viii, 14–17: but the saints are glorified and partake of the divine nature, which is only promised in this life and held by faith; they have become like him in that higher likeness of which St. John speaks. They have entered into the glory of their Lord, are sharers with him in the glory of his mediatorial kingdom. They have entered into their joint-inheritance, and must be regarded as co-workers with him. They are, in some sense, Christs, therefore mediators by participation of both his human and divine natures, though, of course, not of his divine personality.

Being thus exalted, deificated in their nature through its assumption by the Word, and participating of the divine nature, the *cultus sanctorum* is strictly dialectic, and is only their due, and, in fact, is below their real worth. It detracts nothing from the worship due to God or to the man Christ Jesus, because it is through the mediation of the Word made flesh that the saint acquires his worth, and becomes a co-worker with him in his mediatorial kingdom, or a mediator in a participated sense; and worth, acquired by grace or the gift of God, is as much the saint's own as if inherited from nature, or obtained by the sole exercise of his natural powers, and is equally entitled to be recognized and honored or worshipped. I did not understand this when in a former series of the Review I treated the question, and represented the *cultus sanctorum* as the worship of God in his works, and in his noblest works, the beatified saints. Such worship is proper, but it is the worship of God, honors God, but honors not the saint any more than it does any other creature of

God. But, as here presented, we not only honor God in his saints, but we honor the saints themselves for what they are, for the virtues they possess through the gifts of grace. God, in rewarding the saints, rewards his own gifts; and so he would, were he to reward us for our natural virtues, since we are by nature his creatures, and have only what he gives us.

The worship of the Blessed Virgin as St. Mary rests on the same principle; and the higher worship we render her as Mother of God, called *hyperdulia*, rests on her relation to the Incarnation, her share therein, and the rank or position she necessarily holds in consequence. As St. Mary, she is surpassed or equalled by no saint in the calendar. Through the merits of Jesus Christ she was preserved in the first instant of her conception from all taint of original sin, and was never for one moment under the power of satan; she was conceived and born without sin; she was full of grace, never in her whole life committed the slightest venial fault; she was all holy as all beautiful, and the model of every Christian grace and virtue. As mother of Christ, and therefore mother of God, she is blessed among women, above all women, and holds a rank which no other woman, nay, no other creature does or can hold. As Mother of God, she necessarily holds the highest rank that any creature, not hypostatically united to the divine Word, can hold, next below the eternal God himself, above all angels, archangels, cherubim, seraphim, thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, all created orders, and is rightly crowned Queen of heaven. The error of Nestorius, in refusing to recognize her as Θεοτόκος, *Dei Genitrix*, or mother of God, was in denying the hypostatic union, or dissolving Jesus, which made him Antichrist, 1 John, iv, 2, 3; and in maintaining, as do most Protestants, that only the humanity was born of Mary, not the humanity hypostatically, indissolubly, and for ever united to the divine Person, or Word, who is God. The human nature of Christ has no human personality; its personality is the Word, or Son of God; and as the human nature taken from the Virgin must have been conceived and born a person, Mary is as truly the mother of the Person born of her, as any mother is of her son, and therefore strictly and truly the Mother of God.

Now, as Mary's relation to the incarnate Word is indis-

soluble and must ever remain, and as that relation places her in a position above all created orders next to the uncreated Trinity, simple logic suffices to show that the highest worship below the supreme worship, called the worship of *latria*, due to God alone, is her due, and cannot be withheld without injustice. The worship is strictly logical and cannot be denied, unless we deny the Incarnation and the catholic principle of mediation, the whole Christian order, indeed, the whole divine plan of creation as made known to us by reason and revelation. The charge of superstition against the *cultus sanctorum*, if we accept the apostolic doctrine of the communion of saints, the relation we have shown the saints bear to the Incarnate Word, and the position they hold as joint-heirs and coöperators with Christ in his mediatorial kingdom, is simply absurd. Spiritism, which evokes or consults the spirits supposed to hover over or around the graves of the dead, is superstition in the original sense and application of the term; but our invocation of saints has no affinity whatever with spiritism; for we do not evoke them, do not call upon them to appear, or to communicate to us the secrets of the past, the present, or the future. We give the saints no honor not their due, and ask of them only to aid and enlighten us by their prayers to God and intercession with him for us; and, therefore, nothing injurious to the sovereign majesty of God, or beyond their power.

The pretence that the worship we render to the Mother of God is idolatry, and the grave nonsense babbled about Mariolatry, must be ascribed to the lamentable fact that Protestants have no distinctively divine worship, and are able to offer no worship due to God alone; and therefore, because they see us offering to Mary as high a worship as they are able to offer to God himself, they conclude that we offer her supreme worship, and, of course, are idolaters. The distinctive act of supreme worship to God is sacrifice, and Protestants have no sacrifice, no altar, no priest, no victim. They hold, indeed, that Christ once in the end of the world offered himself as a sacrifice for all; but they deny that he gives himself to men to be offered by them as an acceptable and all-sufficient sacrifice to God, and adequate to the debt we owe him. Christ not only offered himself once to God for the whole world, but he gives in the church himself to us to be offered up by us upon our altars in the sacrifice of the Mass,

a clean and acceptable offering, as *our* offering through the priest, as our act of supreme worship to the ever-blessed Trinity. No creature, not all we have that is most precious, or that we hold most dear, not even our life can be a real sacrifice, or an adequate worship of God; for all creatures, the earth and the fulness thereof are his already. Only God is an adequate offering to God; and this offering we can make, because God gives himself to us, and him we offer by the hands of the priest in the Eucharistic sacrifice, as *our* act of supreme worship. This worship we offer to God alone, never to a creature, not even to his ever-blessed and holy Mother.

Protestants, rejecting the Eucharistic sacrifice offered daily on our altars, have no distinctive religious worship, nothing to offer to God, which they may not and do not offer to creatures. Their worship consists simply of prayer and praise; but they pray to the king, the magistrate, the court, or the legislature; and they sing the praises of a distinguished beauty, an effective orator, an eminent statesman, a great poet, or the conquering hero. They may say with the Psalmist, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humble heart, O God, thou wilt not despise," Ps. l, 18; but the Psalmist does not mean to assert that no other sacrifice is required; he would simply teach us that no sacrifice, without an afflicted spirit and a contrite and humble heart, can be acceptable from the worshipper; for he concludes by saying: "Then shalt thou accept the sacrifice of justice," [the sacrifices prescribed by the law,] "oblations and whole burnt-offerings; then shall they lay calves upon thy altar:" *ibid.*, 21. Now, having themselves no real objective worship or sacrifice to offer to God, expiatory, propitiatory, imprecatory, or in thanksgiving, and having nothing more in their external service than they see us offering to the Blessed Virgin, they very illogically and falsely conclude that we offer her the supreme worship due to God alone, and cry out most lustily "Mariolatry!" and hold it the duty of the magistrate to extirpate us as idolaters. But they forget that, as St. Paul says, Heb., xiii, 10, "we have an altar whereof they who serve the tabernacle have no power to eat." We have, in the sacrifice of the Mass, a true and adequate worship of God which they reject, and which we offer to God alone, never to a saint, not even to Blessed Mary, nor to any other creature. It is not that we offer undue honor to

Mary and the saints, but that they offer no due honor to God ; for the highest honor, short of the unbloody sacrifice, in our power to pay them, is far, far below their exalted worth, and below that which the eternal God himself bestows on them, which is greater than the human heart can conceive.

The invocation of saints, the frequent prayers we address to them, especially to Mary, holy Mother of God, are authorized by the mediatorial principle, and by the relation of Mary and the saints to the Incarnation. They are co-workers with Christ, and, being joined by a vital, we might say, an organic, union with him, participate in his mediatorial work. We ask of them neither grace nor pardon ; we ask only the help of their prayers to their God and ours ; therefore, as we have said, nothing beyond their power. They and we form one communion ; only we are on the way, while they have already arrived at home, are *in patria*, and no longer pilgrims and sojourners in a foreign land. They are living, more living than we are, for they have entered into the fulness of life, life eternal. They can hear our prayers ; and, being filled with love, and in living communion with us in this land of sorrows and vale of tears, they cannot be indisposed to listen to our prayers, and to join their own to ours. The objections of Protestants betray their ignorance of the principle on which the Christian order is founded, and betray a doubt of the efficacy of prayer, and also a doubt that the saints in glory retain their personality and are really living men, with all their human individuality and human faculties. In fact, to our non-Catholic world, there is a dark cloud hanging over the life beyond the grave, and even the blest seem to them pale and shadowy, unsubstantial, like shades of Hades in the belief of the Gentiles ; and, like the Gentiles, they sit in the region and shadow of death, filled with doubt and uncertainty, anxiety and despair. Death is to them the gate that opens not to life and immortality, but to the dread Unknown, perhaps, to the Inane ; and they banish from their minds, as far as possible, the thought, by engrossing themselves in the pursuit of gain or in dissipation.

The same general principle shows that the respect we pay to pictures, images, and relics of holy persons, is dialectic, authorized by the Christian system, and is perfectly consistent with every other part of Christian faith or practice. We do not make them our gods, or worship them as such ; nor do

we suppose that they are inhabited by a Numen, or a good or bad demon, as the heathen did. Pictures and images are to us symbols, and symbolical of real persons or real worth. To object to them, is to object to symbols or emblems as such; to object to them for this reason, is to object to visible nature which throughout is symbolic, as Father Weninger so admirably shows in his recent work, "Photographic Views,"—to all parables, allegories, figures of speech, nay, to speech itself, which is symbolic of thought, not the thought itself. What, again, are letters but symbols of sounds? If Protestants, who see idolatry in the Catholic use of pictures and images, were consistent with themselves, they would be obliged, for fear of idolatry, not only to prohibit all the representative arts, but to forbid the opening of one's eyes to the beauties of nature or to any thing visible, the opening of one's mouth to speak, or one's ears to hear a single sound. A principle that involves so absurd, so impossible a consequence, is necessarily false. Relics of holy persons are symbolic, and serve as a medium to bring us into relation with the saint whose relics they are. They bring to mind his worth, which we should honor and strive to imitate.

These examples, which are very familiar, show that Catholicity is strictly logical, constituting an organic whole, and that the denial of any thing in it involves, logically, the denial of all the rest. They serve to show also, in showing this, that Catholicity is true, or the real order which God by his creative act has founded; for no system can be universally logical, and yet be false, since logic is a real, not a merely formal science. Hence Catholicity carries the evidence of its truth in itself, and has not to go out of itself to find proof that it is true. No human reason could have invented or constructed a theory so comprehensive, so perfect in all its parts, or so complete as a whole. Protestants regard themselves as the more enlightened portion of mankind, and we readily concede that, naturally, they are not inferior to Catholics. In natural reason they are our equals; and yet, with three hundred years and over of incessant labor, aided by all the advantages of wealth, learning, power, and ample opportunity to do their best, they have not been able, the Bible in hand, to invent or construct any scheme of Christianity or of the universe that will hang together, in which all the parts cohere, in which there are no inconsistencies,

anomalies, irregularities, nor contradictions,—a plain evidence that the human mind is not adequate to the invention or construction of Catholicity, as set forth, say, in the catechism the church teaches even her little children.

The examples we have adduced show, especially in these times of the dislocation of men's minds, the value of the synthetic method of setting forth Catholic faith, and presenting the several mysteries, articles, and dogmas in their intrinsic relation to one another, and fixing the attention on the great principles on which rest all the orders or moments of creation, generation, regeneration, and glorification. The heterodoxy and infidelity of the age, aside from their moral causes, seem to us to grow out of the fact, that people are taught the mysteries, articles, and dogmas, without being duly shown the principles which underlie them, which are really catholic, and are the principles alike of the three stages of creation, or the entire created order. Not seeing this, or that there is in Catholicity a reason for every thing in it, the heterodox do not see why they may not choose among the doctrines the church teaches; why they may not choose this doctrine and reject that; why they may not hold the unity of God and reject the Trinity, the Humanity of our Lord, without accepting his Divinity; why they may not accept the moral precepts of the Gospel, without the mysteries and dogmas between which they see no logical or necessary relation. The present tendency of most Protestants is, to separate the rational order from the revealed, and to fall back on the natural without the supernatural. The common answer in regard to the supernatural order, that all the mysteries, articles, and dogmas rest on the same authority, and that authority, if sufficient for one, is sufficient for all, is a just and logically conclusive answer; but it seems to us desirable that people, as far as practicable, should be enabled to see that not only are all taught by the same divine authority, but that all are virtually connected one with another, and with the whole; that no one or a part can be detached and denied without logically denying all: as we see exemplified in the more advanced Protestants. The moral precepts of the Gospel, and what is called the Christian life detached from faith, or the doctrines and mysteries of revelation, lose their Christian character, are reduced to the natural order, stand on the level of heathen morality, and are meritorious for this life only, not for the world to come.

No doubt, to instruct the mass of the people sufficiently to understand this, is difficult, impracticable even; the people must always be treated to a great extent as children, who are required to believe and obey because their father commands, being unable to see and understand the reason of what is commanded. We can never educate the people to be such thorough theologians that they will not need teachers, as well as priests to offer sacrifice and administer the sacraments. Perhaps the difficulty could in part be removed by giving a more extended course of theology in our seminaries for training candidates for the priesthood. We do not wish or mean to go beyond the province of a layman, and encroach on that of the bishops or pastors of the church, who know, far better than we do, what is needed to protect their flocks and to advance the interests of which they are the divinely appointed guardians; but, in the present state of the church in most countries, despoiled of her revenues, or, as with us, without revenues, and living on the alms of the faithful, there are some things which they cannot effect without the coöperation of the laity. Our theological seminaries receive but a meagre support; and such is the great want of priests to attend to the first spiritual necessities of the faithful, that our bishops have not the means to render the theological course longer and more thorough, and they feel that the spiritual wants of their respective dioceses are so great and so urgent, that they cannot afford to leave their young levites in the seminary any longer than is absolutely necessary. When once ordained and placed on the mission, what with church-building, establishing schools and erecting school-houses, looking after the poor, hearing confessions, attending sick calls, etc., the priest has little opportunity for study, and if he keeps up, in a missionary country like ours, what he acquired in the seminary, he does well; and it is a marvel to us how so many laborious, hard-working missionary priests, who can have hardly a moment unoccupied, not only keep up their seminary learning, but actually add to it, and keep themselves *au courant* of the literature, science, philosophy, and speculations of the age.

Yet the people, whatever nonsense to the contrary is babbled, need leaders, and are nothing without them; and they must be led to understand that their proper leaders in all that relates to the kingdom of God on earth or in heaven are

the clergy, and that their education and training is a prime social necessity. "Educate the leaders," said the wise Jesuit Father Larkin,—God rest his soul! one of the dearest and best friends we ever had, and who for years was our spiritual director,—“Educate the leaders, the officers, the generals, colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants, and they will properly instruct and discipline the rank and file.”—All that is good comes from above, and descends from high to low. God descends to man when he would redeem him and raise him to himself. The people must pray to our Lord to multiply vocations to the priesthood, and give liberally, of their substance, to their venerable and venerated bishops, the temporal means to afford the aspirants to the priesthood ample time and leisure for the best possible preparation. This much we may urge on our brethren of the laity, without transcending our province. Though, after all, when we read the life of the venerable Curé d’Ars, that modern miracle of divine grace, we learn that the most effective instruments for the conversion of this proud and conceited age are those missionaries who are the humblest, the most disinterested, the most self-forgetting, and who never dream of attributing any of the glory of their success to themselves, to their own learning, ability, or virtue. St. Paul’s words teach us the same lesson: “For see your vocation, brethren, that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and the things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are, that no flesh might glory in his sight.” 1 Cor., i, 26–29.

Yet St. Paul himself was a learned man, master of the sacred learning of the Hebrews, and of the profane literature, science, and philosophy of the Greeks; and yet none of the apostles labored more assiduously or successfully than he. St. Augustine, the great Doctor of the Western Church, was versed in all the learning and science of his time both sacred and profane; as were St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, St. Gregory the Great, and St. Thomas, the Angel of the schools: and yet who have rendered greater services to the church? God can dispense with

human ability and learning, or, rather, supply their defect, as intimated by the apostle when he says, 1 Cor., i, 30: "You are in Christ Jesus who is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." Learning, science, even the science of sacred things, without humility, is worth nothing, or without that charity which makes the soul lose, as it were, itself in God. But humility is not always the accompaniment of ignorance or mental weakness, nor pride always the companion of learning and science. There is a science that puffs one up with vanity, and a philosophy that is vain; but real learning and ability are always modest, and the natural effect of the science of divine things is to make one humble. The greatest and the most learned in spiritual things or in the science of theology, are the least disposed to glory except in the Lord. St. Paul and with him the great Doctors we have named, were not less humble, not less self-forgetting, not less disinterested, nor less ardent in their charity, than the humble curé of Ars. The seminarian course is intended to combine spiritual discipline with scientific culture, and, as far as training can do it, to make the candidates for the priesthood humble-minded Christians, holy and disinterested priests, as well as able and learned theologians. There can, then, be no danger in lengthening and enlarging the seminarian course. But, perhaps, we are already transcending our province, and forgetting that a reviewer is not a pastor of the church.

ART. II.—*Photographic Views; or, Religious and Moral Truths, reflected in the Universe.* By F. X. WENINGER, D. D., of the Society of Jesus. New York: O'Shea, 1873. 8vo. pp. 372.

FR. WENINGER is one of the most truly apostolical men we have ever personally known, and one of the most laborious and indefatigable missionaries in the country. He appears to be constantly giving missions, now to his own countrymen, the Germans settled among us, now to English congregations, and now to French and Italian colonists; now in the East, now in the West, now in Texas, and now in California, and

everywhere with marked success. He would almost seem to have the gift of tongues and of ubiquity; no distance frightens him, no labor fatigues him, and no obstacles deter him. He is a most remarkable man; an Austrian by birth, of a good family, thoroughly educated, a profound theologian, full of spiritual life, simple as a child, and brave as a hero. His life is devoted and has been, we know not for how many years, to the American Missions, more especially among our German-speaking Catholics.

Yet, with all his labors and travels as a missionary, which would seem not to give him one moment for rest, he contrives to find time to be an author, and to write and publish volume after volume admirably adapted to the wants of all classes of our countrymen, whom he learns thoroughly in his travels, in his missions to them, and intercourse with them. He is, in fact, one of our most prolific Catholic authors, as well as the most laborious and successful of our missionaries. The work before us is his latest publication, and, in some respects, his best. It is a book not easy to classify or to describe. It is original, peculiar, we may say, *sui generis*; yet the principle which it endeavors to illustrate is no new discovery. The book is not one to be read and dismissed, but to be meditated; and, perhaps, should be classed under the head of spiritual reading, only it is wholly unlike any other ascetic book within our knowledge; and we place it in this class of writings with some misgivings, and because we know not where else to place it.

The principle on which Fr. Weninger has composed his work is profoundly philosophical; namely, that nature is symbolic, or has a meaning beyond its visible appearance, or what may be called its literal sense. Great truths above its literal sense, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, are symbolized by it, and reflected in the universe as in a mirror. The symbolic character of the universe is no discovery or invention of the author. St. Thomas implies it when he says, "*Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*;" and the Holy Scriptures are full of passages which assert and illustrate it, as for instance the 18th Psalm: "The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands. Day to day uttereth speech, and night to night showeth knowledge. There are no speeches nor languages where their voices are not heard. Their sound hath gone forth into all the earth, and their words

unto the ends of the world. He hath set a tabernacle in the sun: and he as a bridegroom coming forth from the bride-chamber, hath rejoiced as a giant to run his race. His going out is from the end of heaven, and his circuit even to the end thereof, and there is no one who can hide himself from his heat. The law of the Lord is immaculate, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, giving wisdom to the little ones. The precepts of the Lord are right, giving joy to the heart; the commandment of the Lord is light-some, enlightening the eyes;" and so on, where the natural throughout is made to symbolize the moral and spiritual, the visible the invisible.

Plato founds his philosophy on the assumption, that the sensible symbolizes or, as he says, copies the intelligible or ideal. The sensible and the particular constitute what he calls the *mimesis*, and the mimetic mimics, copies, or represents the ideal: which is neither particular nor sensible, but universal and noetic. The mimetic copies the idea in the divine mind; and it is by the sensible image impressed on preëxisting matter, as the seal on wax, which is the fac-simile of the idea, that we know ideas, as it is through ideas or the ideal that we arrive at the knowledge of God. So far Plato may be followed, except as to the preëxistence of matter. Plato holds very properly that the soul does not soar to God on the one wing of intelligence, but on the two wings of intelligence and love. The ideal in love, like the ideal in the order of intelligence, is symbolized by the sensible. But the love Plato recognizes, and which has had such a fatal influence on the Platonists, is not, indeed, the love of the senses; it is the love of the Beautiful, *το καλον*, which he very improperly treats as an absolute or necessary idea, and therefore being and identical with the true and the good, *verum et bonum*. Yet his ideal beauty is symbolized by the sensible order, and its most expressive symbol is woman; and the ideal love, the love of ideal beauty, begins in the senses from which it is gradually purified and rises to sentiment, thence to idea, and thence to the First Fair, or the absolute, where all trace of the senses, of sentiment, of the personal, is lost, and it expands into the impersonal and the universal, the beautiful in itself. The Platonists of the middle ages, Paterini for the most part, make the love begin in the senses, and find it symbolized in woman. The knight, also the poet, had his

"ladie love," Beatrice or Laura; but it was not the woman he loved, but the ideal beauty which she symbolized. This has been well set forth by Richard Simpson, Esq., in a very striking essay on the Sonnets of Shakspeare, which he was obliging enough to send us, but which is not now in our possession. The Paterini, who were a secret society, often conformed outwardly to the church, and sought to conceal their heresy, or to express it in the language of Christian faith and theology. They sought to substitute the Platonic love, sufficiently set forth in Plato's *Symposium*, the most characteristic of his dialogues and, practically, the most corrupting, for the divine charity of the Gospel. It is the love sung by the Troubadours, Trouvères, Minnesingers, nearly all of whom were Paterini; and some have ranked Dante and Petrarca in their number, making Beatrice and Laura merely symbols of the Beautiful they worshipped. But this, though we have Dante's own authority in his case for pronouncing the *Divina Commedia* an allegory, is not generally conceded, and can hardly be true of Petrarca, for he was a Guelf, not a Ghibelline, as were the Paterini. Fredrick II, so hostile to the papacy, and the first troubadour who sang in Italian, was unquestionably a Paterini, and patronized the secret society as an instrument of his hatred of the pope, as Kaiser William, through his chancellor, Prince von Bismarck, does now the Internationale, through which and kindred associations he hopes to be able to put an end to the church, and emancipate the civil order from the divine.

Plato has sometimes been called Plato the Divine, and some of the Fathers held him in high esteem, though none of them followed him throughout. Most of them in philosophy were eclectics, and borrowed alike from the school of the Platonists, and that of the Aristotelians, or Peripatetics. The Scholastics preferred the latter, and Plato survived principally in the schools outside the orthodox lines; and, with some modifications, Platonism was the philosophy of nearly all the sects that warred against the church down to the Protestant apostasy. It struggled for the mastery in the fifteenth century, and succeeded in dethroning peripateticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the greater part of Europe. Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson, no bad representative of the heterodox thought of the age, regards Plato as the philosopher of mankind, and pretends that all who philosophize at all

speaking his language and reproducing his ideas. Gioberti has attempted to catholicize him, and to bring him almost bodily into the church. For ourselves, the older we grow, the less do we esteem Plato and Platonism. We recognize the poetic grace and charm of his style, the lofty sweep of his imagination, and the vigor of his dialectics, but we can find in him no well defined system of philosophy either intellectual or moral, no uniform or self-consistent doctrine.

Plato is said to have taught the immortality of the soul, generally held by all the Gentiles, though none of their philosophers, as far as we have discovered, ever taught the resurrection of the body. Plato's arguments for a future life are exceedingly weak and inconclusive, resting, as they do for the most part, on the doctrine of reminiscence. But our difficulty is to find out what Plato did or could mean by the soul. The late Père Gratry of the New Oratory, in his *Connais-sance de Dieu*, holds that Plato taught not only the unity of God, but one God as creator of all things; yet Gioberti concedes that he had no conception of the divine creative act; and we, after considerable study of his works, have been unable to find in them any other conception of creation than that of the impression by the Divinity of the ideas of his own mind on preëxisting matter, as the seal upon wax. The individual, whether man or horse, tree or plant, is composed of the idea and the matter on which it is impressed. By idea, which is the only reality in the case, for the mimetic is purely phenomenal, Plato sometimes understands the idea in the divine mind, the *idea exemplaris* of St. Thomas, and sometimes the image, or fac-simile, impressed on the preëxisting matter. Now, in one of these two senses, Plato must understand the human soul. If in the first sense, he identifies it with God, for idea in God, or *in mente divina*, St. Thomas tells us, *nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei*; if in the second sense, he identifies it with the image, and, therefore, with matter, and denies it all substantial existence; and then its liberation from matter, on which he lays so much stress, would be its destruction, not its purification and immortality. The recognition of the soul as an individual existence is then clearly an inconsequence, and its immortality is the immortality of the Divine Being, or of the idea identical with the divine essence, not of the soul as a distinct personal existence.

We accept Plato's doctrine, that the soul, if soul on his

theory there be, has two wings, intelligence and love, on which it soars to the Empyrean, and becomes united to the "First Good and the First Fair;" but we do not identify the love he asserts, the love of the beautiful, and which expresses itself in art, any more than we do the worship of art, with the divine charity of the Gospel, with religion, or the worship of God, as do our American Transcendentalists, and not a few of our German writers on æsthetics. "The beautiful" is not, as Cousin teaches, and as we ourselves formerly held, one of our absolute ideas. The beautiful is not identical with the *verum* or the *bonum*, the True or the Good: there is no beauty in itself. Even Plato defines it as the splendor of God, not as God himself. There is no Beautiful except to an existence endowed with imagination and sensibility, and, therefore, the beautiful is relative. The Platonists make it ontological, and absorb in it the true and the good; and Plato himself, in the *Gorgias*, endeavors to show that injustice, falsehood, bad actions of any sort are ugly, not beautiful: whence it follows that whatever is beautiful is true and good. The Platonists in the middle ages, who were almost all heretics, tried to make the love of the beautiful, symbolized by beautiful woman, pass for the charity enjoined by the Gospel, and which is the bond of perfectness and the fulfilment of the law of God. Hence the source of the heresy of the *Evangile externe*, and the absurdities babbled about the Joannine Gospel in the thirteenth century, and which are widely babbled even now outside of the church. On this same doctrine of love, the love of the beautiful, were based the immoral doctrines of the Paulicians, the Albigenses, the Waldenses, and the Paterini or Cathari, and kindred sects. It was the source of the fabled institution of chivalry, so unmercifully ridiculed by Cervantes in his inimitable Don Quixote, and which some modern writers suppose had a real historical existence, and which they even adduce as proof of the mild and civilizing influence of the Catholic Church, just as they adduce the fabliaux, lays, and roundels of the Provençal and kindred poets, as the rich literature inspired by Catholicity. There were Christian knights, horsemen, with noble and generous sentiments, gentle and courteous manners, in the middle ages, and the church certainly labored to give to knighthood, really of pagan origin, a Christian character; but knight-errantry and the so-called institution of chivalry

were only the creation of the romancers and poets. There never was any such institution of chivalry as is described to us by Saint-Pelagie and other romancers.

The principle, that nature is symbolic, is accepted and made the basis of his philosophy by Plato, but is imperfectly understood, and is misinterpreted and misapplied by the Platonists, as we have seen. The poets also proceed, or did formerly, on the same principle; and all great poets discern the truth, beauty, and goodness which visible nature symbolizes. We say all *great* poets, of whom, however, we have in our days no longer, especially in English, only a fading reminiscence. The present race of poets no longer see in the visible universe any thing but the universe itself. They stop with the symbol, which for them is no symbol at all, but the thing itself. They worship the idol, not the *numen* it represents. For them a spade is a spade, the primrose on the river's brink is a primrose, and images no great moral or religious truth; at most, mere sensible beauty. A writer in the *Catholic World* some time since, an Englishman of course, gave us an essay on the *Catholic Tendencies* of Tennyson, in whose poems we discover only nature-worship. Tennyson is a poet of the nineteenth century, of the earth earthy. Nature teaches him nothing beyond itself, and he is less inspiring, less elevating, we may say, less religious, than the old Epicurean poet Lucretius. He has a musical ear, and is able to elaborate a flowing and melodious verse; but his thought, what little there is of it, is commonplace, narrow, and superficial. He is no seer, no maker, no *vates*; and, if he observes nature, he knows not how to read her secret. His Arthurian poems have some Catholic imagery, for the originals, which he modernizes and modifies in his own way, were written in Catholic times; but his vision extends not beyond nature.

Longfellow is another contemporary poet supposed to have some Catholic tendencies, probably because he treats Catholic subjects, introduces Catholic characters, and does not openly abuse Catholics; but he sees in nature nothing deeper, higher, or more universal than humanity. He takes up the *Golden Legend* of the middle ages, eliminates the supernatural, and reduces the sacrifice the young damsel makes of herself to a sacrifice for the sake of humanity, prompted by the maudlin sentiment of philanthropy, not for

the sake of God, prompted by divine charity. These and all the popular poets of the day deal in description for its own sake, the lowest of all the possible forms of poetry ; and show thereby that for them nature has ceased to be mimetic, and symbolizes nothing to their reason or their imagination. A similar sentence may be pronounced on nearly all modern popular literature. Art has ceased to be creative or imaginative ; it has become mechanical, and copies models by square and compass.

Fr. Weninger takes the principle in a profounder sense than does even Plato. He does not make simply the sensible symbolical of the intelligible or ideal ; but he makes all nature, visible and invisible, symbolic of the supernatural, and finds the highest moral and religious truths reflected in the universe. Plato makes the sensible and the individual mimetic, or symbolic, of the ideal or, in his own language, the methexic, which is simply a natural participation of the Divinity, and is only the plastic soul of the Platonic philosophy, which we are surprised to find Gioberti in his posthumous essay on the *Mimesis* and *Methexis*. accepting, and thus maintaining that men are third, not second, causes. This comes very near implying that, if God creates the Demiourgos of the Gnostics, the Demiourgos is the creator, as the same Gnostics held, of the world, or cosmos. In fact, whoever undertakes to follow Plato is sure to be bewildered and led into all manner of absurdity ; for Plato was at bottom a pantheist, as Gioberti concedes, though, he contends, a mitigated pantheist ; and pantheism is essentially sophistical. We do not know that we are justified in holding the Italian abbate responsible for his unfinished posthumous works, collected and published by his Italian friends whose orthodoxy is questionable ; but we know there is enough in them to justify the severest censures passed by the Jesuit fathers on his writings.

Fr. Weninger finds reflected in the universe not only truths of the natural order, but of the supernatural order itself. He of course could not so find them, if he were not instructed by supernatural revelation ; but, so instructed, he is able to catch their reflection in the mirror of the universe. Yet this proves a great truth, that the natural is symbolical of the supernatural, and therefore that the natural is created *ad supernaturalem*, and, without the supernatural founded by

the Incarnation, it would lack significance, would be a symbol of nothing; for the truth could neither be reflected in the universe, nor revelation aid us to catch it, if it did not exist, or if the natural and supernatural were two separate and unrelated orders. This confirms the doctrine set forth in the foregoing article, and proves that those scientists that deny or ignore the supernatural, and confine themselves to the study of the natural alone, can no more know the natural than he who studies words without reference to what they symbolize or express, can know things.

Certainly Fr. Weninger has assumed and attempted to illustrate, in his admirably written and very elegantly printed book, not only a true but a profound and far-reaching principle, especially in his interpretation and application of it. The great reason why so many reject the supernatural is, because they regard the two orders as separate and unrelated orders, and it seems to them that an all-wise and all-powerful God would make his work all of one piece from beginning to end; and the Genoese professor, brought to the notice of our readers in the article on *Synthetic Theology*, undertakes, with rare learning and science, to prove that he has actually done so. We cannot unite the natural with the supernatural in our science without the light of revelation, nor could we at all if the two orders were not really and ontologically connected through the Incarnation as parts of one whole. In such sense the natural has its significance in the supernatural, generation in regeneration, and regeneration in glorification. The first in the real order implies the second, and the second the third, so that there is no break in the creation, but all three are integral in the one divine creative act; for glorification is only the fulfilment of what is initial, or inchoate, in genesis. This may not be formally brought out and stated in the book before us, but it is all implied in the principle on which it is written. No one of the three parts is complete in itself, or can stand without the other two. The reason for rejecting the supernatural does not therefore exist.

The great truth we have attempted to develop is set forth and proved by Fr. Weninger in his Introduction, which no reader of the book should neglect to read and ponder well, for it furnishes the key to all that follows. The book itself consists of brief and apparently disconnected reflections,

separated from one another in the printing by a star, as if each stood alone on its own basis, and had no bearing on any thing beyond itself. A photographic view of some fact or aspect of nature is given, and then follows the religious or moral truth it symbolizes, or that is to be drawn from it; yet these apparently independent and isolated views and reflections are so arranged that he who reads and meditates them one by one as they are set down, will find that he has been led step by step to the sublimest heights of Christian faith and evangelical perfection. He will find that he has mastered, so far as it is given us in this life to do it, the whole Christian faith and morality in its unity and integrity, as one consistent, uniform, and indissoluble whole. He who meditates these apparently detached views or aphorisms, is led step by step from the external aspects of nature, by its analogies, to the science of faith and sanctity, and from that to a foretaste of the science of glorification, or beatitude in the union of the soul without loss of its personality with God; or, in other words, he will find the whole divine plan of creation unrolled before him, so far as it can be known to us in this life by reason and revelation, from the beginning to the end captivating the understanding with truth, and inflaming the heart with divine charity.

We repeat, the book is to be meditated, not simply read. It is a book to have always at hand, to be opened in whatever mood one may be at the time. Some photographic view will be lighted upon which will afford food for meditation for the whole day, to one's great intellectual and spiritual advantage. One cannot open the book and read a single "photographic view," without feeling himself lifted, as a dear friend says, "into a heavenly atmosphere." We certainly discover a new significance in nature, a higher meaning in life, and breathe a higher, purer, serener, and more invigorating atmosphere. The soul is elevated and strengthened, and the sense of duty is deepened and made more abiding. It is therefore an admirable book of meditations, adapted to every capacity and to every mind, and its simple paragraphs are more suggestive and fruitful to most minds, especially to those who live in the world, than the set meditations, constructed according to formal rules, which are so abundantly supplied us by our ascetic writers, and which we men of the world find it so difficult to follow without pain-

ful distractions; and which, after all, most of us read rather than meditate. Take one of Fr. Weninger's photographic views for an example. We open the book at random :—

“If a small portion of the wick falls upon the candle and takes fire, it may gradually waste the candle; so the slightest particle of self-love, detached from the wick of pure intention, can mar or destroy the merit of our best actions.” p. 51.

Or another, immediately following :—

“When, on entering a room, we find a person carelessly seated at a table, upon which a neglected light is dimly burning, we conclude that he has fallen asleep. That sleeper is a fair emblem of those Christians who fail to purify their good intentions by repeated acts of the love of God, and, heedless about the sanctification of their souls, indulge in the slumber of tepidity.” *Ibid.*

Either of these extracts conveys a lesson, even a graceful and gentle rebuke, prompts a desire for amendment, elevates the thoughts to God from whom all pure desires and good intentions come, and the flames of a burning love for whom consumes our sins and all our impurities, and makes us say to him in our hearts: “Whom have I in heaven but thee? and what but thee can I desire on earth?” It also furnishes us a text for self-examination and matter for our meditation all the day, while engaged in our ordinary avocations. We have cited these two views without selection, simply as specimens of the author's understanding of nature as symbolic, and how it mirrors great moral and religious truths to the understanding. In general, the author is very successful in his interpretation of the symbols and analogies of nature, for he is alike a thoughtful student and a man of prayer and meditation at the foot of the crucifix. We greet his book, and most sincerely thank him for it. It will be a great help to many souls.

ART. III.—*Catholic Popular Literature.*

1. *All-Hallow-Eve ; or, The Test of Futurity, and other stories.* New York : Catholic Publication Society. 1872. 8vo. pp. 279.
2. *Geraldine : A Tale of Conscience.* By E. C. A. New Edition, complete in one volume. New York : P. O'Shea. 1872. 12mo. pp. 687.

"ALL-HALLOW-EVE" is a well written story, intensely interesting, founded on an Irish superstition. Its chief fault is, that, instead of combating the superstition, it appears to be written to confirm it, and to show that the devil has the gift of prophecy. The Irish, perhaps others too, not Irish, have a custom come down from heathen times in its main features, more honored in the breach than in the observance, of trying on All-Hallow-Eve various experiments to discover the secrets of the future, especially those which are peculiarly interesting to lads and lasses. The greater part, no doubt, regard it as a harmless sport, see nothing serious in the attempts to read the future, have no belief in the predictions, and take no heed that the custom is a relic of heathen superstition, and strictly prohibited by the Church. But the author of "All-Hallow-Eve" takes the predictions *au sérieux*, and writes his story to exhibit their exact fulfilment. If, in the conduct of the story, he had contrived to laugh at the superstitious custom, and to show the folly of trusting to absurd divinations, instead of making them "the Test of Futurity," he probably might not have effected much one way or another ; but he would have better discharged his duty as a Catholic writer. We can wink as hard as any one at old national customs, even though not free from superstition, especially in a people so conspicuous for their adherence to the faith, and for their sufferings for it as the Catholic Irish ; but when it comes to defending such customs, it is quite a different thing, and goes against the grain. Aside from this point, "All-Hallow-Eve" is a powerfully written story, and a vivid sketch of a certain phase of Irish life and character.

"The Unconvicted, or, Old Thornley's Heirs," one of the two other stories in the volume, is too much of an extract from records of the police, or the *Newgate Calendar*. The writer claims to be a lawyer, but he manages the case so badly that we wonder not that the accused, his dearest friend from boyhood, refused ever after to recognize his friendship, or to have any personal intercourse with him. Hugh, the nephew of old Thornley, accused of poisoning his uncle whom he loves, and tried for murder on evidence that would not justify suspicion of a cat, is unconvicted indeed, but branded with infamy by the jury in the very verdict that acquits him, and which is approved by the judge that tries him. We may have forgotten the little law we once learned, and little enough it was; but we believe that, according to English law as well as our own, the verdict of the jury in all criminal trials must be simply a verdict of guilty or not guilty, of conviction or acquittal. It may recommend the convicted to the mercy of the court, but we never heard of an English jury bringing in a verdict of not guilty, and yet adding, that till certain extraneous matters are cleared up, suspicion will justly attach to the accused whom they acquit of the crime with which, according to the verdict, he has been falsely charged.

We object, also, to the story, that all the bad characters introduced are Catholics. Old Thornley, an old reprobate, who married an heiress, and when he had made sure of her property, murdered her, is, if we recollect aright, a Catholic; his housekeeper who actually poisons him is a Catholic, so also is her wretched husband whom she caused on a false charge to be transported, and who finally murders her; and so are all the thieves, pickpockets, gamblers, swindlers, and counterfeiters, and double-distilled villains, introduced. There are, no doubt, bad Catholics enough in England and elsewhere, but we see no necessity for a Catholic writer to go exclusively among Catholics to find villains of any shade or hue; for either our experience deceives us, or there are some villains to be found among non-Catholics, who, better than any Catholics, disclose the depths of depravity to which men who turn their backs on God may fall. We are told, it is true, that these bad Catholics neglect the sacraments of their church, and in no respect practise their religion. There is no denying it; but even this seems to reflect in some degree on their Catholic parents, if not on the vigilance, zeal, and fidelity

of their pastors or the clergy. When children are left to grow up in ignorance and in neglect of their religion, and in large numbers become vicious, criminal, and the pests of society, there is a fault somewhere, and it can never be all on the side of the children themselves.

The housekeeper is, perhaps, the vilest and most repulsive character in the story; yet the author extenuates, in some measure, her crimes on the ground that she committed them to advance the interests of her son, whom she has induced old Thornley to adopt as his nephew, and to make him the heir of the bulk of his immense wealth. Old Thornley is in her power, because she knows of his having murdered his wife. She poisons him to prevent his altering his will, or to conceal her theft of the new will he has just secretly, as he supposes, made, disposing of his property differently from her wishes. She accuses Hugh, the real nephew, of the murder, and contrives, with consummate skill, a combination of circumstances likely to secure his conviction. She fails. Hugh is acquitted, but his name is blasted. She has stolen and secreted the last will, but for some reason, perhaps to hold it *in terrorem* over her son, the heir under the previous will, she neglects to destroy it. It is found by the detective police, and her machinations are at an end. She flies from London to Liverpool, where she engages her passage to America. While waiting for the packet to sail, she encounters her husband from whom she had been separated for many years, with whom she had refused to live, and whom she had caused by her false swearing to be transported for house-breaking and robbery, of which she knew him to be not guilty, solely because she wanted him out of her way. He has fallen to be a low, worthless fellow, and the companion of the lowest and vilest criminals. He meets her at Liverpool and asks her to live with him; she refuses; he in his frenzy—a case of moral insanity—stabs her and gives her a mortal blow; but she survives long enough to make her confession to the priest and to repeat it before witnesses, so far as necessary to save the innocent, receives absolution and the last sacraments, and soon after dies in peace and in the joyful hope of heaven. Now we are ready enough to pardon her crimes on the brink of the grave, and can charitably hope that her penitence is sincere and acceptable. We doubt neither the divine charity nor the mercy of God. The

sinner, no matter how great a sinner one has been, can be, if duly contrite, pardoned in a moment, on confession and absolution, and die in a state of grace. That is not the point we make. What we do not like is for popular literature to make light of this spending one's whole life in serving satan by all manner of wickedness, and to count it as nothing, if the sinner on his death-bed, even in his agony, only is able to make his confession and receive absolution. For our part, we doubt the likelihood of one who has lived such a life as the housekeeper, receiving the grace at the last moment to repent, and make a good confession and a happy death,—a grace we all pray for, and fear may not be granted us; yet we must think that this part of the story, though not impossible, lacks verisimilitude. Poor Louis Napoleon, with two chaplains in his family, died without the presence of a priest, and apparently without the last sacraments. We judge him not, for we know not what previous preparations he had made for a sudden and unexpected death. The sinner is always in danger of being struck down, or of meeting with an unexpected death for which he is unprovided. None should be driven to despair, for God's mercy is infinite, and while there is life there is hope. But we think our Catholic story-writers should mark with more decided disapprobation the wicked life of the bad Catholic, and not rely so much, or lead their readers to rely so much, on an edifying confession at the last moment, as is too common with them. Nearly all the Catholic villains in Catholic novels make edifying deaths, yet it is extremely hazardous to trust to a death-bed repentance.

The next and last story in this volume is "Jenifer's Prayer." This is a very different story, its villains are not Catholics, though, through Jenifer's prayer, most of them are converted at last. The good characters are all Catholics, and all the Catholics are good, only a little too Dickensish; that is to say, a little too insipid. Jenifer's prayer was short but comprehensive. It consisted in simply offering up her "life and all in it." When she wanted the conversion of her neighbors or the daughter of her mistress, to protect any member of the families in whom she takes an interest, or to avert a terrible calamity, forthwith goes up in heart her prayer, "My life and all that is in it," which, in one way or another, sooner or later, proves effectual; for

what more could she do than make an offering, joined with that of our Lord on the cross, of her life and all that is in it? There is villany in the story, horrible villany done or plotted against those dear to Jenifer, but she continues her prayer, "My life and all that is in it," and the villany is defeated or repaired. We can, with very few reservations, conscientiously recommend the story of "Jenifer's Prayer." It breathes a Catholic atmosphere. The author is an admirer of Dickens, but his Catholicity saves him from the maudlin philanthropy of that over-praised writer. Between Mr. Brewer and the Brothers Cheeryble there is a distance, as there is between Catholic charity and Protestant benevolence.

"Geraldine: A Tale of Conscience," is a new edition of an old, and once a very popular Catholic novel, giving the history of the conversion of a marvellous Protestant young lady to the Catholic Church; her marriage, the death of her husband, her widowhood, and at length her reception into religion as a Sister of Mercy. The book was, as is said, a grand success; and, when by the great mercy of God I was brought into the church, it was very generally and very highly esteemed as a work of rare ability, intense interest, and singular merit. It was the book to be put by Catholics into the hands of their Protestant friends; and it is still popular, if we may judge from the fact that this new edition has been just issued by so judicious a publisher as Mr. O'Shea. We are assured that it has been the instrument of many conversions both in England and in this country, and we can easily believe it. "The spirit breatheth where he will; and thou hearest his voice, but thou knowest not whence he cometh, or whither he goeth: so is every one that is born of the spirit:" St. John, iii, 8. God uses such instruments to effect his purposes of mercy or of judgment, as seemeth to him good; but let not the instrument attribute the honor to its own fitness, for its fitness is in the hands that use it.

But we are writing in this article of Catholic popular literature, and are considering it in reference to its Catholic, not its non-Catholic, readers. In all that we write or publish, our first thought is due to Catholics; and it is for Catholics, not for non-Catholics, that our popular writers of either sex should seek to create a literature. Our first thought and first care should be to provide for our own household. The Catholic

critic of our popular literature must always judge it by the influence it is likely to exert on the sentiments, the manners, the tone, and the spirit of the Catholic public. Charity begins at home. We are by no means indifferent to the conversion of those who are outside of the church, sitting in the region and shadow of death; but we believe that, in the ordinary providence of God, the literature that best edifies the Catholic body, that tends the most directly to strengthen the attachment of the faithful to the church, to inflame their love for God and for one another, and to make them earnest, devout, enlightened, robust, and heroic Catholics, is the literature that will be the most effective in attracting those who are without, stimulating inquiry among them, and in creating in their minds a respect for the church, and an irrepressible desire to be numbered among her children. It is not the invincible logic of Catholics, but their pure and noble example in fulfilling the sublime precepts and counsels of the Gospel, that overcomes the world, and makes it prostrate itself at the foot of the cross, and beg for the pardon of Him whom it has crucified. We understand by Catholic popular literature, a literature produced by Catholics, for Catholics, and informed with the Catholic spirit, free, living, generous, and noble.

We admit the rare ability of "*Geraldine*," the intense interest of the struggle it depicts, the general truthfulness of its doctrinal statements. The author is a woman of extraordinary intellect and power; but "*Geraldine*," regarded as a book for Catholics, is in some points objectionable. It is too apologetic in its tone, and concedes Christian virtues and worth to Protestants which they have not. It is not edifying to find a convert apologizing to his or her non-Catholic friends for yielding to the grace of God and following the supernatural light of truth into the church, the only medium of union with Christ, the mediator of God and men. It is an act for which to give thanks to God whose grace gives the ability to perform it, not to be apologized for, or excused to unbelievers and misbelievers. We do not hold the mass of those who adhere to heretical communities as blameless before God for remaining aliens from the commonwealth of Christ; nor do we believe that any of them abound in virtues which are attainable only by the supernatural grace of God. We hold, of course, that there is grace outside of the church

for our Lord says, "No man can come unto me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him." St. John, vi, 44. But this exterior grace operates *ad unitatem*, to bring persons to Christ in the church, not to sanctify and save them outside of the church, or to enable them to practise the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity, in the bosom of heretical or separated communities. Our Lord says again, St. John, x, 16: "And other sheep I have, that are not of this fold; *them also must I bring*: and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be made one fold and one shepherd." There are, no doubt, many amiable, intelligent, sincere, and worthy people among Protestants, as there were among the ancient Gentiles; but we find in them no virtues that rise above the natural order. Many of them have the natural, domestic, social, and civic virtues, which deserve and receive a temporal reward; but none of them have the supernatural Christian virtues to which is promised the reward of eternal life; or, if they have been baptized, and by an extraordinary grace some among them have retained their baptismal innocence, they should be regarded as those "other sheep" which, our Lord says, shall hear his voice, and which he says he must bring into the one fold, for *extra ecclesiam nulla salus est*. Some of the best and most high-minded characters in "Geraldine" are Protestants; and the impression the book leaves on our minds is, that the Church of England is schismatical and heretical indeed, yet that persons who do not see that it is so, may live the Christian life and practise the Christian virtues in its communion about as well as in the communion of the Catholic Church.

I am a convert, but I confess myself utterly unable to sympathize with the long and painful struggle poor Geraldine is said to have gone through in becoming a Catholic: and to me that struggle is well-nigh unintelligible. There is too much sentimentalism in it; and we cannot but think that the writer, even if giving her own experience, has labored to heighten its interest by drawing largely on her imagination. The *Revue de Deux Mondes*, in criticising my "Convert, or Leaves from my Experience," published in 1857, sneeringly says that my conversion, as I described it, "was a conversion *à l'Américaine*, very reasonable, very logical, but not very interesting, indeed, rather a dull affair. It was attended by no violent moral shocks, no breaking up of one's whole interior

life, and convulsing one's whole nature ;" for I intentionally suppressed what was purely subjective. The criticism is very just, so far as the history of my conversion was given. I had, indeed, no very tender ties to break, for I had always lived very much apart, and my social connections were not many, nor very close ; and those I best loved I felt would go with me, if, in fact, their convictions should not precede mine, as in the case of my wife they did. I gave up nothing for the church that I valued, but gained every thing I longed for. This makes, I grant, a difference between my case and that of Geraldine Carrington ; but I never engaged in that long, painful search after the truth, which detained her for such a length of time. I never had any painful anxiety to know the truth, simply as an object of the intellect. The question with me came not in the shape, What shall I believe ? but in this other shape, What shall I do to be saved, or who or what will deliver me from my sins ? I suffered more or less anguish of soul, no doubt, but less to know the truth, than to know how I should obtain strength to obey it ; not so much to know the law, as to attain the power to overcome the weakness of my will and my infirmity of purpose, to resist temptation, to subdue my passions, and to maintain an upright walk. I never had any purely intellectual difficulties to overcome ; and all my doubts were as to the ability of the church to help me to a deliverance from sin and death, and to place me in communion with Christ, my only Redeemer.

I came to the question of the church as a sinner in need of a Savior. Overcome by a sense of my own moral weakness, and feeling my need of spiritual assistance, of divine help, for the arm of flesh failed me, and in agony of soul, I cried out, "Lord, save or I perish." Geraldine comes to the question without a consciousness of sin or of moral weakness, with the feeling that she had led a Christian life, that she had maintained a good conscience, that she had no sins to be repented of, that she stood in need of no spiritual help but such as she fancied she had found even among the evangelicals, and the question for her was at first a purely intellectual question,—a doubt of the truth of what she had hitherto been taught. The doubt was not a doubt of herself, but of her teachers. She then engages in a weary search after truth, and goes through a course of reading to which I, even in the

prime and vigor of manhood, could never have submitted, and has set-to battles with the dignitaries of her church, with her evangelical and Anglican sisters, and with whoever will take up the cudgels against her. Her progress is like that of the frog at the bottom of the well, who jumped up three feet every day and fell back two feet every night.

Now, this may be the process Geraldine really pursued; but, if so, it was a miracle that she ever found the church, or that her conversion at last was effected. To attempt to come to the church by such a process, is as absurd as to attempt to get the infinite by the addition of numbers. The devil can match any man, or woman either, at chopping logic and interpreting testimonies from history, the fathers and councils, to which one has the key only in the Catholic faith, or the teaching of the church herself. For my part, I never sought the truth; it came to me, how or whence I could never say; but it came and brought with it the force to convince, and I believed as the child believes the father or mother, and for thirty years since have never doubted. I never sought or found the truth; God showed it to me, and gave me the grace to open my heart, and to accept it. The way to learn the truth is to open one's mind and heart to it, as the sunflower opens her bosom to the rays of the sun, and to permit it to penetrate the soul and give it light, warmth, and life. The theological reader, I trust, will exonerate me from intending to favor either the irresistible grace of the Calvinists or the *gratia victrix* of the Jansenists, both which imply the passivity of the soul in faith. All that is meant is, that we do not, either by historical or philosophical investigations, find out the truth. If we appeal to history and antiquity, what is the key to either, or the rule of their interpretation? If we take private reason for our guide, and go forth to examine the sects and determine which is true, or how much of each is true and how much is false, we only do what Protestants do, and, like them, lose ourselves in a wilderness of contradictory opinions, go round in circles, get confused, and no longer are able to discern any distinction between truth and falsehood, or right and wrong. If we assume that our Lord founded a visible organic body called the church, as the Scriptures and the whole Christian world say he did, the difficulty vanishes; for all who know any thing at all of the subject, know it is the church in

communion with the See of Rome, for that is the only visible church-organization that has had a continuous historical existence from our Lord and his apostles down to us. The fact lies on the very face of history, no more to be mistaken than the sun in the heavens. The sects all know it, and no Protestant requires it to be proved. However sectarians may attempt to get rid of the fact by their explanations, they, by their very explanations, bear witness to it, and in reality assert it. We have no need to seek it; we have only, assisted by grace, to open our eyes to the truth always before us, and we behold it; to open, by the same assistance, our hearts, and the truth enters them, and we believe it, and with joy unspeakable thank God for it. Then taking the truth, the church and what she teaches, for our guide, we can explain history, if we wish, and confirm it, examine all the sects and their opinions, and explode them as corruptions, mutilations, or travesties of the church and her divinely-inspired doctrine.

Catholicity is the key to all history, and it is only in the church that we learn what history means. How great the mistake, then, while ignorant of the church and her teaching, to attempt, as Geraldine does, to find out the truth guided only by one's own learning and private judgment. Those outside may be assured that no such long and tedious process is either necessary or useful. "Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven, that is, to bring Christ down; or, Who shall descend into the deep; that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead? But what saith the Scripture? *The word is near thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart*: this is the word of faith which we preach." Rom., x, 6-8.

The process through which the authoress conducts her heroine, never did and never could of itself alone have led to her conversion. It is precisely the process by which every Protestant seeks to ascertain what is the Christian church and the Christian faith; and if it could be successful in Geraldine's case, why is it not in theirs? and why do we not find them all of one mind instead of being cut up into a thousand and one conflicting sects, holding every variety of opinion, from the high-church Anglican down to the bald rationalist? The process at best could give only what theologians call *fides humana* or a probable opinion, which excludes neither doubt nor uncertainty; a hundred cross-lights are continually disturbing and even distorting the mental vision, and causing us

to doubt to-day what we thought we had settled yesterday, and requiring us to renew from day to day our examination, and repeat perpetually the same process. It is the Protestant and a false assumption, that we are to find out the truth by private inquiry and the collation of facts and opinions, that has caused so many inquirers to miss finding the truth. Determined not to be deceived, and to admit nothing that can be doubted or even cavilled at, they shut up their hearts and narrow the aperture of their minds, till it is impossible for truth to find an entrance into either. After years of weary search, they give up in despair, and fall back on the sad philosophy, "Let us eat and drink and be merry, for to-morrow we die."

Such books as "Geraldine" assume, while controverting it, the very theory of private judgment and private examination, and cause those outside to believe that the work of finding out the truth must be done by us alone, while yet ignorant of it, and deriving no assistance from it. They have an unfavorable effect on Catholics themselves, and lead them to rely on processes for the conversion of those without, which, in almost all cases, must prove ineffectual. They can be effectual only in the case of those whose minds and hearts grace has already opened to the reception of the truth, and these do not need it. A simple statement, a presentation of the truth, suffices for them. They need no argument to prove that it is truth, any more than they need arguments to prove that it is the sun that is shining when they see its clear, unclouded light, and feel its life-giving warmth. In no case do arguments motive assent; they at best only remove the *prohibentia*, or obstacles to assent, and enable the creditive subject to come into immediate relation with the credible object. Hence what Protestants call "Evidences," Catholic theologians call "Motives of Credibility." They are reasons not for believing, but for proving the faith credible, or not incredible.

It is important, both for ourselves and for those without, that our popular literature, so far as it touches questions of this sort, should be free from all taint of the pelagian or semi-pelagian heresy. We cannot make the first motion towards Christ without him or without his assistance. We may prove to our satisfaction, and believe with all the strength of human conviction, the entire body of Catholic doctrine from the

papacy down to the holy water-pot, and yet be just as far from the kingdom of heaven, or from faith in Christ, as if we rejected the whole; for it is not God we believe, but our own reason, and we are simply Protestants. Faith is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God; and conversion is the work of grace, not of argument or logic, though it is always logical, or in accordance with the Supreme Logic. We use arguments in defending the faith and repelling the assaults of the enemies of the church, for the safeguard and protection of the faithful, not for the conversion of the enemies themselves. They can be converted only by the grace of God; and only those whom grace disposes to receive the truth ever are converted. As sufficient grace is given to all, why all do not use it to comply with it, and to be led to the faith; or why of two women grinding at the mill, one is taken and the other left (Matt., xxiv, 40), is one of the mysteries of election which, happily, it is not the province of popular literature to explain.

We have dwelt at a disproportionate length on this point, in respect to which, however, "Geraldine" does not sin more grievously, if at all, than do all the so-called Catholic novels that we have seen, written with a view to the influence they may exert on the non-Catholic world. They are mostly written by women, and by women who have just come into the church, and who write of Catholic things very much as persons blind from childhood, but whose eyes have just been couched, see natural objects. They see all things on a smooth, uniform surface and in contact with their eyes, without any appreciation of perspective, or the relative proportions of objects, learned only by time and experience. They are seldom exact, save as to the mere formal statement of dogmas and worship, copied from the most elementary books of Catholic instruction. They give us correctly enough the bare skeleton, but they are too new to Catholic life to be able to clothe the dry bones with flesh and blood; and, instead of presenting us the living body of truth in all its symmetry and beauty, they give us a lifeless and more or less deformed image made of wax or clay. We would not speak lightly of their efforts which are well-meant, and which perhaps God blesses oftener than we think; but they leave their nests before they are fledged. They need not be in a hurry to rush into print. They should wait at the foot of

the cross, till they have learned both their strength and their weakness. They would not then attach so much importance to every mood of mind they passed through on their way to the church, to every vague thought or momentary doubt that came into their heads, or sudden pang that shot through their hearts at the thought of sundering old ties and breaking up old associations, and entering what to them is a new world and, certainly, a new life; they would be less anxious to have it understood that they acted honestly, from pure motives, and in obedience to the dictates of conscience, or to justify themselves in the eyes of Protestants, and would spare us no little twaddle and sentimental nonsense.

I have always regretted that circumstances, not under my control, seemed to compel me to appear as a Catholic reviewer on the morrow of my reception into the church, while almost totally ignorant of Catholic theology, and still more ignorant of Catholic life and usages; and I have often admired, in later years, the wondrous charity of the Catholic bishops and clergy, in overlooking the crudeness and inexperience, if not the overweening confidence, of the neophyte, and in giving a generous support to his REVIEW, notwithstanding the manifest ineptness of its editor. It is true, I studied hard, day and night, for several years, under an able master, to supply my deficiency; and, also, that I published very little which was not previously examined and revised by one of the ablest and soundest theologians I have ever personally known; but it was a great drawback upon the usefulness of the REVIEW that its editor and principal writer had not had leisure previously to make his course of theology, and to place himself *en rapport* with the Catholic community, and that he had in every successive number to write up to the very limits of his knowledge, if not sometimes beyond them. I had always to write as an apprentice, never as a master. Very different would have been the course and influence of the REVIEW, had its editor known thoroughly his religion in the outset. I have not made much progress in the knowledge of theology and still less of spiritual life, I have also forgotten much of what I had acquired; but I have learned this much, not to venture beyond my depth, and not to broach questions that I have not mastered, or, at least, think I have mastered. If I could have done so in the beginning, I should have spared myself and my friends many mortifications.

The lesson we are trying to enforce on our young and unfledged converts, is a lesson we have learned from our own bitter experience. New converts have zeal, and view Catholic things with a freshness of feeling that old Catholics have not; but, after all, they cannot be the principal creators of a Catholic popular literature, such as Catholics themselves need.

There has never been in any nation a Catholic popular literature produced outside the sanctuary, that fully realizes our ideal. Even in what Digby calls the *Ages of Faith*, the popular literature, if we except the legends of the saints, and what was written by ecclesiastics or religious, was hardly Catholic save in costume and coloring. The lay literature, romances, and poems, as far as we know them, were wanting in the Catholic tone and spirit, and in the observance of the pure and sublime morality of the church. Their authors had never sanctified their imaginations, or harmonized their æsthetics with Christian ethics. Lay literature is almost always profane literature, in both senses of the term, and proves that, in the so-called ages of faith, the laity, as now, were only superficially instructed in their religion, and were not thoroughly imbued with its spirit, so as to live and breathe it; so as to express it in all their spontaneous thoughts and free utterances. Perhaps, what we ask is too much; but we think it is no more than is needed. We do not ask for the suppression of the imagination, the play of fancy, the graces of wit and pleasantry, or the natural sentiments of the soul; we do not ask that all literature wear the long face and speak with the deep guttural tones and the nasal twang of the Puritan; we know there is a time to laugh as well as to weep, a time to sing and dance as well as to be grave and thoughtful. Popular literature should be in the main recreative, light, pleasing, such as will charm and recreate us in our hours of weariness or relaxation from severer labors or studies. The popular novel does it for Protestants, and for want of a substitute Catholics often resort to it; but seldom without more or less injury to their moral delicacy, or to the clearness, purity, and robustness of their faith. Now, what we ask is a Catholic popular literature that will serve all the purposes the popular non-Catholic novel serves, without imparting any taint to the imagination, wounding Catholic delicacy of sentiment, weakening Catholic faith, or chilling

the ardor of Catholic devotion. Is this an impossibility? Perhaps so; but yet it has been realized in Christian art, architecture, painting, and sculpture, and wherefore not in literature?

In France and in some other countries, we believe, there are societies for the publication of good books. They, we doubt not, do much good; but a Catholic popular literature cannot be called into existence by any number of societies, however well meant or well managed; for a good book, fresh and living, fitted to take and keep its hold on the popular heart, cannot be made to order; it must be the spontaneous and free expression of the inward spirit, operating in its own way, and according to its own laws and inspirations. An author, knowing that he must conform to the views of a society, a community, a committee, or even to those of a superior, cannot work freely, is shorn of half his strength, and his book will want originality, freshness, and verve. The man must be filled, saturated with the Catholic spirit, be a master of Catholic science, and work under the inspiration of Catholic faith, and with a continual aspiration to the Catholic ideal. It is not by associations or attempts made with *malice prepense* that a Catholic popular literature is to be created, but by the Catholic instruction, training, and disciplining of the community by the pastors of the church and the masters of spiritual life; and by encouraging those who are prompted by their own genius to write freely out from their well-informed minds and full hearts, with no other restraints than those imposed by Catholic faith, piety, and morality, good sense and good taste.

The French have a Catholic popular literature of great value, though it is nearly smothered by the general popular literature of the country, which, whatever its merits in other respects, is decidedly irreligious, immoral, even cynical, anticatholic, revolutionary, satanic. The immense majority of the French are registered as Catholics; and yet, in France, public opinion for a long time has been infidel, and the leading journals, those with the largest circulation, and which are the most popular, are hostile to the church, sneer at the "clericals," and make war on the *parti prêtre*. A few years ago, we know not how it is now, *La Presse* alone circulated daily twice as many copies as all the Catholic journals and periodicals of all France put together. The most popular

writers in France, those whose works have the largest sale and are the most eagerly devoured, are decidedly unreligious, as well as anti-popular. These infidel journals, novels, and romances must circulate largely among French Catholics. We can hardly understand it. French Catholics have sufficiently proved that they are capable of heroically enduring any thing and every thing for their religion, but — ridicule. They are covered by an infidel gibe, sneer, or *moif*. They seem to suppose that they can touch pitch and not be defiled, drink poison and not be harmed. The French character is full of glaring contradictions. No people on earth are more generous, respond more readily to the calls of charity, than the Catholic people of France, and none send out in larger numbers, more devoted, self-denying, disinterested, zealous, intelligent and heroic missionaries even to the most distant parts of the ocean, or contribute more liberally for the support of Catholic missions among the heathen in every quarter of the globe. For years French Catholics have contributed more to the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, than the Catholics of all other nations put together, and yet they sustain an irreligious and immoral literature at home, and consent to be governed by infidels and Universalists. The present authorities of their country may give them courage to brave ridicule, and to assert their principles in both literature and politics, and teach them that no man can be a good Catholic in one department of life, and at the same time an infidel in another.

The English-speaking Catholics are at present much more active in founding a popular Catholic literature than would at first sight appear, and have already produced admirable specimens, models even, among which we may mention, without suggesting any noxious comparisons, "*Palmas*," by the late Cardinal Wiseman, whose services to Catholic science and literature will be only the more highly appreciated as time goes on; "*Callista*," by the univalued Dr. Newman; "*Thou and the Sybil*," which displays rare classical learning, great ability, and genius of a high order; "*Christianity Strewed*," by Lady Georgiana Fullerton; the "*Life of St. Edmund Damiani*," by Richard Simpson, Esq., though not exactly written with too much sympathy with the Anglican persecutors, and with too little with the persecuted Catholics; and among ourselves the "*Sketches of the Lives*,"

Labor and Sacrifice of the Holy Catholic Missionaries in the West," by the late Archbishop of Baltimore; "*Catholic Missions among the Indians*," by that indefatigable worker and industrious collector, John Henry Hays; and the "*History of the Church*," in our country, by the same author in connection with others in forming the "*History of the American People of the United States*," by Herbert B. Charles. Hays, through his careful work of a close and well-knowledge, and the life of that remarkable man and devoted and laborious missionary of the Alleghenies, the Rev. Francis Xavier, just published and written by the only daughter of the missionary, the *Catholic World*, a publication so true to be and conducted by our personal friends, is contributing largely to the formation of a living Catholic popular literature of the country, through some of its number are persons profoundly Catholic, are marked by a high order of genius; yet, under the influence of pure literature, it is far superior to the select non-Catholic literature of the country. Thus, in reading it, it often at once has a higher, purer, and more correct notion than is formed of us the philosophy of the ethical and most accomplished system in that part of the world, the *American Monthly*. The *Catholic* newspaper press, so far as it has come under our observation, for the last eight years, has been greatly improved in its literary character, has assumed a higher and more dignified tone, and is exerting a growing and more legitimate influence in elevating and extending the minds of our Catholic readers.

In England the Catholic press we should rather be becoming more independent and less dependent. The *Catholic Journal* is inferior in literary taste and ability to our weekly journal in the United Kingdom, it is a weak creature and generally, yet true, independent, unprejudiced, and uncorruptly Catholic, thoroughly, honestly, and honestly paying its money as when the paper is the great English. It is the best Catholic journal that we are acquainted with. The *British Review*, hardly any more than our own, suffers within the department of popular literature; yet it must be mentioned. It is an able and learned periodical, but it lacks the grace, the charm, the charm, and freedom of the earlier days. The *West*, as before, is an able man, and, we are told, is led by Providence to be a great writer and a powerful promoter. We acknowledge his ability and his learning, we love and honor the man; but,

some how or other, we can hardly read a page of his writings, no matter on what subject, without having our patience tried, or our irascibility excited, we should say, our pugnacity aroused, and we want to fight him, metaphorically, not literally. He writes good English, we suppose, but he is often well-nigh unintelligible to us. We are frequently at a loss to make out what he is driving at. He describes instead of defining, and fails to reduce his utterances to their principle. He mixes up the subjective and objective in a most perplexing confusion. Like Protestant writers, he seems to write without unity or catholicity of thought, and to reason always from particulars, sometimes subjective particulars, sometimes objective. His philosophical articles are to us as unintelligible as Dr. Newman's "Essay at a Grammar of Assent," of which we can make neither head nor tail. It is our fault, we presume; for we have so long been accustomed to proceed from the universal to the particular, and to using particulars only as illustrating a universal, or, rather, a generic principle, that our mind cannot get out of its old grooves so as to understand the logic that from the particular concludes the universal. In a word, we are not of Dr. Ward's school in philosophy; and we believe the human reason, as far as it goes, sees things as they are, and as they are seen by superior intelligences. Neither do we accept his or Dr. Newman's theory of development of Christian doctrine; and we believe the Christians of the first century held as *explicitly* the whole Christian faith, as do we of the nineteenth century. Yet we like the *Dublin Review* upon the whole. It is, perhaps, rather John-Bullish for a periodical with an Irish name; but we like its bold and manly tone, we respect its learning and ability, we reverence its uncompromising Catholicity, and we feel Catholic science and literature in the English-speaking world would suffer a grave loss without it. We try not to judge others by ourselves, or by what, after all, may be our own idiosyncrasies. If of English descent, we are not English bred, and have been formed, if formed at all, in a very un-English school, at least not in an English school of the present time. The English school of philosophy now in vogue seems to us a cross between Locke and Coleridge, and to have originated in the mad attempt, against the admonition of my Lord Bacon, to apply what is called the

inductive method to the study of philosophy, instead of restricting it to the study of the physical sciences alone, as it should be restricted.

But we are straying from our subject, which is that of Catholic popular literature. English and American popular Catholic literature has been greatly extended and enriched by translations from the French and German. Among translations from the French we may mention the "Life of St. Elizabeth," and the "History of the Monks of the West," by the lamented Count de Montalembert, who, if his last moments were somewhat clouded by the progress of cæsarism, by political defections and disappointments, and by his horror of centralism, not to speak of the effects of a long and painful disease, we are sure never forgot that he was a son of the Crusaders, or ever ceased to be loyal in his heart to the church whose rights he had so often, so boldly, and so eloquently defended; "the Life and Letters of Madame Swetchine," by Count de Falloux; a "Sister's Story," "Anne Severin," and "Fleurange," by Madame Craven, though her novels are a little too high-wrought, and border too closely on the sentimental for our taste, yet are valuable portions of our Catholic literature, into which they are now incorporated. We will only add that we hope that Madame and other Catholic novelists will remember that cousins-german are within the prohibited degrees, and will take care that they have the proper dispensation before marrying them. From the German, we can only mention "Angela" and the "Progressionists," by Conrad von Bollanden, of which the *Catholic World* has published a translation, and which we trust The Catholic Publication Society will soon issue in a separate volume; and "the Old God" and "the New God," by the same author, both of which, we believe, have been translated and published. The last has certainly been admirably translated by Fr. Noethen, pastor of the Church of the Holy Cross, Albany, N. Y., and published in a style of much beauty and elegance by Sullivan of the same city. Herr von Bollanden writes for the people, in a simple and homely style, to put them on their guard against the barbarism, tyranny, and violence of "progress," "liberalism," and "modern enlightenment." He is a charming writer, witty, sarcastic, but devout and full of tenderness.

Much of what is included in English and American popu-

lar literature is really produced by authors of the Irish race. The unhappy condition of Ireland, since the apostasy of England, has been unfavorable to the free and full development of the Irish spirit and genius in the direction of popular Catholic literature. The Catholic Irish have been engaged in a life and death struggle to defend their religion and their nationality, or race, against one of the most powerful and unscrupulous of modern nations, bent on the utter destruction of both. In their minds, as in fact, though not in principle, the two have become identical, and Irish popular literature bears throughout traces of the double contest, and we hardly know whether we are to place the works of such authors as the Banim Brothers, Gerald Griffin, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, Mrs. Sadlier, and others equally deserving to be named at home and abroad, in the category of popular *Catholic* literature, or that of popular Irish *national* literature. In some of them the Catholic element, in others the national or race element, predominates; yet, be this as it may, this class of works forms no insignificant portion of the reading of the majority of the English-speaking Catholics of the British empire and of our own country. The Irish, we need not say, are a gifted race; and to them, rather than to the Scotch of our day, belongs the *perseveridum ingenium Scotorum*, which centuries ago became proverbial. In the changes which time is sure to introduce, the Irish writers will become more distinctly Catholic, the national question will become less and less absorbing, and the children of the Irish race will, perhaps, furnish the richest and purest Catholic popular literature the world has yet known. They have all the natural genius and qualities necessary to produce it, and will do it if they lose not their Catholic faith. We are not among those who question the greatness and glory of Ireland in past ages, but we believe the greatest and purest glory of the Irish race is reserved for the future, when their genius will pervade the whole English-speaking world, now numbering no less than ninety millions of the human race.

It must be evident to the most careless reader that we are not giving even the slightest sketch of Catholic popular literature, and far less an inventory of its riches. We do not know even the titles of a hundredth part of the works in our own language, and far less those in French, Spanish, Italian, and German, which deserve favorable mention. We have

only named a few works, such as we happen to be acquainted with, as specimens, some of them as models, of what we understand by Catholic popular literature, its spirit, tone, and range. We should be glad to see the novel less frequently resorted to because of its fatal facility of composition, and its inevitable tendency to enfeeble the mind both of the writer and the reader. We should like much to see the departments of history and biography, especially of eminent Catholics, enlarged. Both history and biography furnish more startling incidents, and produce a deeper and intenser interest, than any possible work of fiction; and what is more to the purpose, they cannot be prepared and well-written without labor and pains, or read without stimulating thought, awakening noble aspirations, or strengthening the mind and adding to its stock of knowledge. It is easy to write a story which simply takes off a vain and selfish woman, wife or mother, full of stale witticisms on old bachelors and elderly spinsters, and which rings the changes on love, courtship, and marriage; but such stories, which are only idle gossip, can hardly improve, much less edify. They are not worthy of a place in Catholic popular literature.

- ART. IV.—1. CARDINAL WISEMAN'S Works. *The Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*. First American Edition, New York: O'Shea. 1872. 2 vols. 12mo.
2. *Origin of Civilization, and the Primitive Condition of Man. The Mental and Social Condition of Savages*. By SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M. P., F. R. S. New York: Appleton & Co. 1871. 12mo. pp. 280.
3. *Tradition: Principally with reference to Mythology and the Law of Nations*. By LORD ARUNDEL OF WARDOUR. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872. 8vo. pp. 731.
4. *The Primeval Man: An Examination of some Recent Speculations*. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. New York: Routledge & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 200.

MR. O'SHEA, we are happy to learn, proposes to bring out the complete works of the late Cardinal Wiseman in a new and uniform edition. He begins his edition with the two

volumes before us, on the connection between science and revealed religion, which he sends out in a style very creditable to his house. We can only congratulate him, and wish him ample success.

Cardinal Wiseman's "Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion," originally written and delivered in Rome nearly forty years ago, are too well known and too highly appreciated to render any review of them by us either necessary or proper. It is to be regretted that his Eminence was not able to find time to revise them before his lamented death, and to bring them up to the level of science at the latest date possible; for the sciences treated have no fixedness, and have undergone many and important changes since these lectures were originally prepared and delivered. Yet we are not aware that any thing has been discovered and established that requires any serious modification of their principles, or that invalidates their general conclusion, that the investigations of science in its several departments tend upon the whole to confirm the historical accuracy and authenticity of the Scriptural narratives, and therefore prove a valuable auxiliary to Christian apologetics. Yet this is hardly true of the actual theories and speculations of contemporary science, though it is true, if restricted to what scientific investigations have really discovered and settled. The theories and speculations of the scientists held in highest repute, are just now decidedly antisciptural and materialistic in their tendencies, while philosophy, adopting their inductive method, is as decidedly pantheistic or atheistic, though the Spencerians, or cosmists, concede that science is as yet in no condition to demonstrate what the fool says in his heart, *non est Deus*, or that there is no God.

His Eminence has more confidence in scientists than we have, and estimates the results of their investigations more highly than we do; but we are happy to find him maintaining that the Christian faith does not depend on external evidences, that it has its internal grounds of certainty, which nothing drawn from foreign sources can shake, or is needed to confirm. Christianity is herself the key to both history and science, she is the touchstone of truth; and whatever in history or science is found in conflict with her is, by that fact alone, proved to be neither genuine science, nor authentic history. History and science must plead before her; not she

before them. His Eminence knows this and insists on it, but, perhaps, with less emphasis than is desirable. We hold that Christians should plant themselves on the rights of religion, and yield in these times, even by way of argument, no advantages which they may justly claim. We think that his Eminence overrates the aid which the sciences he treats have furnished to Christian apologetics, hermeneutics, and Biblical criticism. The early commentators understood these matters as well as we do, and they as yet stand unrivalled. But he knew infinitely more of such matters than we do; and, in a case of difference, the probabilities in the case are that he is right, and we wrong. We make no pretensions to any proficiency in the study of what passes for science. Indeed we have never been able to get any thing more than a smattering of the sciences so-called; for they have none of them remained unchanged long enough for us to master them. We have tried our hand at most of them first or last; but they all changed so rapidly, we had so often to unlearn to-day what we learned yesterday as undoubted science, that we gave the matter up in despair. Yet we are and always have been fond of the study of philology, ethnology, archæology, mythology, history, and especially that old mystic East; but we have never been able to convince ourselves that the present knows any thing of much importance that was unknown to the early fathers and great doctors of the church. We consult the scientists, they are in ecstasies over the progress they have made; we press them, each confesses that his science is as yet only in its infancy; but, for the first time in the history of the world, each has hit upon the true principles and method of investigation, and the most magnificent results are to be hereafter obtained. Well, well, so be it.

“Hope springs eternal in the human breast;
Man never is, but always to be blest.”

We must wait till the infant science has become an adult, and the magnificent results are obtained. When the scientists have succeeded in extracting sunbeams from cucumbers, in showing us how nothing can make itself something, or how there can be effects without causes, or the cosmos can exist without a maker, we will listen reverently to their instructions, and confide in their speculations.

Let us not be misapprehended. Cardinal Wiseman does not rest the claims of revealed religion on what is called science. He contends not only that science raises no objection to revealed religion, that science, when really science, does not itself refute; and he certainly shows that in many cases it has clearly done so. Hence he concludes, that the fears which many good people have of certain sciences on account of their supposed infidel tendencies, are unfounded; for the presumption is, that, if science in a large number of cases refutes its own objections and removes the embarrassments it creates, it will ultimately do so in all cases. We doubt it. We are not authorized to conclude, because it has done so in some important cases, it will do so in all; nor do facts tend to justify the presumption. The sciences are far more decidedly antichristian to-day, than they were when Cardinal Wiseman first delivered his lectures. The answers he gives to the scientific objections raised in his day, are for the most part quietly ignored by subsequent scientists, and the sacred books of the Jews and Christians, denied all historical value, are quietly placed in the same category with the sacred books of the Hindus, Persians, and Chinese; and Christianity is assumed to be only one form among a thousand other forms of religion which the race has developed, or with which its natural religious sentiment has clothed itself. The most honored and revered scientists in public estimation in our day are the Huxleys, Tyndalls, Lyells, Lubbocks, Darwins, Spencers, the Comteans, and the Cosmists, or Evolutionists, men who might make a Lamarck, a Lam  therie, or even a Cabanis, who defined man to be "a digestive tube open at both ends," die of envy.

His Eminence finds traces of the Deluge everywhere, scientific, historical, traditional. His scientific arguments are based on the marks which geology discloses of a powerful cataclysm or convulsion the earth at no remote period underwent, most probably by water, displaced, perhaps, by the upheaval of the Andes. But a geologist of some note informed us the other day, that the theory of convulsions or cataclysms, save such as are produced by causes now in operation, is at present very generally rejected by geologists. Take away the historical account of the Deluge recorded in *Genesis*, and nothing, as Lord Arundel admits, could be made of the traditions of nations, which, holding the account in

Genesis for authentic history, we refer unhesitatingly to Noah's flood. We assume the truth, as we have the right to do, of the Scriptural narratives, and content ourselves with requiring those who bring objections from science to prove, first of all, that what they allege is genuine science, not simply an induction, a theory, a hypothesis, or a conjecture; and till they do that, we sturdily refuse to reply to their objections, however specious or damaging they may seem. It is the only course that is just alike to religion, and to those who object to it. His Eminence is more condescending. He undertakes to prove to them that it is not science; we ask them to prove that it is; for we have little patience with scientists, whom we seldom find able to reason.

The second book on our list is a pretended scientific work, by Sir John Lubbock, one of the great lights of modern English science. He is a baronet, a fellow of the Royal Society, a member of parliament, and author of a history of prehistoric times, that is, history, if not evolved from his own "inner consciousness," at least written by way of induction from mutilated phenomena and unintelligible monuments. His account of the mental and social condition of savages, though it tells us little that we have not known almost from our boyhood, is not devoid of interest, and, except as to inferences and one important point, is in the main, we believe, correct. Sir John holds that the race began its human career in the lowest barbarism in which it is possible for man to exist as man, and has by its own indigenous and unassisted efforts, after ages of toil and struggle, worked its way up to the high civilization, say, of England in the nineteenth century, even to that of Sir John Lubbock himself, who stands at the summit of that civilization. This theory, which assumes that the primitive state of man as man, that is, when he by development has got rid of his monkey appendages and emerged into a man, is that of the savage state or lowest barbarism,—we propose to examine with some degree of thoroughness before we close, but must first turn our attention to the third book on our list, "Tradition," by Lord Arundel, and briefly and very inadequately noticed in our January REVIEW, and which contains, in fact, a very full and satisfactory refutation of the savage theory of Sir John Lubbock and others.

Lord Arundel of Wardour aims, in this really erudite

volume, to refute the Benthamites and diplomates, who substitute what they call international law for the law of nations, and which they hold to be of human and conventional origin, founded on pacts and precedents to be interpreted by each nation for itself, according to its own judgment of utility or expediency. As there is and can be no international sovereign, there can be no international law except by a figure of speech, and consequently no international court, judge, or umpire, whose judgments are legally binding on either party, or capable of execution, except by an appeal to arms. Consequently each party is its own judge and jury, and is free to do whatever under the circumstances it judges expedient or useful, if it has the power. If the king of Sardinia judges it expedient or useful to him and his people, to invade and annex the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Italian Duchies, and the Pontifical States, and imprison their legitimate sovereign, there is nothing to prevent him if he has the power to do it. There being no law of nations, there is no law or rule of right or justice that he would violate in doing it. This practically resolves right into might, the favorite doctrine of Thomas Carlyle, and places the weaker party always in the wrong. He is always in the right who has the stronger force, and success is the test of merit.

Yet there is no "untutored" savage that would not instinctively revolt at a doctrine so favorable to tyrants and robbers, to the assassins and plunderers of nations and of individuals; for even the most degraded savage has at least a rude sense of justice, which he never confounds with simple physical force. However, the doctrine follows legitimately from Bentham's denial of the rule of right, and putting in its place the rule of utility, pleasure, or happiness. It is openly defended by Carlyle in his glorification of Mirabeau, Danton, Napoleon I, and Frederic II, miscalled the Great. It is the doctrine acted on by the Subalpine government, and by virtue of which it has effected the unity of Italy; it is the doctrine on which Prince von Bismarck has acted in creating the present German Empire; and it is the doctrine approved by the diplomacy of all nations, except its victims. Russia, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Spain, the United States, hold friendly diplomatic relations with the Subalpine robber and usurper, and not one of them has protested against his robbery. France cannot protest

against the new German Empire, for she is its victim ; but the diplomacy of Europe and America renders homage to the new Kaiser, and adorns with the laurel wreath the brow of his unprincipled and unscrupulous Chancellor. A prince wants to annex a neighboring state to his own possessions. Let him do it, if able, and diplomacy will sanction his robbery, by calling it *un fait accompli*, or justify it by "the logic of events."

Now, against this abominable doctrine which makes physical force the measure of right, and justifies the *Væ Victis* of the Romans, Lord Arundel protests in the name of liberty and civilization, and asserts the law of nations, or the *jus gentium* of Roman jurisprudence and universal tradition. The *jus gentium* was not simply the portion of Roman law common to all nations, but was coincident with the law of nature, natural right, superior to all municipal laws, eternal and immutable, sacred and inviolable, and held to bind the nation, not only in its intercourse and relations with others, but in its entire national action, whether relating to foreigners or to its own citizens or subjects. Any municipal legislative act in contravention of the *jus gentium*, Roman jurisprudence held to be null and void from the beginning. "Unjust laws," says St. Augustine, speaking as a Roman jurist as well as a Christian theologian, "are violences rather than laws." The Romans held the *jus gentium* to be imposed, not by men or by the nations themselves by mutual agreement, but by divine authority, and therefore binding on the conscience of the nation itself, and on the consciences of all nations. It was of divine, not of human origin, and therefore under the protection of the avenging gods. The Athenians evidently distinguished between justice and utility. Aristides, appointed to examine a project concocted by Themistocles, reported that "nothing could be more useful to Athens, but at the same time nothing could be more unjust." The Athenians, it is said, therefore refused to entertain the project. The Athenians had a higher civilization, if the anecdote may be credited, than the princes and diplomats of the last century and of the present. It would be an insult to pagan Greece or Rome to call that solemn Englishman and ethical and juridical reformer, Jeremy Bentham, a pagan. The pagans were hardly ever such utter apostates from religion, morals, and common sense, as he was. The most sophistical of the

Greek sophists never became more utterly unable to distinguish between right and wrong, or befogged by their sophistry.

International law, divorced from ethics, founded on utility, and interpreted by precedent, favors only the strong, and affords no protection to the weak. The law of nations is the eternal and immutable law of justice, which binds the nation and governs the intercourse of nations with one another, and interposes the shield of sacred and inviolable right between the weak and the strong, and enables small states to subsist in peace and security by the side of great and powerful states. The pope, for Christian nations, is the divinely-appointed guardian and judge of the law of nations, and his is the only voice among sovereigns that now rings out in its defence. He presents at this moment, when past his fourscore years, a sublime example of fidelity to justice where all are faithless, and which the world must ere long admire, and yield to it the homage that is its due. He stands and speaks, and his enemies one by one drop into their graves. Palmerston is dead; Cavour is dead; Mazzini is dead; Louis Napoleon is dead; Garibaldi is sick, eaten up by chagrin, and impotent; Victor Emmanuel would make his peace to-day, if his government would let him; Bismarck alone remains in full vigor, but all does not go smooth even with him, and his turn may come soon. If men for the moment turn a deaf ear to the voice of the Vicar of Christ, God hears him and avenges the violated law of nations, and summons to his own judgment-seat those who prided themselves on their power and craft, and thought that they could trample on his justice with impunity. It is not with a weak, trembling old man that they have to account, but with the Omnipotent God. Let them tremble before his justice which they have despised, for he in his wrath will scatter them as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor before the wind: "I have seen the wicked highly exalted and lifted up like the cedars of Libanus. And I passed by, and lo! he was not: and I sought him, and his place was not to be found." Ps. xxxvi, 35, 36.

Lord Arundel, knowing well that man has no power to invent or to make the Law of Nations obligatory, aims, in the second place, to trace its origin in tradition back to Noah, and through him to Adam in whom it was infused by his Maker, and from whom it has been tradited to all the

families, tribes, and nations of his posterity, spread as they are over the whole face of the earth. This leads him to an examination of the mythologies of nations, in which are embodied and preserved the traditions of the race. His lordship finds that, in these mythologies, the people are represented as owing their civilization to the gods who taught them the use of fire, to plant corn and the vine, and the various arts of husbandry, to rear flocks and herds, who *gave them laws*, and raised them to a state of civilization. From the character of the principal feasts in honor of the services rendered the people by the gods, and the symbols and emblems used in them, he identifies these gods sometimes with Adam and his sons, Seth and Cain; sometimes, and more frequently, with Noah and his three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet, through whom the race was continued, its traditions preserved, and the earth repopled after the flood. Hence, he contends that the mythologies and traditions of the heathen, when properly explained, agree in ascribing the law of nations and civilization which it founds and sustains, to Adam, who received the law directly from his Maker, and its preservation and transmission through Noah and his three sons, to the several families, tribes, and nations until their posterity became divided. This accords with the Scriptural tradition, and is the only historical sense of which the mythological traditions and symbols are susceptible.

The only point here that we are not prepared to accept is, that the heathen mythologies originated in hero-worship, as his lordship contends, and that the nucleus of the myth is a real historical personage. The Scriptures tell us that all "the gods of the Gentiles are devils," and we do not find that the heathen ever raised deified kings and heroes to the rank of their greater gods or principal deities. But we agree that the devils worshipped by the heathen as gods, as the spiritists are now doing in our own country, gathered around them and appropriated to themselves, and set forth in their own distorted way, real historical traditions and events; and it is this fact, in our judgment, that has misled the majority of our most eminent mythologists. They seem to us to overlook the fact, that all the gods of the heathen, and therefore all the mythological gods, were literally devils, which is the real key to the false religions and mythologies of the Gentiles. But the point is not essential to his lord-

ship's argument. All that it requires in order to stand firm is, that the historical events, celebrated or commemorated in the worship of the devils, should be events, though distorted and disguised, ascribed to Adam, Noah, and other Scriptural personages in authentic tradition; and this much we think his lordship, as well as other mythologists, has sufficiently proved.

The noble author very justly rejects the practice so common of late, of writing history by induction from isolated facts and monuments, like the pretended histories of prehistoric times. He maintains that any attempted historical inductions from the facts or particulars disclosed by the analytical investigations of the various mythologies and mutilated and distorted traditions of the heathen, can give no trustworthy historical result. We can study them with advantage only when we have authentic tradition for our guide. This authentic tradition is recorded in the Scriptures, and has come down to us in its purity and integrity through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the church. The mythologies can add nothing to it; but, studied in its light, they bear witness to its universality, and tend to confirm it. This study is not necessary to our faith as Christians, but is very useful, as Cardinal Wiseman shows, in repelling a certain class of objections urged by infidels.

The fourth work on our list, by the Duke of Argyll, is a brief examination of the theory of the origin of civilization by Sir John Lubbock, and of the speculations of Charles Darwin on the origin of species and the descent of man. It is able, but too brief and sketchy to be generally satisfactory. His Grace, as does the late Dr. Whately, Protestant archbishop of Dublin, denies that the primeval man was a savage, or that the human race began in the lowest form of barbarism, and has risen to the highest civilization as yet attained to, by their own indigenous and unaided efforts. But his Grace relies very little on tradition, which, as a Presbyterian, it might be inconvenient for him to do; he is also disposed to concede a much greater antiquity both to the earth and to man, than we think there is any reason for doing. He maintains, against Darwin's theory of the development of new species by natural selection, that, as old species become extinct, God creates new species, and that not development, but creation is constantly going on. But as we intend to pay ere long our

respects specially to Mr. Darwin, we confine what more we have to say in this article to the savage theory of Sir John Lubbock.

Sir John holds that man began in the lowest barbarism in which he can exist as man, and, as we have said, has risen by force of nature or his own indigenous efforts to civilization, as he had probably previously risen from some lower animal, the ape, perhaps, to man; though we believe he does not actually assert that man is an ape or some other animal developed, but leaves us to believe it. We are perfectly familiar with Sir John's theory. We held and defended it for years, and pronounced it "the evangel of the nineteenth century;" for if it is not the theory of progress itself, it is built on that theory, and derives all its support from it. The theory makes two assumptions; 1: That the primitive state of the human race was the savage state, or that of utter barbarism; and 2: That men have risen from that state and advanced to the highest and most refined civilization yet reached, by their own inherent energy and indigenous efforts, without any supernatural instruction or foreign assistance. The first part is refuted by Lord Arundel in his conclusive proofs, that the law of nations, which we take it is the basis of all real civilization, is and can be no human invention, but is a universal tradition, handed down from Adam through Noah to us, embodied in all languages, and borne witness to by the consciences of all men and nations. Till this fact of universal tradition is overruled, Sir John's theory cannot be even entertained; for it is condemned by a higher authority than any that can possibly be alleged in its support. There is and can be no higher authority on the question than that of *Genesis*, which we cannot suffer to be disputed.

Is it alleged that science is science, and therefore certain and indisputable, and, consequently, that whatever conflicts with it is manifestly false? We reply, that nothing that conflicts with *Genesis* or Christian tradition, is or can be science. What is alleged as to the primitive state of the human race is not science, is only a theory or hypothesis. This is all that the scientists can even pretend. They must vindicate it, prove it to be science, before they can claim a hearing, or have any standing in court.

Sir John alleges that the primitive state of the human race was that of barbarism, but he does not and can not

allege this as a fact historically known or verifiable; he can and does allege it only as an inference or induction from certain isolated facts and monuments that in his judgment warrant it. But his judgment may be at fault; he may mistake the true sense of the facts and monuments on which he bases his theory, and consequently present only a baseless hypothesis. History cannot be evolved from one's "inner consciousness," or written by way of logical induction. Indeed, without the Biblical traditions, as Lord Arundel maintains, Sir John has and can have no key to the sense of the facts and monuments on which he relies, and no test to which he can bring his inductions and inferences for verification. The common practice of those who pretend to controvert Christian tradition in the name of science, of bringing forward an unproved and unprovable theory or hypothesis, which, *if true*, might be a serious objection, and then insist on our disproving it, or else giving up Christian tradition, is not logical nor scientific, and cannot be tolerated. It is for them to prove, not for us to disprove, their theories, hypotheses, conjectures, guesses. Till they are proved, they are not science and make nothing against us, even should we be unable to disprove them. A man may assert that the dogs that licked up Jezebel's blood were ringstreaked, and we could by no means disprove it. It is for Sir John to prove his savage or barbaristic theory, not for us to disprove it; and till he proves it, he cannot make it the basis of any valid argument or statement unfavorable to Christian tradition. Unhappily, the most unscientific and illogical reasoners we have ever encountered are precisely our professed scientists. Logic is a science which they seem by common consent to eschew as not necessary or useful to them.

The theory in question is based on another theory, that of progress, or that the race or species is naturally progressive, ever advancing in its march through the ages, from the imperfect towards the perfect. This being so, it is evident that the race must have begun in the deepest ignorance and the grossest barbarism. Hence the late Theodore Parker, a champion of progress, in undertaking to give in one of his sermons an account of the state of Adam, or the primeval man, gave a graphic and not untruthful picture of the average New Zealander. The slight defect was in omitting to prove that the New Zealander is the type of the primitive

man. Sir John gives a very elaborate, and, with one rather important exception, so far as our knowledge goes, a very true account of the mental and social condition of savages; but he also forgets to produce the proof that the primeval man was a savage. The conclusion drawn from the theory of progress is worthless, because that theory is itself not only unproved, but unprovable, nay, demonstrably false. It is unscientific, unphilosophical, and unhistorical.

Individual growth there is from infancy to manhood. Progress of individuals and even nations in culture, wisdom, virtue, religion, by the study of tradition, by foreign influences, or supernatural instruction and aid, there has been and may be; but none of the species, nor of the individual even, by his own inherent energy, or unassisted indigenous efforts. As far as there is any evidence touching the question, it proves not the progress of the species, but, if any thing, its deterioration. Even in the case of the lower animals, there is, aided by the science and art of man, no permanent, if any improvement at all, of the species or even of the breed. A better breed may be selected, but a new breed is never created; for, in crossing, there is always a reversion, after a few generations, to one or another of the original types crossed: which would seem to indicate the permanence and immutability of original species against the speculations of Darwin on the origin of species by natural selection, since it proves that they cannot be originated even by intelligent artificial selection.

The theory of progress on which Sir John relies, is inadmissible; for it asserts effects without causes, that nothing can make itself something, or, what is the same thing, that the stream can rise higher than its fountain, the effect surpass the cause, that man in and of himself can make himself more than he is. All growth is by accretion and assimilation from without. The germ of the oak containing the law of its development, is in the acorn; but, without air, light, heat, and moisture derived from without, the acorn will not germinate and grow into the oak. The law is universal. The human body grows and attains its maturity only under proper external conditions, and by assimilating its appropriate food. The soul can grow or advance only by assimilating spiritual instruction and moral truth, nor elevate itself to a higher condition without assimilating a grace from a

source above itself. So, if man had begun in the savage state, he could never by his own indigenous and unassisted efforts have risen above it. He could have got out of it only by the supernatural assistance of his Maker, which amounts to the same thing that Christian tradition asserts, and which the mythologies of all nations bear witness to, in ascribing the origin of their laws and civilization to the gods.

The theory is unhistorical. There is on record no instance of a savage tribe becoming by its own spontaneous and unassisted efforts a civilized people. All the historical authorities known to us agree in this; and we, who have been reading history all our life, have not been able to find an instance of the kind. Theorists who assert it, do not pretend that they have any strictly historical authority for it. It is not, they will own, a strictly historical fact, but an induction. If the primeval man was a savage, how has he become civilized, if the race is not progressive? The question reveals the true spirit of our modern scientists. They imagine a theory, then imagine another, equally baseless, to prove it. They prove that man began in the savage state, by the theory of progress; and the theory of progress, by the theory that man was originally a savage, and, consequently, could not become civilized if not progressive. Save in those physical sciences, where a crucial test is practicable, what is called modern science, or science in an absolute manner, and opposed to Christian tradition, is really nothing but hypothesis piled on hypothesis. It is gravely called science, so far as we can discover, only for the reason that it is *not* science. Yet we are gravely asked to give up our faith on its authority.

There may be instances in which a savage tribe has become a civilized people; but none in which it has become so by spontaneous development. It has always been by coming into relations, more or less intimate, with a people already civilized through missionaries, colonists, or conquest. We add not *trade*, for that exhausts savage and barbarous tribes, but, so far as history goes, never civilizes them. The Greeks attributed their civilization to Ægyptian and Phœnician colonies,—Cecrops in Athens, Cadmus in Thebes, etc. Modern historians have tried, indeed, to prove that both the Greek civilization and the Greek religion were indigenous; but this is more than the Greeks themselves pretended. In

later times, the Grecian genius influenced the form of their civilization and of their mythology ; but the Eastern origin of both is written on their very face. The ancestors of the English, that is, Britons, Kelts, and Teutons, were by no means savages. When we first catch some historical glimpse of them, they are unlettered, it is true ; but they have a very copious unwritten literature, if we may use the expression, considerable cultivation, and the principal elements of civilization. Nobody can say when the Irish civilization began, and the Britons, as painted by Cæsar, might want some of the elements of Greek and Roman civilization, but were not by any means a savage people. The Teutons or Germans, the descendants, we take it, of the white Scythians of Herodotus, and known in early history as Massagetæ, Getæ, Gettones, and later, as Gottones, Guttones, Goths, and Teutones, are never presented as pure savages, or an absolutely uncivilized people. They appear to have been, according to Ozanam, in his *Etudes Germaniques*, to have been in part an agricultural and sedentary people, with cities and villages, under a regular government, and civil and religious laws ; and, in part, a nomadic people of the same race, leading a pastoral life, and uniting with the sedentary population in case of military or predatory expeditions. Old Jernandes, a Christian Goth, in his history of his nation, indignantly repels the aspersion that they were uncivilized. Indeed they were not more superstitious than the Greeks and Romans, were far less cruel than the Romans, less unchaste, held marriage in greater respect, were far more truthful, and more faithful to their word, if we may credit the ecclesiastical writers who were contemporary with their invasion and conquest of the Empire. Indeed, except in literary, artistic, and scientific culture, it may be doubted if the Prussians, not Christianized till the twelfth century, are to-day much in advance of the Marcomans, the Allemanni, the Franks, the Goths, and Vandals, who overthrew the Empire of the West, and seated themselves on its ruins.

History presents us, or preserves for us the memory of no savage ancestors of the oldest civilized nations, the Ægyptians, Assyrians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Æthiopians, Abyssinians, Chaldeans, Persians, and Indians. Where then are the people or nations, civilized to-day, whose ancestors were savages, an ignoble herd roaming in

the forest, living in dens and caves, on nuts or wild roots, which they disputed with the swine; naked, without arms either of offence or defence except their fists, ignorant of the use of fire, and of the simplest agricultural or mechanical arts? The Greek and Latin poets describe their own ancestors in similar terms, it is true; but they never describe that condition as their primitive condition, or as that of the human race. It had, according to them, been preceded by the Saturnian Age of Gold. Their traditions are worth as much for the one state as for the other. Not only is there no instance on record of a savage people having attained to a civilized state by its own unaided efforts, but it is even doubtful if any tribe sunk in the *lowest* barbarism has ever by any means become a civilized people at all. We may well say Sir John Lubbock's theory is unhistorical.

Sir John, in his description of the mental and social condition of savages, fails to note that the most striking characteristic of the savage is precisely his stationariness or unprogressiveness. Ages on ages roll over him, and bring no change in his habits or in his condition. Heeren remarks truly that the description given by the companions of Alexander the Great, of the Fisheaters along the coast of Keramania, eastward of the Persian Gulf, answers equally for them to-day: a fact which affords a passable comment on the theory, that fish-eating tends to increase the power and activity of the brain on account of the phosphorus so abundant in fish. The savage is the greatest routinist in the world. Generation after generation follows in the track of its predecessor, fishes, hunts, makes war in the same manner, as regularly as the bee constructs her cell, or the beaver builds his dam, to-day as did the bee or the beaver four thousand years ago. The savage has to perfection the *nil admirari* of English high life. He has no wonder, no curiosity, no aspirations, no "inward questionings." His senses are acute, and he is a keen observer; but he never speculates or inquires into the meaning of facts beyond their direct bearing on his condition or pursuits in life,—fishing, hunting, circumventing an enemy, or eating and sleeping. His life runs from generation to generation in the same unalterable groove, unless something external to him intervenes to lift him to a higher plane and divert his course. He is in some sort a man petrified. Nothing is more absurd than

to suppose him capable, without assistance from abroad or from above, of changing his state for that of civilization, which repels rather than attracts him, as all who have studied his character well know.

Sir John Lubbock seeks to gain credence for his theory of the origin of civilization, by alleging certain anticipations among savages of civilization, and certain reminiscences of previous barbarism among the civilized. But the facts he adduces as anticipations of a coming civilization, may, as the Duke of Argyll very well observes, just as easily be explained as reminiscences of a lost civilization; and there is no objection to regarding the other class of facts as reminiscences of a vanishing barbarism. Though we deny that the race began in the lowest barbarism, we hold that no small portion of the human family, after the confusion of tongues at Babel, the apostasy of the Gentiles, and their dispersion in the days of Phaleg, lapsed into barbarism, into what the poets call the Iron Age. Those who wandered farthest from the original seats of the race, when all "were of one tongue and the same speech," fell the lowest, and, perhaps, are still savages. Others who wandered less far, and remained near the original seats of the race, deteriorated indeed, but not to so great a degree, and have been recovered to civilization, though retaining traces of the barbarism or semi-barbarism into which after the apostasy and dispersion they had fallen. This explains both classes of facts noted by Sir John, and accords with Christian tradition, as well as with the Gentile traditions preserved and transmitted in the heathen mythologies and by the heathen poets, as Lord Arundel, guided by the historical light of the Mosaic Records, has amply proved, whether we accept the doctrine which his lordship holds in common with the most learned and generally approved mythologists, that the greater gods of the Gentiles were Adam and Noah and their sons deified; or whether we reject it; for, as we have seen, these gods gather round them the Scriptural traditions, and appropriate to themselves the events and facts in the historical personages of that tradition celebrated or commemorated in their memorial festivals, sacrifices, and offerings. The devils cannot create; they can only use and corrupt what already exists.

The history of the human race on this globe is a history of deterioration rather than of progress. Progress there has

been by the supernatural teaching and assistance of Christianity, and where the Christian tradition has been preserved and conformed to in its purity and integrity. There was a marvellous progress in Europe from the sixth century to the sixteenth of our era under the powerful influence of the church, the disinterested, self-denying, and persevering labors of her devoted pontiffs, clergy, missionaries, and religious. But I find deterioration rather than progress in the Gentile world, both before and since the commencement of the Christian era. Great monarchies grew up, the Ægyptian, the Assyrian, the Medio-Persian, the Macedonian, but by conquest, annexation, robbery, and violence, like modern Prussia, or the present so-called kingdom of Italy; not by the internal growth of intelligence and virtue, by the strict observance of justice or the law of nations, nor by any elevation of the standard of civilization. They were all great tyrannies, a curse to the human race, and have all fallen through internal weakness and decay, and have either lapsed into barbarism, or have been superseded by barbarous tribes which they once held in subjection without civilizing them, and which now roam over the desolate sites of their former power, pitch their tents, or rob the unwary traveller among the mouldering ruins of their greatness. So, too, mighty Rome rose, became the haughty mistress of the world, but, like her predecessors, fell to pieces from her own rottenness; and it is due to the church she persecuted and sought to destroy, that her memory is not as completely lost as that of the great robber empires that once flourished in the East.

The history of these great empires that once grasped the world in their hands, is not the history of a progress in civilization, of social amelioration, nor of an advance in the arts and sciences. We find always their earliest civil constitution the most favorable to liberty and social well-being, to intelligence and individual growth. The oldest works of art are the best, the earliest literature is the richest and soundest. The oldest of the Hindu sacred books are the freest from superstition, and approach nearest to the Biblical doctrines and traditions; the two greatest poets of Greece, Homer and Hesiod, are the earliest known; the soundest elements of Greek philosophy are confessedly derived from the wisdom of the ancients, and the oldest laws are the wisest, the justest, and the most

salutary; and the changes introduced, which tend not to restore primitive legislation, are the effects and causes of deterioration in morals, manners, or social and political condition. The people who founded the city of Rome and gave it its renown, were less superstitious, less immoral, and had higher civic virtues as well as domestic, than the Romans under the Cæsars, whose corruption, luxury, and effeminacy, as well as cruelty and superstition, made holy men look upon their conquest by the German barbarians as a blessing to mankind.

The history of the apostate nations before the Christian era is a history of deterioration, of political and social corruption, of the progress of tyranny and oppression, of moral and religious degradation. We witness the same tendency in the modern nations that have apostatized from Christianity, and rejected the authority of Christian tradition. True religion and real civilization are inseparable; or, rather, true religion is civilization, or, at least, includes it. No people who believe and practise true religion, is or can be an uncivilized people. Adam received from his Maker the true religion, preserved by the patriarchs to Noah, and through him down to the building of the Tower of Babel; and so long as the race remained of "one tongue and the same speech," Genesis xi, they held and, externally at least, observed the true religion, the Christian religion (for there is and never has been but one religion properly so-called), and were civilized. With Nemrod, "the stout hunter before the Lord," probably commenced the great Gentile apostasy, and simultaneously the deterioration which resulted in the ignorance, superstition, devil-worship, and barbarism of the heathen. The conversion of a family, tribe, or nation to Christianity, brings it within the pale of civilization. Before the opening of the sixteenth century the church had converted and, therefore, civilized the various families, tribes, and nations of Europe, with the exception of the Turks encamped on its south-eastern margin, whom the schismatic Greeks, severed from the source of Christian life and power, were impotent either to convert or to expel; she had opened the route to the East by way of the Cape of Good Hope, and had also discovered this Western Continent, and was preparing to convert and, therefore, to civilize the barbarians and savages of the other three quarters of the globe, when came the so-called Re-

formation, favored by the sovereign princes, to renew the great Gentile apostasy, and caused that "falling away," predicted by St. Paul.

The history of these modern apostate nations is the exact counterpart of that of the ancient Gentile nations. They reject the law of God, and therefore the law of nations, recognize no law that comes from a source above the nation, or which man himself does not make. They are every day losing sight of the moral order and of the divine government. They exclude God from the affairs of this world, and make either Cæsar or the people supreme and independent. They recognize no authority but that of the prince or that of the majority, and no measure of right, as we have seen, but might or physical force. They may recognize in some extramundane region a divinity that dozes all day and sleeps all night, and takes no care how the world wags. They may even admit his supreme authority, but only in a vague and indeterminate sense, as an abstraction, without visible organization or organs, and therefore without any practical efficacy in the government of men or nations. They worship Fortune as the supreme goddess, and hold Success to be the test of merit. Losing causes are always wrong, and God is always on the side of the strong, just now on the side of Prince von Bismarck and Victor Emmanuel; as in my boyhood, when the pope was held a prisoner at Savona or Fontainebleau, he was said by the preachers to be on the side of Napoleon I, who was identified with the Man-Child of the Apocalypse. These nations are laboring with might and main to make education purely secular, to exclude religion from the schools, and to train up the rising generation in atheism, which they call *science*, as they call religion superstition. They boast of their "enlightenment," but their enlightenment consists in forgetting or despising the wisdom and common sense of their ancestors; they boast of their progress, but in the moral and spiritual order, in religion and the basis of civilization, their progress, as we said years ago, is in losing, in unclothing, and reducing themselves to utter nakedness. The only progress they can boast is in the purely material and mechanical order. Their moral, social, political, and educational reforms are all failures, or rapid strides towards barbarism. But even in their mechanical and material progress, the good gained is more than counterbalanced

by the evil that accompanies it. It enriches a few, but trebles the burdens of the poor. What gain is it to the poor man that he can buy a coat for one-fourth of the price paid by his great-grandfather, when he must have six coats where his great-grandfather needed but one? They boast of the progress of liberty? When was there less liberty in Germany or Italy than now? They boast of democracy, but democracy only substitutes the mob for Cæsar, or the irresistible tyranny of soulless corporations for the prince, as we see in our own country, where the cost of living for poor people is greater than in any other country on earth, and where corporations govern the government.

When the people have lost the sense of the moral order, when religion has lost its hold on them, or when it is at best only a disembodied idea, without organs through which to make known and apply the divine law, and is practically only what each one's own fancy, prejudices, interests, passions, or caprice make it, or, if organized at all, subordinated to the prince, as the imperial government of Germany and the robber government of Italy contend that it should be; when the law of nations is reduced to a mere convention, pact, or agreement between nations, which in practice is only what the will of the stronger party dictates; and when the government has no authority from God to govern, and has no powers but such as it holds from the governed,—there is no civilization, and society is undeniably on the declivity to the lowest barbarism, whether we believe it or not. Such is the state towards which modern society is at least tending, and which it has well-nigh already reached. The modern apostate nations may not have, in all respects, as yet sunk to the lowest depths of the ancient world, but in some respects they have sunk lower than Greece or Rome.

These considerations are sufficient to refute Sir John's theory in both its parts, and to prove that man is not naturally progressive, or capable in and of himself of emerging from the savage state, and that, when left to himself, to his own strength alone, he deteriorates instead of advancing. And it must be so, for man is not in a state of pure nature, but is always either lifted above nature, or dragged by Satan below it. The moment a man abandons religion, turns his back on Christ the Lord, he does not fall back on pure nature, but he falls under the influence of Satan, becomes

captive to the devil, who leads him socially into barbarism, and individually, or, as to his soul, down to hell. Hence the reason why the secular order cannot stand without the spiritual, and why educating and disciplining the natural powers in relation to a natural end never suffices to secure it. When *ex-Père* Hyacinthe represented a distinguished American priest, a convert, as denying that he had ever been a Protestant, and claiming that, prior to his conversion, he was simply a natural man, he overlooked the fact, that nature is in bondage to Satan, till liberated by regeneration in Christ. We are, *in hac providentia*, never simply natural men standing on the level of nature, but always below that level, if not raised by grace above it. Hence, as Görres writes in his *Christliche Mystik*, "Man is always either ascending under divine influence, or descending under demoniacal or satanic influence." Who does not ascend, descends. By the prevarication of Adam, as we read the Council of Trent, man lost the supernatural justice in which he was originally constituted, and the integrity of his nature annexed thereto, became darkened in his understanding, enfeebled in his will, and fell into bondage to the devil. Hence, when not liberated by grace from bondage to the devil, or when they apostatize from Christ the Liberator, men and, through them, nations cease to ascend or to aspire, and come under the power of Satan who drags them downward, downward, till they recognize and worship him as God, as did the heathen, and as do again in our own community the modern spiritists.

The modern doctrine of progress is not yet a century old, and yet we told the truth when, some thirty years ago, we pronounced it the "creed of the nineteenth century." It is held by almost everybody with unquestioning faith, or, rather, with the blind credulity of the fanatic. It pervades all popular literature, even most scientific treatises; it is iterated and reiterated *ad nauseam* by the press, from the stately quarterly, the infallible daily, down to the seven-by-nine weekly; it is in the air, it is truly the *Welt-Geist*, and who sings not its praises is outlawed, insulted, laughed at, denounced, is an *oscurantisti*, an old fogie with his eyes on the backside of his head, a dweller among tombs, a spectre, a shadow, not a living, breathing man. It is one of the strangest delusions that has ever seized and carried away the human mind, and in it Satan would seem to have outdone himself.

With not a particle of evidence to sustain it, treading on an earth covered all over with ruins, we know not how many layers deep, with the unmistakable signs of deterioration, weakness, and decay everywhere staring us in the face, we yet are deluded enough to assert that man is naturally progressive, and that the nations would pursue a steady march towards the realization of an earthly paradise, much more desirable than the heaven hoped for by Christians, but for the priests, but for the pope, just now but for the Jesuits! Well, it is rather characteristic of insane persons to be spiteful towards their best friends, and to be the most enraged at those whom they, when sane, love best and esteem the most. I had a crazy aunt who in her lucid moments loved and adored her husband, but in her crazy fits would scream, rave, and tear as if a thousand devils were after her, if he but offered to approach her.

What has no reason can hardly be said to admit of a rational explanation. There are men who, because conscious of knowing more than they did when first breeched, fancy that they know just so much more than the rest of mankind. Mr. Herbert Spencer has hit upon the theory of Evolution, and forthwith puts it out as a new system of philosophy, as a decisive fruit of progress, although it is only the revival of the Flux and Reflux of old Heraclitus, exploded ages ago. Men made certain discoveries in chemistry and electricity new to them and their contemporaries, and immediately proclaimed them as new discoveries in science; yet no chemist can tell us even how Titian, not a very ancient painter, compounded his colors, or of what materials. The ancients, it is probable, knew as much of electricity as we do; they certainly understood ground-lightning, of which our electricians knew nothing a few years since. But have not the moderns discovered steam and its uses, invented the steam-engine, the steamboat, the steam-spinner and weaver, the steam-mill, the railroad, the locomotive, and the lightning telegraph? We concede it. But then they are in the material and mechanical order, an order below, not above, man. They may or may not be useful results of the application of the mind to particular branches of science bearing on material production, transit, and communication, but they do not elevate man, and are no progress in religion, sanctity, morality, truth, justice, the law of nations, which

form the basis of civilization, and without which civilization would be only a polished barbarism. To worship steam is, after all, not much in advance of the worship of his fetiche, Mumbo Jumbo, by the African negro.

But no matter. There certainly has been progress in one thing, of some sort; therefore man is progressive by the inherent force of his nature; therefore might, by his own indigenous and unassisted efforts, have risen from barbarism to civilization. If he might or could, he of course did. So that point is settled. Furthermore, the English in pursuit of gain opened up India and eastern Asia, and the French expedition opened up Ægypt and her long-forgotten lore to the scholars of the West, who commenced creating a science of comparative religion. The examination of the Ægyptian, Hindu, Chinese, and other mythologies, did not present any evidences of progress in themselves, they even gave unmistakable signs of a deterioration, and that their purest period was their earliest. But this counted for nothing; for these were evidently superior, on the one hand, to the fetichism of the lowest barbarians or savages, and inferior, on the other, to Christianity, or the sublime monotheism of the synagogue and the church. Assuming that the race began in utter barbarism, and that religion is a fact in the natural history of man, fetichism must have been the primitive religion, the earliest form with which the religious sentiment clothed itself. Thus, from fetichism to the mythologies of the mystic East, Ægypt, Chaldea, China, and India, there is manifestly a progress, although in them all traces or reminiscences of primitive *fetich*-worship are found. The religious sentiment, which is man's natural aspiration to the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, gradually separates as men's ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness become purified, expanded, and elevated, from these forms become too gross, too narrow, "too strait" for it, and it clothes itself with new forms that give it more room and freedom to expand, and thus advances to polished Greek and Roman polytheism, the most graceful, the broadest, and the most advanced of the Gentile religions. But still refining, purifying, and enlarging itself, the religious sentiment takes another step forward, and develops and realizes in fixed institutions Jewish and Christian monotheism, of which the Catholic Church embodies the highest ideal as yet realized. Clearly, then,

man is progressive, and is for ever advancing towards the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, but to which he never fully attains.

This is substantially the reasoning by which men, not absolutely in need of physic and good regimen, sustain their doctrine of the natural or inherent progressiveness of the human race. But there is a difficulty in the way of this conclusion. It assumes that fetichism and the various mythologies successively developed, are all older than Christianity, and that whatever is detected in any of them coincident with Christian doctrine or practice, is an anticipation of Christianity, or an indication of the goal towards which the race is advancing with what speed it can. This difficulty, very slight, no doubt, in the estimation of modern scientists, who treat religion simply as a fact in the natural history of man, a physiological or psychological fact, but rather serious in the estimate of an old fogie like ourselves,—is, that Christianity, under the patriarchal form, is at least two thousand years older than the oldest of the heathen mythologies or superstitions, and is itself the primitive religion. The oldest historical document in existence is the Hebrew book of *Genesis*, and in it we find that the Christian religion, under the patriarchal form—differing from Christianity, as held by the church, only in the respect that the patriarchs believed in Christ who was to come, and the church in Christ who has come and done the things necessary to perfect their faith, Heb., xi, 40—was the religion of Adam and his posterity before and after the Deluge, till the building of the Tower of Babel, the confusion of tongues, the dispersion of mankind, and the Gentile apostasy. The earliest of these heathen mythologies and superstitions date only from a period long subsequent to Noah's flood, and consequently cannot have been the germs from which Christianity has been developed. This is established by Lord Arundel, who shows that in them all are reminiscences of Noah, the Ark, and the destruction caused by the Deluge. This chronological difficulty upsets the whole theory, that man is naturally progressive even in religion, and shows that the heathen religions in any form are not primitive, but departures from and corruptions of the primitive religion, as Protestantism is a corruption, by way of mutilation and travesty, of Christianity as taught by the church authorized by God himself to teach it. As nobody who

knows both Protestantism and Catholicity can for a moment doubt that the latter is older than the former, or that Protestantism is a corruption of the Catholic type; so no one who knows the patriarchal religion and the several forms of heathenism, can have any doubt as to which is primitive, or that heathenism is a corruption of the patriarchal type.

The modern theory, that religion is a fact of the natural history of man, as carnivorousness is a fact of the natural history of the lion or tiger; or if understood to mean any thing else than that wherever and in whatever condition we find him, savage or civilized, he has some form of religion,—is untenable. The human soul does not secrete religion as the liver secretes bile, or the stomach the gastric juice, because even in the grossest superstition the human will intervenes. Man is no more capable of inventing religion than he is of inventing language, and it has been well said that, to invent language, language itself is necessary. To pretend, as it is the fashion at present to do, that man has by nature the faculty of speech, and attains to language by its spontaneous exercise, is equally unsatisfactory. The faculty of speech is simply the faculty of using language which one has learned from a teacher, not the faculty of creating or producing language; as is evident from the case of born deaf-mutes, who want neither the faculty nor the organs of speech, and who, if cured of their deafness, can learn to speak. Besides, language embodies ideas, the profoundest philosophy, which comparatively few of those who use it are capable of grasping. Men could have language only by learning it, or by its being infused into Adam along with the knowledge it embodies, or the ideas which it signifies or expresses.

Religion could not have originated as a function or a spontaneous operation of human nature, for it is objective as well as subjective. Schleiermacher, so long court-preacher at Berlin, and whose *Glaubenslehre* is yet, we believe, held in some repute, makes the essence of religion purely subjective, and defines it to be "the sense of dependence." That man has the sense of dependence, or the consciousness that he does not suffice for himself, is unquestionably a fact; but this is not religion till it is bound to some object independent of one's nature, on which one believes himself dependent, and which he holds to be able to do him good or to do him harm. This implies the idea or conception of the objective, and

therefore of something which is neither sense nor sentiment. In all religion there is an act of belief in the divine, in the relation of the soul to it, and in its obligation to adore it, as well as the act of adoration itself. Those two acts require the exercise of both intellect and will, and hence religion is not and cannot be a simple spontaneous, or a blind and indeliberate, product of human nature. The essential nature of religion is such that it could not have been a human invention, nor a spontaneous expression of human nature. The object presented is not in man, and therefore could not be developed, as say the heterodox Germans, from his "inner consciousness." It depends on an object not only independent of man, but above him; and in no case does or can the human mind seek and find its object, for in no case can it act without it. To every thought both subject and object are necessary, and both cannot concur in the production of thought, unless both are given. The object on which all religious thought depends is the divinity, and the divinity can be given only by its own act. All religion implies God, and God can be thought only through his own act affirming or revealing himself. Religion could then never have existed without God, or have had any but a divine origin. False religions are therefore impossible without the true.

The primitive religion, since divinely given, must have been not a false, but the true religion, recognizing the true God in his true character, and the true relation of man and nature to him. Men may corrupt or falsify religion or the divine tradition of religion, but could never originate it; for the inward sentiment, however you define it, can of itself attain to nothing even in conception or imagination beyond, above, or distinct from itself. The fetiche-worshipper must have believed that God is and is to be worshipped, before he could have identified him with his fetiche, whether an animal, a block, or a stone. He who has no conception of God cannot identify him with the wind, the storm, the elemental forces of nature, or adore him in the sun, the moon, and stars, or in images made by men's hands. Not one of the heathen mythologies, idolatries, terrible and abominable superstitions, could have existed, if they had not been preceded by the true religion, of which they are human and satanic corruptions. The theory, then, that the race began in the lowest and grossest feticism, and that in the various heathen

mythologies, idolatries, and superstitions, we can trace the upward progress of the human mind to the Christian Church,—is absolutely untenable, as unphilosophical as it is unhistorical. The very fact that it can find currency with the leaders or would-be leaders of the science and erudition of the nineteenth century, is a striking proof of its falsity, of the deterioration instead of the progressiveness of the race.

We think we have said enough to show that Sir John Lubbock's theory, that the savage is the type of the primeval man, and which is, except with those who receive the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX, dated December 8, 1864, and the decrees of the Vatican, and perhaps a few laggard Protestants, the generally received theory of our times, certainly of the so-called movement party,—is as baseless as a castle in the air, and not only incapable of proof, but demonstrably false and absurd. The theory of progress to which it appeals for support, is equally baseless. I think I have shown it to be so in this article; and I had previously shown it to be so, when urged against the immobility of the church and the unchangeableness of the Catholic faith, in my little work, published by the Sadliers, entitled "Conversations on Liberalism and the Church," to which I take the liberty to refer the reader, as well as to several articles on the same subject which I contributed sometime since to the *Catholic World*.

We have treated our modern scientists, sciologists they should be called, and their theories and speculations, it may be thought with scant courtesy, but we hope not with unfairness. We think it is time that the interests of truth, religion, society, civilization, should be consulted rather than the feelings or reputation of such pretended scientists as Professors Tyndall and Huxley, as Charles Darwin and Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock and Herbert Spencer, and others who, under the honorable name of science, are doing their best to sap, in the cultivated classes as well as in the popular mind, the very foundations of religion, morality, civilization, even society itself. The earlier works of Sir Charles Lyell may be excepted from this censure; but his "Antiquity of Man," and his acceptance of Darwin's origin of species in natural selection, authorize us to class him with the common herd of antichristian scientists. These men, who set up what they call science as the test of revelation,

or of moral and religious truth, are the enemies of both religion and science, and the friends of either should keep no terms with them. They serve neither God nor man, neither the interests of time, nor those of eternity. Christian tradition is the test of truth, and nothing can be science that is opposed to it, or incompatible with it. He who knows Christian tradition has no need to examine a theory that contradicts it, or to weigh the facts and reasons alleged in its support; he knows beforehand that it cannot be true, and is to be indignantly rejected at once.

We reverse the common way of putting the question. Of course, there can be no conflict between real science and divine revelation; therefore we say, if what you call science conflicts with revelation, it is false and no science at all; but they say, *therefore* if your alleged revelation conflicts with science, it is false, no real revelation, but a gross imposition. Some Christians consent to this way of putting it, which is making science the test of revelation, not revelation the touchstone of science. We object to this. It is so-called science, not revelation or Christian tradition, that is on trial. The thing questioned is the alleged science, and it is for it to prove that it accords with Christian tradition, or does not conflict in any respect with revelation. We do not pretend to construct science *a priori*; we leave to scientists their method of induction without any interference or obstruction, to find out all the truth they can, and set forth and defend it without let or hindrance from theology; but if any of their inductions come athwart Christian tradition, we pronounce them at once unscientific and false; for theology is the queen of the sciences. The Holy Father does not undertake to teach the sciences; he leaves the scientists themselves to do that; but he is the infallible judge of faith, and knows that no proposition, false in faith or theology, can be true in science. So when they allege as science what is false in faith or theology, he condemns it, and forbids it to be defended or even entertained by Christian men.

In answering, as we have done, certain theories and speculations of scientists, we make no war on science or scientific pursuits. We may not believe the results of science are as great or as valuable as the scientists pretend; we may even doubt whether society has upon the whole gained any thing by the marvellous inventions of labor-saving machinery, by

the various applications of steam as a motive power, or from railroads and magnetic telegraphs; but we are ourselves fond of scientific pursuits, and we honor science, and even scientists in their place, and when they do not conclude, because they know something of granite, gneiss, feldspar, mica, silix, and slate, and can talk flippantly of old red sandstone, and the different geological ages of the globe, that they are therefore qualified to judge of theology, ethics, history, and civilization; or any better qualified than simple men like ourselves who know little of such things, but who do know our catechism, and, knowing that, know enough, when the scientists bring forward inductions, theories, hypotheses, and speculations that conflict with it, to know that they are not science, but are baseless and false. We know enough of science to know that a man cannot lift himself by his own waistband, or make himself more than he is, and therefore that the alleged law of progress is not science; and when one asserts the identity of gratitude and gravitation, and therefore denies all distinction between physics and ethics, we know enough to tell him that he knows less of science than he imagines.

There are some scientific men whom we love and honor; but they are men of real science and learning, modest and humble, who do not imagine that all science was born with them or their generation. They know the present and are not ignorant of the past. They believe Horace when he says, "Brave men lived before Agamemnon." They know the traditions of the race and respect them; and distrust all theories, speculations, or inductions of their own which conflict with Christian tradition, as defined by the divinely appointed and infallible authority. They try their science and erudition by authentic tradition, not this by them, feel themselves honored in doing so, and supremely blest in having an unerring standard of truth to which they can appeal, or an unfailing light to guide them in their researches, and to save them from falling into dangerous or destructive errors. These men have not less science or learning, but they have less pride and arrogance. than the men we have named; nay, surpass them in their science and learning as much as they do in their modesty and humility. We think they should take up the proud and boastful sciolism now so popular and so menacing, and not leave the task of rebuking

and refuting its pretensions in such unskilful and incompetent hands as ours.

But I may say, in conclusion, I have uttered and recorded anew my protest against Sir John Lubbock's theory, which was my own in earlier years, and which I defended earnestly till the end of 1842. It was the discovery of its unscientific character, its utter untenableness, that converted me from the rabid radicalism which I had defended all my life, to conservatism, and prepared the way by divine grace for a further conversion, that to the Catholic, the Christian, faith. I learned then that the spirit of the age is not necessarily divine, nor always an infallible criterion of truth and error, or of right and wrong; that, if popular sentiment is in general on the side of justice, popular opinion is not seldom simply a popular delusion. I have in this article combated a popular delusion, not with any hope of recovering the deluded, for no one can be reasoned out of a delusion, but in the hope of guarding those yet in their senses from losing them. The recovery of the deluded can be effected only by divine grace.

ART. V.—*Democracy favors Inequality, and is a heavy burden to the People.*

DURING our late civil war it was almost proverbial to call our government the best government under heaven; and whoever in the loyal states expressed an opinion to the contrary ran some risk of being sent to Fort Lafayette, Fort Warren, or to some other Federal place of imprisonment. I defended the government during those fearful times, and stood by it when many a stout heart failed, because it was the government of *my* country, and I owed it the allegiance due from the citizen; but never since the "Hard-Cider" campaign have I believed it practically "the best government under heaven," or superior to almost any other civilized government. "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" upset my democracy, by showing how easily the people can be humbugged and carried away by a song. Till then I had believed in democracy, though I believed in little else.

My friend, the Hon. George Bancroft, defined democracy, in a lecture which I published in my *Boston Quarterly Review*, to be "Eternal justice ruling through the people:" I defined it in a series of Resolutions adopted by a democratic state convention, to be the "Supremacy of man over his accidents"—meaning thereby that democracy regards the man as more than his possessions, social position, or any thing separable from his manhood—and got most unmercifully ridiculed for it; but the ridicule did not move me, and I held fast to the doctrine, that the will of the people is the most direct and authentic expression of the divine will that can be had or desired. The people held with us then, in some respects, the place the church now holds with us. We labored under the comfortable illusion that, in order to secure wise and just government, all we had to do was to remove all restrictions on the free and full expression of the popular will, and to leave the people free to follow in all things their own divine instincts. The defects of bad legislation to which I could not shut my eyes, I attributed not, to democracy, but to the fact that the democratic principle was obstructed, and the will of the people could not have its free and full expression. There were still many restraints on their will, retained from old monarchical and aristocratic institutions; such as an independent judiciary, and the English Common Law with its subtilties and technicalities. These should all be swept away, and the unrestrained will of the people be supreme, and make itself felt alike in the administration of justice, and the election of representatives in the legislature and in all the offices of the government, state or national. To secure the rule of justice and the recognition of the man over his accidents, every thing should be swept away that imposed the least check on the direct and immediate action of the popular will. People, though adopting the democratic principle, told me I went too far, but I knew I was logical; and I have never in my life been able to persuade myself that a principle, really sound and true, will not bear pushing to its last logical consequences. If the democratic principle will not bear being so pushed, it is simply a proof that it is untrue, and cannot be safely adopted. This was my reasoning then, and is my reasoning now. The country, public opinion, gave me the principle, furnished me the democratic premises, and I took it for granted that the prin-

ciple was sound and the premises indisputable, as do the majority of my countrymen.

The "Hard-Cider" campaign of 1840 came. In it I took an active part on the democratic side, in behalf of Martin Van Buren, the last first-class man that sat, or probably that ever will sit, in the presidential chair of the United States; and my party was, as all the world knows, wofully defeated. It was the first presidential campaign in which I had ever taken an active part, and almost my first experience in practical politics. It was enough. What I saw served to dispel my democratic illusions, to break the idol I had worshipped, and shook to its foundation my belief in the divinity of the people, or in their will as the expression of eternal justice. I saw that they could be easily duped, easily made victims of the designing, and carried away by an irresistible passion in the wrong as easily as in the right. I was forced by the shock my convictions received, to review first my logic, and then to examine the premises which I had taken on trust from my democratic countrymen, which I had not hitherto thought of questioning. I found them untenable and absurd. I ceased henceforth to believe in democracy, but I did not cease to be a loyal citizen, nor did I deem it necessary to abandon the democratic party so called, which, after all, was less unsound, less radical, and more conservative than the whig party, which had carried the elections; but I labored day and night with voice and pen, in the *Boston Quarterly Review* and in the *Democratic Review*, to make it still more conservative, and to convince its leaders that the people as the state need governing no less than the people as individuals. So I labored till my happy conversion to the church, when, having no associations with the Catholic population of the country, except our common Catholic faith, I ceased to have any political influence; and if I resume the discussion of political topics, it is solely with the hope of being of some service to my ingenuous, pure-minded, and educated young Catholic friends, destined to exert a powerful influence for good or for evil on the political future of the republic.

The great democratic principle was asserted by the Congress of 1776, in the declaration that "Governments derive their just powers from the assent of the governed." They thus declared that governments originate in convention, and that

law derives its force as law from the will of those it is to bind. This asserts the purely human origin of government, and rejects all law enjoined by any authority above the people. It denies the right or authority of any government to command, for no such right or authority can be created by any convention or agreement; it denies, also, all law that restrains the will of the governed. That the law binds only by virtue of the assent of those on whom it is to operate, Gallicans asserted in principle, in asserting that papal constitutions do not bind the conscience unless assented to, at least tacitly, by the church. This principle, which reverses all one's natural ideas of government and law, the recent Council of the Vatican has condemned, when applied in the spiritual or ecclesiastical order; and we see no reason why a Catholic should not condemn it, when applied in the political and civil order. No government that has real authority to govern, can originate in convention alone; for the convention itself needs to be authorized by a law or an authority superior to itself, since St. Paul teaches, *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*. Where there is no law of nations, which the nation itself is bound to obey, there may be national force, but no national right or authority to govern. Laws that emanate from the people, or that are binding only by virtue of the assent of the governed, or that emanate from any human source alone, have none of the essential characteristics of law, for they bind no conscience, and restrain, except by force, no will.

We do not allege that human governments have no legislative authority or power to enact laws and bind the conscience; but that authority, that power is not derived from a human source, and is held only from the divine law under which they are constituted. Governments that have only a conventional origin, and only such powers as are held from the assent of the governed, have no such authority, no such power. The grand objection to democracy, then, is, that it rejects the law of nations, the *jus gentium*, denies the rule of eternal and immutable right, and resolves eternal justice into more conventionalism, and, if a government at all, it is simply a government of force, under which, as we have seen in the foregoing article, might makes right. I am not arguing against a republic, or a government largely popular in its constitution and administration, such as ours was intended to be; but against the democratic principle, that founds govern-

ment in convention, and derives its powers from the consent of the governed, or which applies to the civil order the Gallican principle, condemned by the Council of the Vatican, when applied in the spiritual or ecclesiastical order. It makes the people who are to be governed superior to the government, and leaves their will supreme, subject to no authority, bound by no law. It is, therefore, simply the principle of political atheism. So far as the national authority is concerned, the principle is not confined to a popularly constituted government, but is accepted and acted on by most modern governments, especially by the Sardinian, the Prussian, the Russian, and we fear also the Austrian, in none of which is the law of nations, binding the conscience of the nation itself, recognized.

The American constitution is not founded on political atheism, but recognizes, as we showed in our article last January on *The Papacy and the Republic*, the rights of man, and, therefore, the rights of God. There remain as yet among us some traces of the law of nations, as asserted by Lord Arundel of Wardour in his work on *Tradition*, reviewed in the preceding article, in distinction from the international law of the Benthamites and diplomates, which consists solely in conventional pacts and precedents, without any recognition of the rule of right, or of eternal and immutable justice. Something of Christian tradition lives among us and is kept alive by the common law and the judicial department of the government, though, latterly, too often overruled by the legislative department which is continually encroaching on the province of the judiciary, as we see in much recent Congressional legislation. What we complain of is the tendency of American public opinion, formed and directed to a great extent by popular journalism, to apply the naked, unmitigated democratic principle to the interpretation of the Constitution and what we call our American institutions; though what is really meant by this phrase which is in every one's mouth, it would be hard to say. Public opinion with us asserts and applies the democratic principle, which, as we have seen, liberates the people as the state from all government, and their will from all restraint; and leaves them perfectly untrammelled, free to do whatever they have the physical force to do. Their might founds and measures their right.

Is it not so? If not, why are the public so sensitive to the

assertion of any authority above the people, or of a law which does not emanate from the people, and which they are bound in conscience, collectively as well as individually, to obey? Why does our American public opinion applaud Prince von Bismarck and Victor Emmanuel for their efforts to subject all authorities or powers in the nation to the national will? The principle is the same whatever the form of government. In our country our Protestant fellow-citizens, being the majority, take great credit to themselves for "tolerating," as Dr. Bellows puts it, the Catholic faith and worship. Why, if not because they hold themselves free to prohibit them, if they should choose? Are they not, in fact, using the power numbers give them, to invade the Catholic conscience and deprive Catholics of their equal rights as parents and citizens, by compelling them to pay for the support of schools to which they are forbidden by conscience to send their children? Evidently they recognize no law of right or justice to which their will is subject, and which we may plead as our protection. The plea of justice in regard to public measures is rarely heard. Utility or expediency, not right or justice, is the standard adopted in politics, as external decorum or propriety is the rule in ethics. Even the late William H. Seward, when he appealed from the Constitution of the United States, which as senator he had sworn to observe, to the "higher law," only appealed from one human law to another, or from the particular to the general; for he appealed only to general humanity, whose rights he never dreamed of identifying with the rights of God. If the abolition party he represented appealed to the law of God as the law of nations, it was to that law without any court or tribunal to declare and apply it, and as interpreted and applied by the party itself. The abolitionist, with all his fine talk, fierce declamation in favor of a law above the state, would have recoiled from the assertion of a divinely instituted court or tribunal to interpret it and give it practical efficacy in the government of men and nations. He asserted it, but only on the condition that he should be free to interpret and apply it for himself; and hence his individualism nullified the law, and his humanitarianism was resolved, sometimes even avowedly, into no-governmentism.

I repeat, I am not warring against the political constitution of my country, nor am I seeking in any respect to

change it; for I am no revolutionist, no monarchist, no aristocrat. It is the spirit and opinions of the American people, or of the majority of them, that I want changed, and so changed as to interpret the constitution of American political society by the principles of law and justice, not by the democratic principle, which asserts the sovereignty of the arbitrary will of the people, or, practically, the unrestricted rule of the majority for the time: which is tyranny, and repugnant to the very essence of liberty, which is will ruled by right, or power controlled by justice.

The philosophers and statesmen of the last century supposed that the evil could be prevented, and the necessary restraints on the popular will or ruling majority could be imposed, by means of written constitutions, which, in the words of the Thetford stay-maker, author of the *Age of Reason*, could be "folded up and filed away in a pigeon hole." They supposed the people emancipated from superstition, as they called religion, and from priests and priestcraft, and left to the promptings of their simple nature, would always be guided by reason, and therefore needed only to be governed in their action by a wise and just written constitution. They held the people could be safely entrusted with the guardianship of the constitution, which was very much like locking up a man in prison, and giving him the key. But experience has proved that written constitutions, unless they are written in the sentiments, convictions, consciences, manners, customs, habits, and organization of the people, are no better than so much waste paper, and can no more restrain them than the green withes with which the Philistines bound his limbs, could restrain the mighty Samson.

John C. Calhoun, the most sagacious and accomplished statesman our republic has ever produced, and who appreciated the tyranny of majorities better than any other man amongst us, placed no confidence in written constitutions; but he hoped to restrain the popular will by dividing and organizing the people according to their different sectional pursuits and interests, or by organizing a system of "concurrent majorities." This would be, no doubt, an advance on simply written constitutions; but it is only in communities where the pursuits and interests of different sections of the population are very distinct, that it is practicable, or could be efficacious. Since the abolition of slavery, the population, pursuits, and interests

of the whole country are too homogeneous to allow the organization he demanded, or to admit the system of concurrent majorities. If introduced, it would be rendered ineffective by the great homogeneous interests and pursuits of the majority of the population, which would overpower and trample on all minorities opposed to them.

We hold that whatever constitutional or organic provisions may be adopted, the stronger interest of a country, in the absence of all recognition of the law of nations, limiting and defining the rights and powers of the nation, will govern the country, whether the interest and pursuits of the numerical majority or not; or at least dictate the policy of its government. For a time, the Southern States could protect their interests, and, to some extent, shape the policy of the government, because they represented the strongest of any one interest of the country, the interest of capital invested in labor; but when short crops and wars in Europe had created a demand for our breadstuffs and provisions, the products of the non-slave-holding states, and the produce of the California mines had strengthened the commercial and manufacturing interests, which already controlled the free states, and enabled the representatives of these interests to meet their foreign exchanges,—they were stronger than any interests the South could oppose to them. The South had then no alternative, but either to submit to be controlled by them, as the people of the non-slave-holding states were, or to secede from the Union, and endeavor to establish an independent republic for themselves. The struggle was a struggle of interests. The abolition fanatics were only the fly on the wheel, and the question they raised amounted to nothing in itself, and was of importance only as it was seized upon as a pretext, and had only this significance, that the business interests of the North could subject the interests of the South to their control only by destroying the southern capital invested in labor. Mr. Calhoun's policy, if carried out, might have staved off the crisis for a few years, but could not have prevented it or its final results.

I have said, in the absence of the law of nations, which, it cannot be too often repeated, is law for the nation as well for the individual, therefore law emanating from an authority above the nation, above and over the people. The attempt of modern statesmen, Mr. Calhoun among the rest, to con-

stitute the state without any power or authority above the people, so that by its own spontaneous working it should maintain order with liberty, and liberty with order, and promote the highest utility and the greatest happiness of the nation, is a vain attempt. The thing is impossible. No simply human wisdom, no adjustment of positive and negative forces, no organization of interests, or system of checks and balances, will do it. The English in their Constitution have carried to perfection their system of checks and balances, or of the organization of separate interests, classes, or estates, each with a negative on the others; yet, in spite of the national boasts, it works with difficulty, and one of the separately organized estates is swallowing up the others. It, in its present form, is hardly a century and a half old, and it undergoes a greater or less change every few years. The prosperity of England under it is commercial and industrial, and is due less to it, than to the fact that she has invented the art of converting debt into capital; and by means of the revolutions, and the wars growing out of them, of the continental states, she has contrived to bring the nations of the Old World and the New into debt to her, and to compel them to pour their surplus earnings into her lap. The nations live and labor to enrich her; and yet her overgrown wealth consists chiefly in paper evidences of credit, and might vanish in a day. Then her wealth is unequally distributed: a few are very rich in paper values, but in no country on earth is there greater poverty or more squalid wretchedness. Then we must take into the account her government of Ireland and India, worse than any of the proconsular governments of ancient Rome. She, also, owes more to her mines of tin, lead, iron, and coal, soon to be exhausted, than to the excellence of her political constitution, or the wisdom of her statesmen.

I cannot conceive a more profoundly philosophic, or more admirably devised constitution, than that of our own government, as I have endeavored truthfully to present it in my *American Republic*, published by O'Shea in this city, in the autumn of 1865. Yet, for the lack of the moral element in the American people, for the lack of a recognition of the law of nations emanating from an authority above the people, and binding the conscience of the nation, it is practically disregarded, and its wisest and most vital provisions are treated by the ruling people as *non avenues*. The people

have forgotten its providential origin, treat it as their own creature, as a thing they have made, and may alter or unmake at their pleasure. It is not a law enjoined on them, and has no hold on their conscience. They give it a purely democratic interpretation. Men talk of loyalty, but men cannot be loyal to what is below them and dependent on their breath; and, therefore, they violate it without compunction, as often as prompted to so do by their interests or their passions. Nothing was more striking during the late civil war than the very general absence of loyalty or feeling of duty, on the part of the adherents of the Union, to support the government because it was the legal government of the country, and every citizen owed it the sacrifice of his life, if needed. The administration never dared confide in the loyalty of the Federal people. The appeals made were to interest, to the democracy of the North against the aristocracy of the South; to anti-slavery fanaticism, or to the value and utility of the Union, rarely to the obligation in conscience to support the legitimate or legal authority; prominent civilians were bribed by high military commissions; others, by advantageous contracts for themselves or their friends for supplies to the army; and the rank and file, by large bounties and high wages. There were exceptions, but such was the rule.

"I will have a draft," said the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, to me one day in his office: "I will have a draft, if I get but one man by it, for I wish to assert the majesty of this government, its right to command the support of citizens in the ranks of the army, or elsewhere, in its hour of need. This reliance on large bounties and high wages, that is running up an enormous bill of expenses which the people must ultimately pay, is derogatory to the majesty of the government, obscures and weakens its authority, and appeals only to the lowest and most sordid motives of the human heart."—Well, the draft was ordered, and, as we all know, proved a failure. The government, indeed, asserted its majesty, but the people did not recognize it; they effectively resisted it, or came to a compromise. How could they see a majesty in a government they themselves had made and could unmake? The universal conviction of the conventional origin of the government despoiled it of its majesty. It had no majesty, no authority, but what it held

from the people, and could command no obedience but such as they chose to give it. If it went farther, it was by force, not by right: and fully did the administration feel it.

The conventional origin of the constitution excludes its moral or divine right, and therefore denies all obligations in conscience of the people, either collectively or individually, to obey it. It has nothing in it that one is morally bound to treat as sacred and inviolable. Its violation is no moral offence, for it is the violation of no moral law, of no eternal and immutable right. Nothing hinders the people, when they find the Constitution in the way of some favorite project on which they are bent, from trampling it under their feet, and passing on as if it never had any existence. The Constitution, to be respected, must be clothed with a moral authority, an authority for conscience, which it cannot be, if of conventional origin; and the government constituted has no just powers not derived from the assent of the governed.

This is wherefore no constitutional contrivances or combinations, however artistic or skilful, can be successful that have no support in the divine order. The government which has no authority for conscience, and none that holds not from God, and under his law, has or can have no authority for conscience, having no moral support, is impotent to govern, except by sheer force, as we have already shown over and over again. Now, as modern statesmen exclude the moral order, and make no account of the divine element in society, and rely on the human element alone, they are unable to clothe power with right, or to give it any stability. The revolutionary spirit is everywhere at work, and is kept down and a semblance of order maintained in Europe only by five millions of armed soldiers. In our own country, we owe such order as we have, first, to the fact that the government acts less as a government, than as the factor or agent of the controlling, that is, the business interests of the country; and second, to the fact that the American people are not yet completely democratized, but retain, in spite of their theory of the conventional origin of power, no little of their traditional respect for authority, and their obligation in conscience to obey the law. Yet, under the influence of their democratic training, they are fast losing what they have thus far retained from an epoch prior to the rejection of divine order by statesmen and the constitution of states.

Democracy which asserts the conventional origin of government, and thus excludes the divine order from the state, necessarily denies with Jeremy Bentham all rule of right, eternal and immutable, and can at best assert only the rule of utility, or, as commonly expressed, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number;" though Bentham himself changed in his later days the formula, and, for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, substituted as his political, juridical, and ethical formula, simply "the greatest happiness." This is the only formula of the sort that the purely democratic principle can adopt or accept. Democrats tell us this end is to be gained by getting rid of the burden of kings and aristocrats, and introducing not only equality before the law, but equality of rights and privileges, and carrying out the great principle, "All men are created equal." Equality of privileges is an absurdity, and there can be no rights where there is no right. But pass over this. "Democracy asserts and maintains equality!" Yes, *asserts* it, we grant, but it tends to promote the contrary. It operates practically, almost exclusively, in favor of those who command and employ capital or credit in business, and against the poorer and more numerous classes.

The political equality, expressed by universal suffrage and eligibility, is of no practical value; for, however elections may go, or whoever may be elected, the legislation will invariably follow the stronger interest, therefore the business interests of the country: it may be now the commercial interests, now the industrial or manufacturing interests, or, in fine, the railroad, and other business corporation interests. There is no help for it in universal suffrage. By excluding the moral element and founding the state on utility, democracy tends to materialize the mind, and to create a passion for sensible goods, or material wealth and well-being. Take any ten thousand electors at random, and ask them what they want of government, and the honest answer will be: "Such legislative action as will facilitate the acquisition of wealth." Suppose such action taken—and most of our legislation is of that sort—how many of the ten thousand are in a position to profit by it? perhaps, ten; perhaps, not more than one. Democracy excludes aristocracy in the European sense, an aristocracy founded on large landed estates, noble birth, education, and manners; and substitutes

for it an aristocracy founded on business capacity and capital or credit, a thousand times worse and more offensive, because more exacting, more insolent and haughty, always afraid of compromising its dignity by mingling with the poor or unfashionable, feeling that it is a sort of usurper, without any hereditary or legitimate claims to respect,—an aristocracy of *rôturiers*, the most contemptible as well as, socially and politically, the most galling of all possible aristocracies. We do not object to a man, or refuse to honor him, because he has risen from a gutter; but we do refuse to honor a man who was born in a gutter and has remained there, but claims respect simply because he has succeeded in gathering a mass of gold around him.*

Democracy, following the lead of the business classes, builds up, and with us has covered the land over with huge business and moneyed corporations, which the government itself cannot control. We complain of the great feudal barons, that they were often more powerful than their suzerain; but our railroad "kings" can match the most powerful vassals, either of the king of France, or of the king of England, in feudal times. Louis XI was not weaker against Charles the Bold, than is Congress against the Pennsylvania Central Railroad and its connections, or the Union Pacific, built at the expense of the government itself. The great feudal lords had souls, railroad corporations have none. Congress cannot resume specie payments, for the National-Bank interest opposes it; and so our commercial interests must bear the loss of a depreciated currency, and the laboring

* There is no mistake in saying that the mass of the electoral people demand of government such legislation in relation to business interests, as will facilitate the acquisition of wealth; nor in saying that all legislation of the sort does and must, as far as it has any effect, favor inequality, and enrich the few at the expense of the many. If all could avail themselves equally of such legislation, nobody would or could derive any advantage from it, and it would facilitate the acquisition of wealth for no one. Where there has been bad legislation, legislation creating monopolies, or conferring special business privileges on individuals, or a particular class or corporation, the repeal by the government of such legislation, may have, to a certain extent, the effect demanded, by removing restrictions. But no other legislation, save such as secures the citizen an open field for exertion, and the full possession of the fruits of his honest industry for facilitating acquisition of wealth, is possible except by facilitating the transference of the earnings of the many to the pockets of the few. Such is the effect of all laws designed to facilitate the operations of the business classes, and to promote business interests. Whether this is a good or an evil, certainly the inevitable tendency of universal suffrage and eligibility is to inequality, not to equality, as is pretended.

classes must continue to pay the higher prices for the necessities of life it creates. In a word, the business classes, according to the old whig party, the "Urban Party" of the time of Swift and Addison, or of Queen Anne's reign, have permanent possession of the government, and use it to further their own interests, which is a damage; for this country is fitted to be, and really is, a great agricultural country.

In the REVIEW for January, I showed the disastrous influence which the equality, asserted by democracy, and supposed to be favored by universal suffrage and eligibility, has on the laboring classes. It is to the honor of the church that she has always had a special regard and tenderness for the poor; and it is no less to her honor that she has never attempted to remove poverty. She always relieves distress when able, and solaces suffering whatever its cause; but she honors the poor, and treats poverty as a blessing, not as a misfortune. In her view, the poor are really the more favored class, and she never attempts, and has never enjoined it upon her children to attempt, to place them, as to the goods of this world, on an equality with the rich. She holds the thing neither practicable nor desirable. Democracy regards the poor as unfortunate, and undertakes to remove poverty by opening to them all the avenues of wealth, and to elevate them by establishing their political and civil equality; and thus leads them, as we see in the recently enfranchised negroes, to aspire to social equality. This causes them to be discontented with their lot, and makes them feel their poverty a real misery. It greatly enhances the expenses of their living. As a rule, men live for their families, especially for their wives and daughters, whom they would see live as well, be as well educated, and as well dressed as the wives and daughters of the better-to-do, whom democracy teaches them to regard as equals. The evil this causes is immeasurable. It induces not a few to live beyond their means, or to make a show of wealth which they have not; it creates a universal struggle to escape poverty, and to acquire riches as the means of equality and respectability. The passion for wealth, so strong in most Americans, and which is called by foreigners "the worship of the almighty dollar," is at bottom only the desire to escape poverty and the disgrace attached to it by democracy. Political economists regard this struggle with favor, for it stimulates production and

increases the wealth of the nation, which would be true enough, if consumption did not fully keep pace with production; though, if true, we could hardly see, in the increased wealth of the nation, a compensation for the private and domestic misery it causes, and the untold amount of crime of which it is the chief instigator. We regard it as an unmixed evil which could and would be avoided, if poverty were honored, and the honest and virtuous poor were respected according to their real worth, as they are by the church, and were in all old Catholic countries till the modern democratic spirit invaded them: "A contented mind is a continual feast," says the proverb.

Democracy, by its delusive universal suffrage and eligibility, stimulates a universal passion, as we have seen, for social equality, which can be gratified only by the possession of wealth or material goods; for democracy, excluding the moral order, can content no one with moral equality. "I am as good as you, and why should you be rich and I poor? Why should you live in a palace, and I in a mud hovel? Why should you ride in your coach and live in luxury, while I must trudge on foot, be thinly clad, and live on the coarsest and most meagre fare, which I can procure only with difficulty, sometimes not at all."—Just consider that there are in this city of New York, at least, forty thousand children, orphans or worse than orphans, absolutely homeless, who live by begging and thieving, and lodge on doorsteps, under the wharves, and in miserable dens; initiated, almost as soon as able to speak, into every vice and crime that finds opportunity or shelter in a great city: contrast these with the children brought up in elegant and luxurious homes, bearing in mind that democracy asserts equality, and say, if there is any thing singular in the logic that concludes communism from democratic premises, or if a Wendell Phillips is not a true and consistent democrat in defending the Paris Commune and the Internationale? Or if, when you denounce either as infamous, you do not forget your democracy, and borrow from an order of ideas that, though approved by Christian tradition, democracy excludes, or at least makes no account of?

But communism, which demands equality in material goods, is not only an impossibility, but an absurdity. Equality of wealth is equivalent to equality of poverty.

Wealth consists in its power to purchase labor, and no matter how great it is, it can purchase no labor, if there is none in the market; and, if all were equally rich, there would be none in the market, for no one would sell his labor to another. Then each man would be reduced to what he can produce with his own hands, wealth would lose all the advantages it has where there are rich and poor, and society would lapse after a generation or two into the lowest barbarism. Communism, if it could be carried out, would not, then, as the communists dream, secure to all the advantages of wealth, but would result in the reduction of all to the most abject poverty,—the very thing which they are ready to commit any crime or sacrilege in order to escape. All projects of reform of any sort, undertaken without divine authority and guidance, inevitably defeat themselves, and aggravate the evils they would redress.

Reject the communistic conclusion. The Democratic Equality asserted, then, can be, practically, only free competition, making all equally free to compete for wealth, and the good things of this world, and leaving each free to possess what he acquires. This is the interpretation democracy receives with us. But in this competition there is only a delusive equality. In it the honest man stands no chance with the dishonest. The baker who feels bound to furnish thirty-two ounces in his two-pound loaf, cannot compete with him who has no scruple in charging the full price of a two-pound loaf for eighteen ounces. So throughout the whole business world. It would be undemocratic for the law to interfere to protect those who are unable, no matter from what cause, to protect themselves. The law must leave all things of the sort to free competition, and to regulate themselves. We thus, under our democratic system, pay a premium for dishonesty, cheating, and knavery, and then are astonished at the daily increase of fraud and crime in the business world. We tempt men to get rich—honestly if they may, but at any rate to get rich—by the contempt in which we hold poverty, and the honor which we pay to wealth, as I have already intimated. Universal suffrage and eligibility can at best secure only this so-called free competition, and enact laws favorable to the acquisition of wealth. But men's natural capacities are unequal; and these laws, which on their face seem perfectly fair and equal, create monopolies which enrich a few

individuals at the expense of the many. There is far less equality, as well as less honesty and integrity, in American society, than there was fifty or sixty years ago. The honor paid to wealth, or what is called success in the world, is greater; people are less contented with moderate means, a moderate style of living, as well as with moderate gains, and have a much greater horror of honest labor. I remember when it was, in the country at least, regarded as an act of prudence for a young couple with little or nothing but health, industrious habits, and a willingness to earn their living by hard work, to marry and set up housekeeping for themselves. Now, except to a very limited extent, it would be regarded as the greatest imprudence. No little of that remarkable purity and morality for which the Catholic peasantry of Ireland are noted the world over, is due to early marriages, which the habits of the people encourage. Yet English and American economists denounce them, and represent them as due to the craft of the clergy who encourage them for the sake of the wedding-fee, and of the baptismal fees most likely in due time to follow. The purity and morality of our New-England people—I speak of them, for I was brought up among them—have diminished in very nearly the same ratio in which early marriages have been discontinued as imprudent, except with the very rich. The class of small farmers who cultivated their own farms, and by their labor, economy, and frugality obtained a comfortable living, and were able to establish one son in business, and to educate another to be a lawyer, a doctor, or a minister, to provide moderate portions for the daughters, and to leave the homestead to the eldest son,—has disappeared; and they have been obliged to emigrate, to exile themselves from their early homes and all the endearing associations of childhood and youth, though they go not beyond the limits of their own country. I myself am even more an exile, in my present residence, than my Irish or German neighbor; for he has near him those whom he was brought up with, knew him in his youth, while I have not one,—not one with whom I can talk over old times, or who knew me before I had reached middle age: and my case has in it nothing peculiar. But the fact, that no small portion of the American people have been separated from the old homestead and scattered among strangers, has a fatal influence in checking the development of their finer qualities, and in

throwing them for relief upon the coarser passions and grosser pleasures of sense.

There is less equality than there was in my boyhood, and the extremes are greater. The rich are richer, and the poor are poorer. The rich are also more extravagant and more fond of displaying their wealth, for, to the great majority of them, wealth is a novelty. Shoddy and petroleum, as well as successful speculation, have made millionaires and thrice millionaires of men of low and vulgar minds, destitute of social refinement and gentle breeding, whose wives and daughters know no way of commanding consideration or of attracting admiration, but by their furs and diamonds and their extravagant expenditures. The effect of this on the community at large, in producing a competition in extravagance, and enhancing the average expense and difficulty of living, is not easily estimated. There is no country in the world where the general extravagance is so great as in our own, or where the cost of living is greater for all classes. Some provision is made for paupers as for prisoners and criminals, but there is a larger class who are too honest to steal, too proud to beg, and too high-spirited to allow themselves to be sent to the almshouse; mostly women, many of them widows with one, two, or more small children, whose sufferings from want of sufficient food, decent clothing, and comfortable shelter, are not to be told. I attribute the sufferings of these to the delusive doctrine of equality, and the worship of wealth which democracy encourages, and the disgrace it attaches to poverty, and to humble labor for a living; for otherwise most of them could find relief and ample provision for their wants in domestic service. A really hereditary aristocracy produces no such evil, for between them and such aristocracy there is no competition. It is the burgher aristocracy and burgher wealth that treat poverty as a crime or a nuisance, and make our women and girls of American parentage shrink from domestic service as hardly less disgraceful than a life of shame.

The corruption generated by the struggle for wealth which democracy stimulates, is not confined to private and domestic life. It pervades public life. Señor Calderon de la Barca, the Spanish minister for several years to our government at Washington, told me in April, 1852, that when he was first sent by his government to ours at Washington, in 1822,

he was charmed with every thing he saw or heard. "The government struck me," he said, "as strictly honest, and your statesmen as remarkable for their public spirit, integrity, and incorruptibility. I was subsequently sent to Mexico; and when, recalled from that mission, I was offered my choice between Rome and Washington, such was my high opinion of the American republic, and the honesty and integrity of its government, that I chose Washington in preference to Rome, though the latter was more generally coveted. I have been here now for several years a close observer, and I have seen every thing change under my eyes. All my admiration for the republic and for republican government has vanished. I cannot conceive a government more corrupt than this government of yours. I see men come here worth only their salary as members of Congress, and in two or four years return home worth from a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand dollars."—This was said in 1852, when corruption was very little in comparison with what it has become. In 1822, the great body of the people were far from being democratized, and no party in the country bore or would consent to bear the democratic name. There was no democratic party in the country known as such, till after the inauguration of General Jackson as president, March 4, 1829; and none became predominantly democratic, till the success of the democratic whigs in 1840, who far outdid the Jackson-Van Buren party in their democracy. The late Horace Greeley always called that party the "sham democracy," and treated at first the whig party, and, after 1856, the republican party, as the genuine Simon-Pure democracy. He was right in one sense; for the whig-republican party was always farther gone in democracy, that is, in asserting the supremacy of the popular will and the exclusion of the moral order from politics, than was the party that bore the democratic name.

Up to the election of General Jackson, the American people, if adopting the democratic theory, were not governed by it; they still were influenced by ante-revolutionary traditions, recognized the moral order, the rule of right to which the people as the state as well as individuals were bound to conform; and I believed then and believe now that no purer government, indeed, no better government, existed under heaven. But since then the democratic

principle has passed from theory into the practical life of the people, and become the ruling principle of their political judgments and conduct, at least, to an alarming extent. The result we saw during the war, and still more plainly see in the corruption developed by the recent very imperfect investigations in Congress. We were told the main facts with regard to the *Credit Mobilier* over two years ago; and the real facts are far more damaging than any that appear from the investigation in Congress. But this, though perhaps on a larger scale, is yet in reality no grosser than the corruption that has for years obtained in Congress, the state legislature, the municipal governments, and the elections all over the country. It is in vain to look to legislation for a remedy. The laws are good enough as they are, and stringent enough; but laws are impotent where the people have become venal, and are easily evaded or openly violated with impunity, when they are not consecrated and rendered inviolable by the national conscience: and it is of the essence of democracy to dispense with conscience, and to attempt to maintain wise and beneficent government, without drawing on the moral order, by considerations of public and private utility alone.

The actual burden imposed by our democratic administrations, whether called democratic or republican, and including both the general government and the several state governments due to the democratic principle itself, cannot be even approximately ascertained. The extravagance of the American people, and the expensiveness of their style of living in proportion to their means, we attribute to democracy, which measures a man's respectability by his wealth, and his wealth by his expenditures; for the American people are naturally both frugal and economical. The American people are directly and indirectly more heavily taxed by government, counting the General government and the State and municipal governments, than any other people known. The population of the United States, and that of France before her late dismemberment, are about equal; and yet the taxes imposed by our government are more than double the taxes imposed by the French government; and if we have to provide for the expenses of a disastrous civil war, France has to provide for the expenses and losses of an equally disastrous foreign war, carried on in her own territory. The cost of living in this country should be much less than in any

European country, owing to the average mildness of our climate, the extent, fertility, and cheapness of land, and the variety of its productions; and yet the cost of living with us, I am told, is greater even than in England, the dearest country in Europe, and which is obliged to import annually from a hundred million to a hundred and fifty million dollars' worth of breadstuffs and provisions to feed her population. We attribute this to democracy, as we do the dearness of living in England; for England is almost as democratic as the United States. The election of a president once every four years costs, besides the derangement of business, the American people more than the Civil List of Great Britain costs the British people. The Aristocracy is hardly a check on the Commons; and as not engaged in business, and living on its own revenues derived principally from land and mines, hardly affects the course of the business operations of the nation, or the general cost and style of living. In Italy and Germany the democratic principle, combined with the monarchical form, prevails; and in both taxation is rapidly approaching the British and the American standard, notwithstanding the confiscation of the goods of the church by the former, and the heavy French indemnity to the latter.

But we have singularly failed to make ourselves understood, if the reader infers that we are defending monarchy or aristocracy, or that we have had any other purpose in our remarks than to show that the assertion of the people as the source of all legitimate authority, and that governments derive all their just powers from the assent of the governed, which makes all authority, all law of purely human origin, excludes the divine order which alone has authority for conscience, divorces politics from ethics, substitutes utility for right, and makes it the measure of justice, fails of the end of all just government, the promotion of the public good, and is either no government at all, but a mere agency of the controlling private interests of the people, or a government of mere force. This with me is no new doctrine: I defended it in the *Democratic Review* thirty years ago, while I was yet a Protestant, and it has been steadily maintained in this REVIEW from its first number in January, 1844. To assert and defend it, was a main purpose for which I originally commenced it.

Now, it is easy to see that what we object to is not popular

government, but the doctrine that the people as the state or nation are the origin and source of all authority and all law, that they are absolutely supreme, and bound by no law or authority that does not emanate from themselves. We call this the democratic principle; but as the people are here taken in the sense of state or nation, it may be applied equally to any political order which asserts the national will as supreme, and free from all authority or law which does not emanate from the nation itself. The principle is applied in Russia, where the czar, as representing the nation, claims absolute autocratic power; it is applied in Germany in a more absolute sense than in the United States, and is the principle on which Prince von Bismarck suppresses the Jesuits and kindred religious orders, and expels them from the empire, and on which he persecutes the church, denies her independence, and demands the enactment of statutes that subject her to the imperial will, that is, the national authority. It is the principle on which the *London Times* asserted the other day that no Catholic can be a loyal Englishman, and on which the sectarian press of this country maintain that we cannot be Catholics and loyal American citizens. It is the principle which inspires and underlies the whole revolutionary party in Europe. It is the liberty of the people, not from aristocracies, kings, kaisers, or arbitrary power, but from all authority or law, that does not emanate from the people, or from the nation, and therefore from a purely human source, that the party is struggling for. That is, the revolutionary party, the democratic party of Europe, are struggling to eliminate from modern society the *jus gentium* of Roman jurisprudence under the protection of religion, or what Lord Arundel of Wardour, as we have seen in the foregoing article, calls the "law of nations," that is, a law emanating from God himself, and founding and binding the national conscience; and, in this struggle, the mass of the American people sympathize with them, and loudly applaud them.

This is what our age calls liberty, what it means by liberty of conscience, that is, getting rid of all laws that bind the national conscience, and thus severing politics from the moral order, and subjecting the moral order itself to the secular authority, however constituted. The moral order, that is, justice. eternal and immutable right, or the law of nations,

is by the divine will and appointment, according to Christian tradition, placed in charge of the pope, or the Vicar of Christ on earth. To effect this object and emancipate politics from the law of nations, or the people, the state, or the nation, from the law of eternal and immutable right, that is, the law of God, it is necessary to get rid of the papacy, and to effect the utter destruction of the Catholic Church, its divinely appointed defender; and we see that the democratic, the liberal party, are willing to sustain so unmitigated a despot as the chancellor of the new German empire, if he will only join them in their war against the papacy, and aid them in their efforts to effect the complete destruction of the church. It is to conciliate and gain the support of this liberal party that the several governments of Europe, even of Catholic nations, have abandoned the papacy, even when they have not, like Germany, Italy, and Spain, turned against the pope. No head could wear a crown, no government could stand a day, at least, according to all human calculations, were it to take up the defence of the papacy, or adhere to it, as did the Frank Emperor Charlemagne.

We have called the attention of our readers to the principle that, as we have said, inspires and underlies this so-called liberal party, because it is precisely the principle that in our country is called the democratic principle. As thousands, perhaps, hundreds of thousands of Catholics in the Old World, have been led to adopt and defend this principle, without understanding its real character; so some Catholics in our own country, fired by political ambition, and engrossed in political affairs, may have also been led to adopt it in equal ignorance of its real anticatholic character, supposing they might adopt it and act on it, without injury to the church, or detriment to their Catholic faith and influence. We do not write with any expectation of undeceiving these, if any such there are. If they read us at all, they will not understand us, and will feel towards us only anger or contempt. But there is a large class of Catholic young men, graduates from our colleges, whose minds are fresh and malleable, whose hearts are open and ingenuous, who love truth and justice, and who take a deep interest in the future of their country. We write for them, to warn them against the dangers which threaten us, and against which there were none to warn us when we were young like them.

There is also even a larger number of Catholic young women annually coming forth from our conventual schools and academies, with fresh hearts, and cultivated minds, and noble aspirations, who are no less interested in the welfare of the country, and no less capable of exerting an influence on its destiny. They have no more sympathy than we have, with so-called "strong-minded women," who give from the rostrum or platform public lectures on politics or ethics; but we have much mistaken the training they have received from the good Sisters who have educated them, if they have not, along with the accomplishments that fit them to grace the drawing-room, received that high mental culture which prepares them to be wives and mothers of men; or, if such should be their vocation, to be accomplished and efficient teachers in their turn. Men are but half men, unless inspired and sustained in whatever is good and noble by woman's sympathy and coöperation. We want no *bas bleus*, no female pedants, nor male pedants either, as to that matter; but we do want cultivated, intelligent women, women who not only love their country, but understand its interests and see its dangers, and can, in their proper sphere, exert a domestic and social influence to elevate society and protect it from the principles and corruption which lead to barbarism. This is no time and no country in which to waste one's life in frivolities or on trifles: *Ernst ist das Leben*. And seriously should those of either sex whom the world has not yet corrupted, soured, or discouraged, take it, and labor to perform its high and solemn duties.

What we want, what the church wants, what the country wants, is a high-toned Catholic public opinion, independent of the public opinion of the country at large, and in strict accordance with Catholic tradition and Catholic inspirations, so strong, so decided, that every Catholic shall feel it, and yield intelligently and lovingly to its sway. It is to you, my dear Catholic young men and Catholic young women, with warm hearts, and cultivated minds, and noble aims, that I appeal to form and sustain such a true Catholic public opinion. You, with the blessing of God and directed by your venerable pastors, can do it. It is already forming, and you can complete it. Every good deed done, every pure thought breathed, every true word spoken, shall quicken some intelligence, touch some heart, inspire some noble soul. Nothing

true or good is ever lost, no brilliant example ever shines in vain. It will kindle some fire, illumine some darkness, and gladden some eyes. Be active, be true, be heroic, and you will be successful beyond what you can hope.

ART. VI.—*The Old Catholic Party.* A Lecture by DR. LITTLEJOHN, Anglican Bishop of Long Island, New York, February 6, 1873.

WE find in the *New York Times*, of Feb. 7, 1873, the following abstract of a Lecture by the Protestant "Episcopal" bishop of Long Island in this state; which shows sufficiently what Anglicans hope and expect from the "Old Catholic party" and the war waged by power against the church in Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy:—

"Right Rev. A. N. Littlejohn, D.D., delivered a lecture last evening at St. Paul's Chapel, corner of Clinton and Carrol streets, Brooklyn, on "The Old Catholic Movement in Europe." This subject, which has recently attracted considerable attention, and enlisted the sympathies of the various Christian congregations not in communion with Rome, drew a large audience, and Dr. Littlejohn, who spent a part of last summer in Germany, was in intimate relations with some of the leaders of the party. Their object, he said, was to reform abuses, and to introduce a purer and more broad Christianity, than was professed by the party of the Vatican. The congress recently convoked in Cologne, was composed of men who now rule the party of reform. That party, numerically, is not large, but its strength consists in the quality of its leading men; and with the lower classes of Germany, the stronghold of the movement, it is not very popular; but then it is an appeal to the intellect, and not to the untutored masses. In Germany and Austria, seventy priests and one hundred congregations had joined the reformers. It is also, he said, extending in Bavaria and Switzerland, and seven newspapers are acting as its organs. Late advices from the latter country, received by private parties a few days since, tell of a council which assembled on the 1st of December at Ulm, where one hundred delegates represented various districts. The programme of church reform was debated; and, owing to the eloquence of Dr. Reinkens, of Breslau, the departure of the Papal Nuncio from Berne was demanded. The dream of the Germans is to form an

independent national church, and in Austria, Spain, and Italy the same idea is spreading. A synod is to be organized, and bishops properly chosen, and a union of all sects of Christians established. The profession of faith embraces all the dogmas of the Old Catholic creed, as adopted by the Council of Nice, and the Bible is accepted as the rule of faith. Enforced celibacy and auricular confession are to be abolished, and service in the native tongue introduced. After reviewing the recent political changes in Europe, and pointing out their bearings on the present movement, Dr. Littlejohn concluded by stating his belief in the success of the new reformation and the overthrow of the papacy."

Dr. Littlejohn is good authority, so far as relates to the purposes, plans, and designs of the "Old Catholic party" and the European governments, now waging war against the papacy, denying the freedom and independence of the church, and cruelly oppressing her religious orders and her devoted children. He fully confirms the statement of the Holy Father in his Allocution of the 23d of December last, and which rendered the Prussian press so frantic, that the object of these governments is "the total destruction of the Catholic Church." This is unquestionably the aim of Prince von Bismarck, chancellor of the new German empire, of the Council of Geneva, if not of the Swiss Federal Council itself, and of the ministers of Victor Emmanuel, as it is the design of the entire revolutionary, or liberal, party throughout the world. Dr. Littlejohn himself says as much, when he tells us that "the dream of the Germans is to form an independent national church, and that in Austria, Spain, and Italy, the same idea is spreading, and expresses his belief that "the new reformation," favored by recent political changes in Europe, will be successful in the "overthrow of the papacy." The Catholic Church is built on Peter, and the overthrow of the papacy would be the subversion of the very foundation of the whole edifice; and the conversion of the one Catholic Church into independent national churches, or, rather, into churches holding from the national authority and dependent on its will, would be her total destruction. For, as we have heretofore shown, *national* stands opposed to *Catholic*, and independent national churches necessarily exclude the very idea of one Catholic Church with authority to teach and govern in spirituals all men and nations, and holding from God alone; as completely as the assertion, on the other hand, of universal

monarchy would be the destruction of particular independent national governments, though our Protestant "Episcopal" bishop of Long Island does not appear to be aware of it; for, though claiming to be a churchman, his ideas of Catholicity and the church are a little muddy.

The establishment of independent national churches, that is, ecclesiastically independent, and politically dependent, implies the annihilation of the Catholic Church. Rightly, then, is the aim of the movement said by the Holy Father to be the total destruction of the Catholic Church, or the visible kingdom of God on earth. It is well that Catholics should understand this, that they may not be deceived in any respect as to the real nature of the controversy now raging, or the momentous consequences involved in the issue. It is well that they should see clearly that in this controversy there can be no compromise, no halting between two opinions, no neutrality. The question is one of life or death, and the issue is the church or the world, Christ the Light of the universe or the prince of darkness, of God or the devil, heaven or hell. This is the momentous issue between the Holy Father and his enemies. The issue is squarely made, and must be squarely met. Who is on the Lord's side must be on the side of the pope, the Vicar of Christ; and whoever takes sides against the pope, or does not take sides for him, takes sides with the prince of darkness, and serves Baal, not the Lord, the devil, not God, and exposes himself to the doom pronounced against the devil and his angels. There can, we repeat, be no neutrals. Whoever in this fearful struggle is not on the side of the pope and the church of which he is the visible head, is on the side of Satan, and aiding and abetting those who are fighting to exclude Christ the Lord from all authority in human affairs, and to liberate all men and nations from every obligation to consult any power or authority above themselves: as we have shown in the foregoing article in which the democratic principle, which asserts the supremacy of the human, is amply discussed. Catholics should feel that there is no evading the issue; and we are sure none, except a handful of Liberal Catholics, every day losing their prestige, and diminishing in numbers, have any desire to evade it. It is wonderful how the faith and courage of Catholics have revived and been strengthened since the Holy Father has been despoiled of his temporal possessions

and imprisoned in the palace of the Vatican. Catholic honor comes to invigorate Catholic faith and courage: for what man, with a man's heart in his bosom, will desert his flag in the heat of battle and go over to the enemy?

The theological leader and instigator of the war against the papacy or the Catholic Church, is Dr. Döllinger of Munich, once held in high esteem by Catholics in Germany and England, though, we must say, distrusted by us years ago. His pride seemed to us to surpass his learning, and his learning to surpass his judgment. It was he and a small number of his friends that got up the conspiracy against the Council of the Vatican before it assembled, and in order to prevent it from defining the infallibility of the pope, and endorsing the Syllabus, in which some propositions of his own were censured. He induced Prince Hohenlohe, then prime minister of Bavaria, to address a Circular, probably written by himself, to the diplomatic agents of the Bavarian government at the several European courts, setting forth the danger to the secular powers and to modern civilization to be apprehended from the probable action of the council, and suggesting the propriety of the several powers uniting in a protest against any endorsement of the Syllabus, or declaration of papal infallibility. Either, it contended, would have a grave political bearing, and the latter would clothe the pope with political supremacy over all the secular powers of the earth.

The Circular, which the Archbishop of Westminster has recently published in an important Introduction to a volume of "Sermons on Ecclesiastical subjects," plausibly and skillfully drawn up, was not without effect, and had led several European governments, the French and Austrian especially, and that of Sardinia as a matter of course, to threaten the Council, in case it did such things, that they would resist it. It also made many eminent prelates, in view of the threatened hostility of the secular powers it had stirred up, doubt the prudence of pressing the question of infallibility to a decision, and indeed oppose it, as every body knows, as inopportune.

The theological leader had treacherously and by plausible, but wholly false, statements called to his aid the secular powers always more or less jealous of the papal authority; but his conspiracy failed. No pressure brought to bear on the Council, no threats or intimidation, singularly enough resorted

to under pretence of maintaining its freedom against the tyranny exercised over it by the pope and Jesuits, could move it, or hinder the Holy Ghost from making his voice heard in its decisions. The papal infallibility was proclaimed by the Holy Father, the council approving; the Syllabus, by implication, as the act of the infallible pope, was endorsed; Dr. Döllinger's propositions remained condemned; and German professordom was not recognized as infallible, or permitted to claim immunity from error. This was too humiliating. It was a triumph of Rome over München, of the Roman Curia over German professordom. Could German professordom be expected to submit?

The theological leader had failed, and, as a theological movement, the conspiracy came to naught, but it had gained a political significance; and Prince von Bismarck,—who, through an alliance with antipapal Italy, had crushed Austria at Sadowa, and, by the aid of Catholic Germany, had conquered France and reduced her, for the present at least, to impotence, and had turned every thing topsy-turvy in Spain, with the secret connivance of Great Britain and Russia, both for the present Prussianized,—came forward as the political leader of the movement, and pitted, not for the first time in history, the empire against the church, Cæsar against Peter. Döllinger had told him, in Prince Hohenlohe's Circular, that the definition of the Council was political rather than theological, encroached upon the rights and prerogatives of sovereigns, and, though there was not a shadow of truth in it, he could use it as a pretext for the war which, as a Protestant, he felt authorized to commence against the Catholic Church in favor of the modern doctrine that rejects all law, all authority, above the empire, and suffers to exist in the empire only national churches, or churches holding from and subject to the national authority. To carry out this doctrine, became his fixed purpose.

To effect this purpose, it is necessary to overthrow the papacy; for as long as the papacy stands the Catholic Church stands, as St. Ambrose says: *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*. The chancellor of the new German empire and champion of the kingdom of darkness, in laboring to this end, proceeded with considerable skill and ability. He first makes sure of Italy, and takes all possible precautions against any conscientious scruples that might be awakened in the mind of Victor

Emmanuel and induce him to relax his hold on the patrimony of St. Peter, liberate the pope, make his peace with the church, and restore Rome to its rightful sovereign. This must not be on any account whatever; and should France or any other power even offer to interfere in behalf of the rights of the pope, it must reckon for its audacity with Germany. Should the Italians, the great majority of whom are still Catholics, attempt any measures likely to restore the Holy Father to his rights, Italy must at once be made a German, or rather, a Prussian province. Secured on this side, the next step was to relax the hold of the papacy on the convictions, affections, and consciences, of the Catholic people.

Here the Döllingerites, or Alt-Katholiken, could serve him; and therefore, against all law, all rights, and common sense, the chancellor insisted on treating them as Catholics, and defending for them all the rights secured to Catholics by the Concordat. Recognized by the empire, and the Catholic prelates forbidden to subject them to the discipline enjoined by the canon law, it was thought that they would be efficient agents in undermining the papacy in the faith and love of the Catholic people. They were to set up the liberty of conscience against the authority claimed by the pope over it. Professor Reinkens, as represented by the *Churchman*, a Protestant Episcopalian sheet published in Hartford, Conn., and in this city, puts the case with tolerable cleverness, though we suspect the *Churchman* has added a few of its own blunders to those of the German professor.

After giving the Catholic side of the question, as presented in our January number, the *Churchman* proceeds to give the "other side," condensed from Professor Reinkens:—

"Professor Reinkens begins by affirming that the Old Catholic movement is a war of conscience against compulsion in matters of religion. Before July 18, 1870, it was still possible for the individual Catholic to save his conscience. This is, indeed, denied by Protestants, who refer to the fact that the Pope has exercised the function of infallible teacher since the Council of Trent. The infallibilists also say that always the individual conscience was subject to the general conscience of the episcopate.

"But up to 1870 the real position was this, that the Pope had, through persistent usurpations, become the judicatory from which was no appeal, and the individual conscience was thus silenced. The papal decisions were accepted, not as necessarily right, but

because there was no power to resist them. But the authority did not affect the conscience. Every one was at liberty, while he submitted to a papal decree, to deny the truth and justice of it before God and men. He might be compelled to obey it, as one obeys the decision of a civil court, but he was not compelled to believe that it was true and just. Thus the individual believer could still save his conscience.

"The Vatican Council has changed all this. It has transferred to the Roman Church the fundamental idea of the 'Society of Jesus,'—that it is necessary to sacrifice to authority not only the will, but the understanding also. As in that society no one must think or judge otherwise than as the superior directs, so is it in the church with regard to the pope. There must be more than an external submission to his decrees. Whatever a man's individual knowledge and conscience teach him, he must judge and be convinced that these decrees are just and true,—that they are the Word and Law of God.

"Thus the voice of conscience ceases to be the voice of God: the pope is higher than conscience. What he says must be believed; what he commands or forbids, binds the conscience. The individual reason and freedom must be sacrificed. There is no room even for reasoning or reflection. God dwells in the pope, and he thinks for us. Whatever he declares in faith or morals is to be received as divine truth.

"It is against this teaching of Jesuitism being made the law of the church, that the Old Catholics rebel. They affirm that all authority, which we are to receive as divine, must rest upon the conscience. It must be in harmony with the internal voice of God. Any thing else leads to the worst hypocrisy. We are now tending to a fearful moral abyss. Jesuitical morality has fearfully spread. There are many abuses that need rectification, and the Vatican Council had a noble work before it, but its action may be summed up in a sentence: It infallibly declared that a council is not infallible. And the infallible utterances of a fallible council we are expected to believe."

The *Churchman* is mistaken in saying, "The Infallibilists hold that the individual conscience was always subject to the general conscience of the episcopate." They hold no such thing, nor do they pretend in any sense whatever that the conscience of the Catholic is subject to the *conscience* of the pope. The conscience of the pope is his own affair, which he, equally with the simplest believer, must regulate with his confessor, and answer for to God, the Supreme Lawgiver. Catholics distinguish between the legislature that ordains the law, and the judiciary that declares and applies it. The pope

binds the conscience, not as lawgiver, but as judge under the law which God has ordained.

It would be difficult to compress a greater amount of ignorance, sophistry, and nonsense, not to say malice, into the same space, than is done in the *Churchman's* summary of Professor Reinken's discourse or tract. No one was ever free to question a papal constitution internally, while he offered no external opposition; for every Catholic was required to give his consent *ex animo*, as all know who are aware of the Bull condemning the "respectful silence" of the Jansenists. There can be no war for conscience against the papacy, if the pope is infallible in declaring the law of God; for there can be no conscience without or against that law. Conscience is a man's own interior judgment of what the law of God prescribes, permits, or prohibits. Deny the law of God, and you deny the existence and even the possibility of conscience, for you leave no law to which it is or can be subject. Conscience is free when it is subjected only to the law of God; it is not free when it is subjected to any human authority, or when the individual has no infallible authority by which to form his interior judgment of what the law of God does or does not prescribe, permit, or forbid. The papal infallibility in teaching, then, so far from denying, abridging, or restricting the freedom of conscience, is its indispensable condition and support. Catholics, and Catholics alone, have true liberty of conscience; and the liberty of conscience Professor Reinkens demands is liberty *from* conscience, not liberty *of* conscience, is simply the suppression of conscience itself, and the emancipation of men and nations from all law, except such as they impose on themselves, which is simply no law at all, as we have seen in the foregoing article. But the liberty of conscience which the professor asserts, really means liberation from conscience, and freedom to power to govern as it pleases, without any regard to eternal and immutable justice; and to individuals, to live as they list. But it is a good war-cry; and if people can be made to believe that the papacy instead of sustaining suppresses it, they are prepared to help on the war against the pope and the church. The so-called "Old Catholics," then, though of no account theologically, are of some importance to Bismarck, and able to aid him in a very necessary part of his great work of destroying and making an end of

the Catholic Church, and of suffering only national churches, subjected to the national authority, to exist.

But this is not enough. It is necessary not only to open the mouths of "Old Catholics," that is, Nationalists falsely pretending to be Catholics, but to close the mouth of all earnest and efficient defenders of the pope and the church among the people. Bismarck's third step was, therefore, to silence the Jesuits and kindred religious orders, that is, missionary and teaching orders and congregations, to suppress their houses, and to banish them from the empire. This REVIEW has not ever been noted for its devotion or subserviency to the Society of Jesus, and at times it has been even hostile to them, probably very much for the reason that the Athenian wished to ostracize Aristides; that is, because he was "tired of hearing him called the Just." The injudicious praise of them by their friends, as if they were the only true Catholics in the church, was little fitted to exalt them in the estimation of a man of our taste and temperament. The Society is not absolutely free from imperfection; but the REVIEW was wrong, and opposed them for things for which it should have commended and defended them. The estimate in which the Society should be held by the loyal Catholic is easily determined by the fact, that, whenever any one would strike a blow at the heart of the church, he begins, whether a private or public person, by attacking the Jesuits, feeling instinctively that he must get them out of his way before he can render his blow effective. When an attack is to be made on religion, they are the first to repel it. Their simplicity and deficient worldly wisdom leave them sometimes to be imposed upon by the cunning and designing, but their Catholic instincts may always be implicitly trusted. Bismarck knows it, and therefore makes them his first victims. For the same reason he attacks all missionary and teaching orders. He knows that, if they have the ears of the people,—and have them they will wherever they go—and the charge of the schools, and the training of children and youth, it is idle to dream of detaching the people, to any great extent, from the church, or of her destruction. What can Döllinger and his seventy apostate and excommunicated priests, even if recognized and sustained as Catholics by the civil power, do against the science, virtue, devotion to the Holy See, of a half a dozen Jesuits, Redemptorists, Lazarists, or even Sisters of Charity? It was

absolutely necessary, if Bismarck would overthrow the papacy and destroy the church, to begin by making away with the Jesuits and other living religious orders and congregations. An obedient and servile *Reichsrath* carries out his wish in the empire, and a submissive Italian parliament meekly receives and executes his orders to the same effect, in the newly stolen States of the Church: and all in the name of liberty of conscience and modern civilization.

Bismarck is no fool in his generation, and sees as clearly as any Catholic does or can, that, if children are trained to believe in God and in the obligation to know, reverence, and obey the divine law, as taught, declared, and applied by the church governed and taught by the infallible Vicar of Christ, it is in vain that statesmen labor to emancipate conscience from the law of God, and to bring the people to reject in the interior of their souls the entire moral order, and cast off without compunction all authority but that of secular government based on might or force alone. So, as his fourth step, for which he is sure, in advance, of the applause of all the sectarians and seculars of both the Old World and the New, he prohibits priests from being school inspectors, and does whatever lies in his power to exclude the Catholic religion from schools designed especially for Catholics, and to prevent Catholic parents from bringing up their children in their own religion. How destroy the church and secularize the entire Catholic community, if you permit Catholicity to be taught in schools? Bismarck's Protestant brethren and infidel admirers in this country understand this as well as he does, and therefore turn a deaf ear to the protests of Catholics against the injustice of taxing them to support schools to which they cannot, with a good conscience, send their children. And why should they not? Are they not of the modern world which excludes justice, or measures it by utility? Do they not follow the spirit of the age, which Mr. Henry Ward Beecher's *Christian Union* takes as the manifestation of the divine will, and ridicules the Holy Father because he refuses to yield to it, but steadily resists it, as our Lord and his apostles did the spirit of their age and nation?

Still this is not enough: Bismarck has taken a fifth step. This last step, taken, as our liberal journals assure us, in behalf of civil and religious liberty, is to place the discipline

of the church, in regard to her own members, under the supervision and control of the civil authority. It prohibits the church from excommunicating or interdicting a priest guilty of heresy, or of any other ecclesiastical or moral offence, without the consent of the government. The principle asserted here, if carried out, destroys at once the freedom and independence of the church, and results in her total destruction in the German empire. It takes away her authority to govern her own members in purely theological and ecclesiastical matters according to her own laws, and deprives her of all power to purge her own body of unworthy members, or to maintain purity of doctrine or discipline. At one blow it sweeps away all the laws of the church for the government of the faithful, and subjects the church absolutely to the imperial or national authority. She can exist only by the total loss of her unity and catholicity, and by being turned into a national establishment like the church of England, which must be distinguished from the church *in* England. This, with the overthrow of the papacy, would be the complete destruction of the Catholic Church, which is the point aimed at.

Now, if we look at these several steps or measures, we shall see they are devised with consummate skill; and taking Bismarck's point of view, that the Papal Church is a human institution and under purely human control, it is difficult to conceive why they should not prove efficient in the hands of such a leader as Bismarck, and be successful, as Dr. Littlejohn thinks and hopes they will be, in overthrowing the papacy. How can it be otherwise? Prince von Bismarck controls Germany, and Germany has prostrated Austria, holds her foot on the neck of France, and dictates the policy of Italy, who holds the pope a prisoner for Bismarck, and is ready at his order to close all communication between the pope and the faithful; Russia is schismatical, and will not interpose in behalf of the pope, nor will England; America cannot, and would not if she could, for she upholds Bismarck with all her sympathies, and earnestly wishes for his success. And why should he not succeed, with all the odds, humanly speaking, in his favor?

Suppose, now, that he succeeds, and the church is swept away, and there are no more popes, bishops, or priests: what is to follow? There will be no longer a voice to be raised in

behalf of outraged justice or violated right; no longer a power on earth to assert the supremacy of the moral order, or to vindicate the law of nations. Cæsar triumphs, and the secular order is supreme. Well, has Prince von Bismarck ever asked himself, have his pets, the Italian robbers and assassins, worthy descendants of those who upheld the Hohenstauffen against the Vicar of Christ, and against the glory and independence of their country, ever asked themselves, if the secular can stand on the secular alone, or civil or civilized society exist without the moral order, without religion as the *lex suprema* of the nation? And when the church is gone, and *might* takes the place of *right*, who is to assert the moral order, or to sustain religion save as a vague sentiment without moral force, or as a degrading superstition? When conscience is destroyed, by being emancipated from the law of God, what is to sustain government and law, to save society from the most absolute and grinding despotism, or to save men from becoming downright savages or a herd of wild beasts? It is strange how men lose their faculties, and into what wild theories they can rush, when once they give way to their evil passions, and suffer Satan to bewilder and blind them by his delusions. But we have discussed this point in the two preceding articles in the present number, and had sufficiently discussed it for all men who retain a modicum of sense, in the article on *The Papacy and the Republic* in our January number.

But we dare tell Dr. Döllinger, Dr. Littlejohn, the *Churchman*, and the Italian robbers and assassins, that, all-powerful as he seems, Prince von Bismarck will not succeed. We disguise not from ourselves or others the gravity of the situation, nor the apparent helplessness of the Holy Father. Human help for him, so far as we can see, there is none; and he is apparently left, as He was whose Vicar he is, to tread the wine press alone. Power, wealth, fashion, literature, science, public opinion, the very spirit of the age,—all, all are against him; and yet, without any hesitation, we tell Prince von Bismarck, as Mr. Ward Beecher's journal flip-pantly told the pope the other day, that "he has undertaken a job too big even for him." Satan has been trying his hand at it eighteen hundred years and more, and with kings and kaisers, princes and people to help him, he has not been able to succeed; and I do not think that Bismarck is stronger than

Satan, or able to command more efficient allies. Satan has seemed on the point of succeeding, and flattered himself that he was just *a-going* to succeed, as a lady said, that "it always seemed to her, when eating vegetable oysters" (*salsify*), "that she was *just a-going* to taste a real oyster;" but he never gets any farther. At that point he always fails, fails shamefully, and leaves his friends in the lurch. The simple fact is, that the church is not a purely human institution; man has not made her, and man cannot unmake her. If Bismarck and his allies had studied and understood history, they would know this, and know that no weapon forged against her can prosper, that his dart will barely strike the boss of her shield and fall harmless at her feet, or rebound and pierce his own heart.

We have seen the church in as great straits as she is in now more than once. She was so under the Arian Emperors when, in the strong language of St. Jerome, "the world awoke one morning astonished to find itself Arian." Bismarck does little else than copy the astute policy of Julian the Apostate, and we see no reason why he should succeed in the nineteenth century any better than Julian did in the fourth. After the Arian heresy came resuscitated paganism. So, after the Protestant heresies, we may have revived paganism, for which every heresy is a preparation; but after paganism came orthodoxy in the fourth century, and the most glorious epoch in the church's history. Then came the Basils, the Gregorys, the Chrysostoms, the Hilarys, the Ambroses, the Jeromes, the Augustines, in the splendor of whose virtues the names of the champions of Arianism and Paganism have become invisible. The Italians would do well to remember Arnoldi of Brescia who held Rome for ten years, and yet effected nothing against the papacy. Their ancestors drove the popes from Rome, and forced them into what the Romans call the "Babylonian captivity," at Avignon, and occasioned the Great Schism of the West; and yet, aided as they were by secret societies which covered all Europe then as now, Paulicians, Albigenses, Paterini, and others, that still survive in some of the degrees of Freemasonry, they did not succeed in overthrowing the papacy or destroying the church, any more than had done the Kaiser Frederic Barbarossa, whose crushing defeat by Pope Alexander III the city of Alexandria, in the Subalpine kingdom, was built

to commemorate. When Innocent III was elected pope, Rome was barred against his entrance, and all the great powers of Europe, as now, were in schism and hostile to the papacy; and yet at the close of his pontificate, which lasted sixteen years, all the powers had become submissive to his authority, and never before had the papal throne been more powerful, perhaps, so powerful, throughout the Christian world. His pontificate was the age of great men and great saints. Nor did Frederic II, who included in his empire all Germany, all Italy, except Venice and Florence, and a considerable portion of what is now France, succeed any better during fifty years of struggle against the papacy, marked on his part by great ability, *finesse*, treachery of every species, lying, perfidy and cruelty not surpassed, if equalled by the most profligate of the pagan Cæsars, succeed any better than had done his ancestor, Frederic Barbarossa. All Europe at length rose against him. The Holy Father, Innocent IV, if we recollect aright, in a General Council, by virtue of his apostolical authority, the Council approving, excommunicated him, deprived him of the imperial dignity, absolved his subjects from their oath of fidelity to him, and he died heart-broken in an obscure village, deserted by all his friends, except one bishop implicated in his condemnation, who, it is said, gave him *in extremis* the last sacraments.

Luther raised what has been called the standard of Reform, which was soon favored openly by some, secretly by nearly all the sovereign princes of Europe, and he felt sure of his victory—aided as he was by the Turks, then a great power, and at war with Christendom—over the pope, and declared the papacy was at an end, the reign of Antichrist finished. Yet though as the tail of the Apocalyptic dragon, he drew after him a third part of the stars of heaven, or states of Christendom, the papacy survived, and left the Reform to devour her own children. The church also was in as great a strait at the close of the last century, as now. There was not a Catholic power that stood by her; there was less faith in the European populations than even at present; the French revolution, everywhere victorious, swept as a tornado all over Europe, throwing down temples and palaces, thrones and altars, and carrying every thing before it, and leaving only ruins in its track. France beheaded her king, massacred her nobility, or forced them to emigrate, abolished the

church, established a constitutional or national church, such as the "Old Catholics" dream of for Germany, suppressed the religious orders, and sent the religious to prison or the guillotine, butchered, drowned, or deported her faithful bishops and priests, invaded by her victorious armies the Italian peninsula, took possession of Rome, dragged the pope from his throne, and hurried him off a prisoner to France, where he soon died at Valence, broken by grief, by age, and by physical suffering: yet the papacy was not overthrown. Hardly less near did Satan seem to victory, when Napoleon I bestrode all Europe as a conqueror, and dreamed of universal monarchy; or, at least, of making all the princes of Europe vassals of the French empire. He founded the kingdom of Italy for his step-son, placed a brother, and then a brother-in-law, on the throne of Naples, transferred the brother to the throne of Spain, crushed Prussia, rendered Austria powerless, formed the Confederation of the Rhine, with himself at its head, despoiled the pope of his temporal possessions, and held him a prisoner at Savona, and then at Fontainebleau; and all the world rushed to do him homage. I remember the exultation of the Protestant preachers, and the triumphant air with which, when he cast the pope into prison, they cried out, "Babylon is fallen, the reign of Antichrist is over, the Mystery of Iniquity is ended."

Well, they did not after all taste the oyster. They reckoned without their host. The pope returned amid the joy and acclamations of the people to Rome, recovered his temporal possessions, repaired to a great extent the damage done to them by the revolution, resumed the free exercise of his pontifical powers to the great benefit of the church, and, full of years and heroic virtues, he calmly and peacefully breathed out his pious and noble soul in his own bed, in his own palace; while his persecutor, stript of all his power, denied the imperial dignity, was sent to fret away his life under a brutal English keeper, on the barren rock of St. Helena. Herr von Bismarck is reported to have said, that "the pope will find in the present war between him and the empire no Canossa." It is possible; but the few incidents of ecclesiastical history to which we have referred, will suffice to prove that the church is divine, under divine protection, upheld by a divine arm; for if she had been human, standing on human wisdom and strength alone, any one of these would

have swept her from the face of the earth. And if our noble pontiff, gloriously reigning though a prisoner, finds not a Canossa, he may find an angel of the Lord, as did St. Peter, opening his prison-doors, setting him free, and bringing to naught the councils of his enemies.

We tell the astute and unscrupulous chancellor, who for the moment wields all the power of the empire, that he will fail as his predecessors have failed. The unarmed, defenceless, and aged prisoner of the Vatican is mightier than he. He may order his obsequious allies, the Italian sacrilegious robbers and assassins, to bar all communication with the Holy Father by the faithful, to rack his aged limbs, and even to slay him; but that will avail him nothing. Every one of the pope's predecessors, including St. Peter himself, for the first three hundred years of our era, suffered martyrdom; I should say, received the martyr's crown, always the crown of victory. Saintly prelates, faithful priests, holy and devoted religious of either sex, may be put to death by the minions of power; but it will avail nothing. Such things strengthen, not weaken, the church. We do not need to cite the promises of Christ to his Spouse, promises which never have failed, and never can fail. Heaven and earth may pass away, but His word cannot pass away. The fair induction from the authentic history of the church for eighteen hundred years is, that, though she may encounter severe struggles, and be obliged to fight terrible battles, no weapon forged against her shall prosper, that she cannot die, that "the immortal years of God are hers," and she will always come forth, like the three children, from the fiery furnace, though heated seven times hotter than it is wont to be heated, without the smell of fire on her garments.

The church has stood, for eighteen hundred years and more, the severest tests of her divinity that can possibly be applied. She has been assailed on every side, and that continually. All that human astuteness and craft, despotism and cruelty, aided by satanic malice, could do against her, has been done. Jew, pagan, heretic, schismatic, barbarian, Saracen, apostasy, power, wealth, fashion, science, literature, public opinion, have all, without a moment's relaxation, for eighteen hundred years, assailed her with all their forces, and have failed. What stronger proof can you ask that man has not made her, and that man cannot unmake her? Why is

it that the chancellor cannot see it? Why is it that he fails to recognize a POWER in and over the universe before which the mightiest power of earth or hell is simply impotence, weakness itself, and that this Power has manifestly upheld and protected the church, and prospered her in spite of all external assaults and internal scandals? Cannot Herr von Bismarck read his folly and madness in the fate which has invariably befallen the persecutors of the church in every age and nation? Does he not see that Pius IX, the vigorous old man, is outliving his persecutors, and increases in vigor and courage as he increases in years and as his wrongs and afflictions are multiplied? Where is Palmerston? Dead. Where is Cavour? Dead. Where is Mazzini? Dead. Where is the mock-hero, Garibaldi? Worse than dead. He has outlived his prestige, and serves only to point a jest. Where is Napoleon III, the professed friend and betrayer of the pope? Dead. Who then is left to the chancellor? Victor Emmanuel, Gambetta, and the Internationale. Victor Emmanuel, if he fears not God, at least fears hell; and if the pressure of Prussia was removed, would make his peace with the pope to-morrow, and send his infidel ministers—to their own place. Gambetta's influence is waning, for the Bonapartists have no longer any need of him to create confusion in France; the Internationale has to bear the infamy of the Paris Commune, and it is a dangerous ally for Prince von Bismarck, whose work it will rend in pieces the moment that it sees he is not likely to succeed in destroying the church. Even he himself is checked in his attempt to Prussianize Germany, and has alarmed by his ecclesiastical policy the conservative portion of Prussian Protestants, who are beginning to see that it is no less hostile to the Prussian Evangelical Church than to the Church of Rome; and he must not be surprised to find himself as powerless as his Protestant brother, the Saxon Von Beust, late chancellor of Austria, or if in dying he exclaim, in the words of Julian the Apostate, "Nazarene, thou hast conquered!" Who wars against the church wars against God.

ART. VII.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

- 1.—*The Book of the Holy Rosary*. A popular doctrinal exposition of its Fifteen Mysteries. Mainly conveyed in select extracts from the fathers and doctors of the Church. With an explanation of their corresponding types in the Old Testament. A preservative against unbelief. By the REV. HENRY FORMBY, of the Third Order of St. Dominic. Embellished with thirty-six full-page illustrations, designed by C. Classen, De Moster, and J. H. Powell. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1872. Large 8vo. Double col. pp. 140.

To this very full descriptive title very little needs to be added. It is a book that must be highly prized by all who practise the beautiful devotion of the Rosary, and indeed by all the clients of Mary: and what Catholic does not glory in being a client of the Blessed Mary, the Immaculate and powerful Mother of God? We are not qualified to judge in all cases of the appropriateness of the author's selection of types from the Old Testament, nor have we studied the book with sufficient care to do it, even if we were; but we have found such of them as we have examined perfectly satisfactory to us. The book is both instructive and edifying. It can hardly fail to deepen and extend, among the faithful, sincere, enlightened, and earnest devotion to Mary, through whom it is the delight of her Divine Son to communicate his favors and the riches of his grace. Mr. Formby considers devotion to Mary a preservative against unbelief: it is certainly a preservative against heresy, for it preserves in the mind and hearts of those who practise it the belief in the Incarnation, or the "Word made flesh;" and all heresies grow out of the denial or misapprehension of the fact of the Incarnation, what it presupposes, or what logically follows from it. Never was it more desirable to encourage and extend Catholic devotion to Mary, than now when the universal tendency is to deny the entire supernatural order, and of course the whole teleological order founded by the Incarnation. Mr. Formby's book is, therefore, an opportune book, and adapted to the most pressing wants of our times. We may add that its illustrations are happily designed and well executed. The book is very attractive to the eye, and at the same time inexpensive. We thank both the author and the publishers for it, and cordially add our commendation, though late, to that which it has already received from the Catholic press.

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- 2.—*Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects*. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Vol. III. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1873. 16mo. pp. cviii and 311.

WE did not receive this volume in season to be able to do more than barely announce its appearance. Through the *London Tablet*

we drew in a foregoing article some facts from the very important Introduction, and we hope to be able to return to the volume in our next REVIEW. It is all-important that Catholics should fully understand the real nature of the fearful war that the world wages against the church, that, on the one hand, their hearts may not fail them, and, on the other, that with one heart and one mind they may rally around the Vicar of Christ, who raises aloft the standard of the cross, and stand by him, come life or come death; and we know no one who better understands the nature and work of the conflict than the author of these eloquent sermons, nearly all of which relate to the difficulties and dangers that surround Pius IX. The Introduction of cviii pages is full of the most valuable instruction; and, as we read it, we cannot but thank God that he has permitted us to live to take part, though a feeble one, in this fiercer war than usual of Satan against Christ, and on the side of our Holy Mother the church. These for the Catholic are glorious times, in which the heroic soul joys to live; for they are times of danger, when one has the chance to win a crown of glory. To live in these times which test one's faith, and to have the opportunity by word or deed to serve the cause of truth against the motley hosts of error and iniquity that Satan has summoned to his aid against our Holy Mother the church and her heavenly spouse, is a crowning honor. We who live now have no need to envy the Christians who lived in the martyr or heroic ages of the church, or our missionaries in Japan or the Corea.

- 3.—*Life of the Cure d'Ars.* From the French of the Abbé MONNIER, with an Introduction by Archbishop MANNING. New York: P. O'Shea. 1872. 12mo. pp. 421.

THIS is a well written and, we presume, authentic life of the world-renowned Curé d'Ars, that modern miracle of divine grace. If any one imagines the church has fallen into decrepitude, or doubts the reality of the supernatural, let him read this life of the venerable pastor of Ars, who seems, from his childhood till he died the death of the just, to have been manifestly led and sustained by the Holy Ghost. His life reads like the life of a saint, and we are not surprised to hear that the Holy Father has permitted the opening of proceedings looking towards his beatification.

- 4.—*Hawthorndean; or, Philip Benton's Family. A Story of Everyday Life.* By Mrs. CLARA M. THOMPSON. Philadelphia: Cunningham. 1873. 12mo. pp. 426.

A CRITIC who fails to follow the reigning taste in literature, is hardly less safe than he who refuses to follow the spirit of the age

in politics or theology. Independent literary criticism is as rare and as offensive as any other sort of independent criticism. Yet the reigning literary taste at any time or in any country is not necessarily infallible, and a Catholic Review has another literary duty than that of echoing popular judgments, or giving a sanction to false and injurious literary fashions. A large portion of our modern popular literature is contributed by women, and is corrupt and corrupting. We therefore adopt the rule, that books written by women shall receive no indulgence on account of the sex of the author, but shall be as rigidly criticised as if written by men, and be judged by the same standard of judgment. If Catholic women undertake to write books to counteract the pernicious influence of modern light literature, we honor and applaud their noble intentions, their generous aims; but their productions must be judged, whatever their merit in other respects, by their adaptation to the end proposed. We do not consider a novel, whether written by a man or a woman, is to be commended, if written on the homœopathic principle of *similia similibus curantur*, because it is filled with Catholic dogmas or Catholic preachments, nor because it turns us out converts by the dozen. We judge it by its tone and temper, by the spirit that informs it, and by the silent influence it exerts on the heart of the reader. "Morton House," which makes no pretension to being a Catholic novel, though evidently written by a Catholic lady, is, in our judgment, more truly Catholic than the "House of York." We have rarely met, in the whole range of fiction, a finer, a nobler, or a more truly Catholic creation, than the modest and unassuming Katherine Tresham, the refined, gentle, and heroic governess. We do not admire equally all the novels, especially Ebb-Tide, by the author of "Morton House," but she never deviates from the most rigid Catholic morals, and, in the case of marriage within the prohibited degrees, she recognizes for Catholics the necessity of a dispensation.

"Hawthorndean" is an unpretentious story of every-day life, free from sensationalism, and unexceptionable in its principles and preachments. It is rather commonplace; and though marked by much knowledge of the human heart and the temptations to which it is exposed, it exhibits no extraordinary intellectual power. It sends one of the best characters in it to be a Sister of Charity, after the obstacles to her love for one who loves her in return, and is not unworthy of her, have been removed: and most likely to the ruin of his soul. We do not like this. We recognize the great blessing of a religious vocation, and that religion is the more perfect state, that, so long as the marriage vows had not been actually pronounced between her and Dr. Hartland, Dora Greenwood was free to become a Sister of Charity; but we think our novel-writers, who have supreme jurisdiction in the case, would do well to restrict the vocation to widows and heart-free virgins, and not send their disappointed lovers to a convent if women, or ordain them priests if men.

We love and reverence the religious orders and the priesthood too much for that. Nevertheless one can read "Hawthorndean" with a pleasant interest, and feel that it is not likely to do any harm. It is all it professes to be, and gives us young girls, flirts, and beautiful wives with brutal husbands.

5.—*The Dublin Review. New Series.* January, 1873. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS is an excellent number of this standard Catholic Review, and is wholly undeserving of the criticism, in our article on *Popular Catholic Literature*, on its able and learned editor,—a criticism founded chiefly on our recollections of his volume on *Nature and Grace*, and his controversy with Father Ryder, and some articles of his on J. Stuart Mill's moral philosophy. Our criticism was too sweeping, and should be restricted to the discussions we have named. We make the correction in justice to Dr. Ward and to ourselves. We are not of his school in philosophy, nor do we believe in the theory of Development; we do not believe universal and necessary ideas are simply *founded* on God; but we believe that they are objective, and are real being, that is to say, God himself, in so far as he is intelligible to the human intellect. We reject Developmentism alike in the cosmos and in the new creation. Our reasons will be found in the article in the present number, proving that the primeval man was not a savage.

6.—*My Clerical Friends and their Relation to Modern Thought.* New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1873. 16mo. pp. 324.

THIS work appears anonymously, but the author's name is well known, and is one held in high esteem by Catholics here as well as in England, his native country. It is written with rare ability, with a perfect knowledge of the subject treated, in a style of singular clearness and force, beauty and elegance, gracefulness and polish, sparkling with wit, and charming the reader by its quiet and genial humor. Though mainly devoted to a threadbare subject, it is as fascinating as any novel. Never has Anglicanism been more gracefully or effectually stripped of its pretensions, or bowed out of court, in which by its own confession it has no standing. The poor Puseyites or Ritualist—we almost pity them, and pray the author to forbear. They are, indeed, the weakest as well as the most arrogant of mortals, and their system is less substantial than the airy fabric of a dream. Yet so is all Protestantism. Never have we seen the Scriptural argument against Anglicanism in all its forms

more ingeniously or effectively handled. The history of Protestantism verifies the author's motto from Shakspeare :

"In Religion,
What damned error but some sober brow
Will bless it, and approve it with a text?"

7.—A *Biographical Dictionary for the use of Colleges, Schools, and Families*. By REUBEN PARSONS, D.D. New York: Sadlier & Co. 1872. 12mo. pp. 362.

THIS work is commendable for its design, but has the appearance of having been too hastily compiled, and too little care taken as to the facts. The author, we are sorry to say, does not appear to be up in his reading to the present state of historical science; he writes, too, in a sort of Western newspaper English, which the masters of the language are in general careful to avoid. He is not felicitous in his choice of terms, and not unfrequently uses words in a sense which, so far as our knowledge extends, neither usage nor etymology warrants; which is a great defect in a work designed for schools and colleges. To say of a man he was *raised* instead of *brought up*, is a provincialism, and, though common in several sections of the United States, is not classical English. Sheep and cattle, or flocks and herds, are *raised*; men are *brought up*, or, in obsolete phrase, *fetchd up*. The book is also disfigured by innumerable typographical errors; some few of which are noticed in an *errata*, but others equally glaring are left unnoticed. The compiler or author seems to have a prejudice against middle names. Thus he writes William Channing for William Ellery Channing. One William Channing was a cousin of the celebrated unitarian preacher of Boston, and another is his nephew. He writes John Calhoun for John C., or John Caldwell Calhoun; John Rousseau, the French poet, for Jean B., or Jean Baptiste Rousseau. Judge Daly's decision, that a man has only one proper name, may be good law, but is not good literature. The author omits many names of distinguished personages, and inserts others of persons of no note at all, or of very inferior note. Why insert the name of the forgotten Eugène Sue, and omit that of Suarez, one of the most eminent theologians that have written since St. Thomas Aquinas? Why give us Malebranche, and not Cardinal Gerdil? Gioberti, and not Hegel, Cousin, or Jouffroy? If the Rev. Dr. Parsons will revise his work in a new edition, omit some unimportant names, and insert some now omitted, be less influenced by his prejudices, correct his English, his errors of fact,—such as that the fierce Ghibelline Dante was a determined Gueff,—and the press, his work will answer the end for which he has designed it. As it is, we cannot commend it.

- 8.—*Elements of Logic, designed as a Manual of Instruction.* By HENRY COPPÉE, LL.D., President of the Lehigh University, Philadelphia. E. H. Butler & Co. 1872. 12mo. pp. 223.

A CATHOLIC friend, who has some interest in the school books published by Messrs. Butler and Co., sends us this manual of Logic with the hope that, after examining it, we shall find ourselves able to recommend its use in our higher Catholic schools and academies. We have examined it, and are sorry that we cannot recommend it. We are willing to admit that it is as good as any similar work we know of in English, though no better than several we could name; but any one of our Latin text-books of logic used in our colleges, is far superior to it; and if an English text-book is needed, let some one of our simple treatises be translated, unless some of our able professors will undertake to write an original treatise of logic in our mother tongue. We are not willing to go to Protestants for text-books in any branch of study.

President Coppée's work is unobjectionable enough, so far as the mere art of logic or of reasoning is concerned; but, in regard to the science or principles of logic, we can in no sense accept it. We do not believe that an argument can be logically correct and materially false; for we hold logic to be a real, not a merely formal science, and that it responds to the truth of things,—a truth which both Schelling and Hegel assert, but misunderstand and pervert, for their logic is subjective. The principles of things and the principles of logic are identical, or the principles of things determine the principles of logic as a science. Nothing can be logical and false, or false and yet logical. Formal logic is logic as an art, not as a science. To say that logic deals only with form of the proposition, not with the matter, is not only to restrict its province, but to reduce it to a frivolous and useless, often a mischievous, art. The science of logic deals with thought itself, not simply with its statement or expression, which is partly the province of the grammarian, and partly that of the rhetorician. We see no great importance to be attached to the study of logic in the author's sense, or how it can either advance knowledge, or strengthen or sharpen the mind to detect fallacies of thought or of reasoning. Errors in reasoning proceed from erroneous, misty, or confused thinking. He who thinks clearly, distinctly, and justly, will both express himself and reason logically without any instruction in the logician's art; for he thinks according to the truth of things, which, being created by the Logos, or Logic itself, are necessarily logical. No one ever seriously reasons illogically, or falls into any fallacy, except through ignorance or mental weakness, defects which no training in the mere formal logic can remedy.

Logic, as we understand it, is both a science and an art. As a science, it is the science of reason, and is the result of the highest

and profoundest philosophy, not its introduction. As an art, it is simply the art of reasoning, and is practised by every clear and sound thinker, whether he has ever learned its rules and technicalities or not, and by no others. For myself, I know I could and did reason as logically before I had ever seen a treatise on logic, as I do or can now. Mr. Coppée's work is too much for logic as an art, and too little for logic as a science, and is, besides, based on an unsound philosophy. In philosophy, the author is a conceptualist, and for the most part follows Sir William Hamilton. He tells us genera and species are simply mental conceptions, or generalizations, and have no existence out of the mind. How then does he or can he explain the fact of generation, or accept original sin, the Incarnation, or any of the mysteries of the Christian faith? We hold man is as objectively real as men; for, without man, there can be no men. The genus is as real as the species, and the species as real as the individual, and it is therefore that like brings forth like; only genera and species, while distinguishable, are not separable from the individual, nor is the individual, though distinguishable, separable from the genus or species. But this is a subject which requires a fuller discussion than we can here give it. We can now only protest against the author's conceptualism, the doctrine of Abelard, and which conducts in its evolution to downright nihilism.

9.—*Truth and Error.* By Rev. HENRY A. BRANN, D.D.
New York: Sadlier & Co. 1873. pp. 160.

WE are disappointed in this little book. We expected from the well known learning and ability of Dr. Brann, who has a strong predilection for philosophical studies, something better than this confused jumble of half a dozen different systems, without a common principle running through and unifying them. True philosophy, in military phrase, flanks the question of certitude and deprives it of its importance; and the importance attached to the question by psychologists arises from confounding philosophy, which is the science of the ideal, that is, the real, with what Fichte calls *Wissenschaftslehre*, or the science of notions or of conceptions, and rendered necessary only by the real or methodical doubt of Descartes, which has ruined nearly all modern philosophy. The philosopher who begins in doubt must end in doubt, for he has nothing but doubt with which to vanquish doubt. Do you say that Descartes only doubts till he finds something he cannot doubt, to wit, his own personal existence? Be it so. From his own personal existence he can conclude only his own personal existence: nothing beyond it. His doubt, therefore, can at least give him only pure egoism.

Dr. Brann says very truly, that, to take the *primum psychologi-*

cum as our *primum philosophicum*, is a great error; but he falls into the opposite error, when he says the true *primum philosophicum* is the *primum ontologicum*. The first leads to pure egoism, and the second to pure pantheism, and both are only disguised, and hardly even disguised, forms of atheism. The *primum philosophicum* is neither the one nor the other exclusively, but the real synthesis of the two, or being and existences in their real relation. The author does not appear to have learned, that to know is to know, and that he who says "I know," says all he says who says, "I know that I know," or, "I am certain that I know." The whole discussion about certainty or certitude, the *pons asinorum* of philosophers, is alike uncalled for and unprofitable; for we have nothing more certain than knowledge with which to prove that knowledge is knowledge, or not an illusion. There are unaskable as well as unanswerable questions.

Dr. Brann makes judgment result from the comparison of notions or ideas. Ideas are not notions. Notions are formed by the mind, and are what it notes of the objects presented or represented to it; ideas are the intelligible or non-sensible objects of thought, and without which the mind would have nothing to note. Judgment is not a comparison of the notions with their objects, and the affirmation of their agreement or non-agreement, as the author supposes. Every thought, whether intuitive or reflective, is a judgment affirming its object. The author also confounds evidence with the object affirmed, and calls it things affirming themselves. He would do better to call it intuition, in which the object presents itself immediately to the mind, for evidence may be taken in a forensic sense, as the testimony of eye-witnesses of a fact, or the testimony of history, which accredits facts not immediately evident. The word, in the Cartesian sense, is not English. We do not accept the author's, or, rather, the Cartesian doctrine, that what cannot be clearly conceived by the human mind is impossible. Conceptions are the mind's abstractions from the concretes presented in intuition, and can never transcend them. Consequently, the doctrine implies that the limits of intuition are the limits of both the actual and the possible.

These are some few of the many criticisms to which Dr. Brann's book seems to us to be open. A book on Truth and Error should separate the one from the other. The author seems to us to mingle them in his tract in an inextricable confusion. The fault may be in us, and we are far from pretending that we fully understand his principles or his method. He enunciates every now and then what we hold to be great and profound truth, but he immediately supplements it with what we regard as a great error, and we cannot see that any thing comes of it. To us, the author's mind seems to be as confused as is the philosophy of the age. He has evidently read much, made himself acquainted with the outlines of many systems, but without having thoroughly mastered any

one of them, or having worked out any system of his own. Yet this unfavorable opinion may arise from our not understanding the author's various terminology, borrowed from incongruous systems in the sense he does, and therefore fail to catch his real thought, and to trace it through his several chapters. We have a high regard for him, we esteem him able, active, energetic, and full of promise; but we are too dull to appreciate the merits of his philosophy as presented in this volume.

10.—*Our Lady of Lourdes*. By HENRY LASSÈRE. From the French. New York: Sadlier & Co. 1872. 12mo. pp. 497.

THAT miracles continue in the church according to the promise of our Lord is of faith, but the fact of this or that particular miracle is a matter of testimony. If the church has scrutinized the fact and the testimony in the case, and in her highest court decided it to be really a miracle, it is sufficient warrant for believing it; for the highest authority to which appeal can be made, has decided the question. If it would not be heresy to deny it, it would at least be temerity and a contempt of court. But, till the court has decided, we are free to form our own judgment from the testimony or evidence in the case. There is nothing improbable in the alleged miraculous appearance of our Lady of Lourdes, in the spring of water that sprung up and continues to flow, or in the miraculous cures said to be effected by drinking of it, or washing or bathing in it. It is perfectly normal in the supernatural order, and it is as easy for God to create a new fact in nature by his immediate power, or by the agency of his blessed Mother or of a saint, as it was to create nature itself. There are no *a priori* difficulties to be overcome, any more than in proving any fact in the natural order by human testimony.

The mass of testimony of all sorts collected and presented in this volume is overwhelming; and it seems to us that it is necessary to accept the miracle or miracles, or to refuse to believe any thing on human testimony. We know that the water does not always effect a cure. A very near and dear friend of ours took some of the water; she appeared to suffer little pain afterwards, and in two or three days passed away as gently and as sweetly as the infant falls asleep, without a struggle or a spasm; yet she was not restored, perhaps because our Mother in heaven wanted her, or that her work here was done. That the water did not prove effectual in her case, does not cause us to doubt its efficacy in so many other well-attested cases. The cure is not wrought by virtue of the water, but by the power of God at the intercession of our Lady; and she, knowing and always conforming to his will, may not intercede for a cure in all cases where the water is used, for it may be his will for his own purposes that she should not.

The miracle, or succession of miracles of our Lady of Lourdes, is

not a greater miracle than the life of the curé of Ars, and the numerous conversions effected through his ministry, nor more incredible. It should not surprise us that, when the church is to be deeply afflicted and to undergo a severe persecution, miracles should be wrought to console the faithful and to confirm their trust in God, who will never desert his Spouse. Instead of carping at them, denying them, or explaining them away, we should thank God for them, and see in them the proof that God has not forsaken us, but is near unto every one of us. We commend M. Lassère's book to all our readers, especially to all who have a special devotion to the Blessed Mother of God; and as we believe devotion to our Lady of Lourdes is authorized, we hope to see it spreading more and more amongst us.

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- 11.—*The History of the Blessed Virgin.* Translated from the French of the ABBÉ ORSINI, by the Very Rev. F. C. HUSENBETH, D.D., V.G., Provost of Northampton. To which are appended the Letters Apostolic concerning the Dogmatic Definition of the Immaculate Conception. Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1872. 12mo. pp. 347.

THE MESSRS. Sadlier & Co. published in 1854 a splendid illustrated edition in imperial octavo of the Abbé Orsini's *Life of the Blessed Virgin*, translated from the French by our highly esteemed friend, Mrs. Mary A. Sadlier, and partly, we may say, at our recommendation, after the original had been submitted to our judgment. We have not compared throughout the translation before us with Mrs. Sadlier's; but we have done so to a considerable extent, and, as far as we have compared them, with a few, a very few verbal exceptions, they are absolutely the same. Of the changes, only one have we detected that is not for the worse. In one instance, Mrs. Sadlier has mistaken, or not perceived, the allusion of the author, and has translated the French literally. The work before us corrects it; in all the other cases of alteration, and they are very few, that we have noticed, the advantage is with Mrs. Sadlier. The translation, said to have been made by the late Dr. Husenbeth, is substantially and almost verbally Mrs. Sadlier's, and is plagiarized from her. Dr. Husenbeth may have edited an edition of the work, but he was incapable of claiming to be its translator. Perhaps Messrs. Virtue & Co., its printers, or even Mr. John Gilmary Shea could throw some light on the origin of what appears to us a literary fraud. The volume with Mr. Donahoe's imprint was printed in London by Messrs. Virtue & Co., and we are not disposed to cast any blame on the Boston publisher. As to the book itself, we think well of it in the main, though we suspect the good Abbé has *improved* somewhat the testimonies he cites from the heathen mythologies, which he makes much more clear and explicit than any which he is able to cite from the Hebrew Scriptures.

- 12.—*Light in Darkness. A Treatise on the Obscure Night of the Soul.* By the Rev. A. F. HEWIT, C.P. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1871. pp. 160.

THE design of this small ascetic treatise is excellent, and knowing as we do its learned and devout author, we have no doubt that its design is well carried out, and that it must be highly serviceable to directors in dealing with a certain class of souls. But it presupposes on the part of the reader a knowledge of ascetic theology, which we do not possess, and it is, therefore, in a measure unintelligible to us. It was not designed for readers like us, and is, in fact, not only out of our line, but out of our province. A reviewer is, we are aware, supposed to know every thing, and to be competent to pass judgment on every possible and impossible subject; but we happen to be an exception. There are things we do not know, and subjects of vast importance that lie beyond our studies, and beyond our comprehension. Of Spiritism we know something, and we do understand and appreciate what Fr. Hewit says on that subject, and also of the extreme difficulty of always discerning the works of the Spirit, and distinguishing them from Satan's imitation of them. We may say generally, that, as far as we feel sure of understanding it, and see clearly its bearing on spiritual life, we appreciate the work very highly, as both instructive and edifying, though we are not one of the souls to which it is specially addressed.

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- 13.—*The Life of Father Mathew; or, the People's Soggarth Aroon.* By SISTER MARY FRANCIS CLARE. New York: Sadlier & Co. 1872. 18mo. pp. 218.

SISTER MARY FRANCIS CLARE would seem to be detailed by her community as a commissary of literature, to supply the Catholic English-speaking world with libraries composed of books of her own writing or editing; and we are told on good authority, that she holds her books are exempt from adverse criticism, both because she is a lady and a nun; yet she takes offence, we are told on the same authority, if the literary works of another lady happen to be praised. We trust no one can accuse us of ever failing in politeness and respect to any woman in her own sphere, or of want of reverence for any sister or nun in the discharge of the ordinary duties of her vocation; but when a woman, a nun or not, enters the field of literature, we recognize the author only. If she exacts nothing, we deny her nothing on the score of sex, or her religious profession. We aim to judge her works on their merits, unless she obtrudes her sex and profession.

We gave our honest judgment of "*Hornehurst Rectory.*" It was the first book of the authoress we had ever read or even seen. We have here the only other book of hers that we have read, "*The Life*

of Father Mathew"; and our honest opinion of it is, that, like Peter Pindar's razors, it was made to sell. We like it better than "Hornehurst Rectory," for it is much smaller; but it is a miserable failure as a biography, and is valuable only as showing how books are manufactured. It was not needed, for we already had an excellent biography of the great Apostle of Temperance, written, if we recollect aright, by the lamented John Francis Maguire, a true and earnest Catholic. We have no interest in speaking lightly of Sister Mary Francis Clare; we have no prejudice against her sex, her nation, or the religious community of which she is a member. She would seem to be one of the popular idols of the day, and we know the fiery furnace heated seven times hotter than it is wont to be heated, that awaits the luckless reviewer who refuses to bow down and worship the popular idol for the moment. We may err in our taste and in our critical judgment, and do injustice to a really deserving person; but, if so, it is owing to our frailty, not to our intention. We are too old and too near the grave, too isolated from the world, and, we hope, too independent of it, to seek popular applause or to heed popular opinion. We would, before going hence, do something to elevate the tone and standard of Catholic popular literature, by making it more thoroughly Catholic. The time has gone by when every book written by a Catholic, especially by a Catholic lady, whatever its merits, must be praised as a masterpiece. We have too much literary talent and genius, and our Catholic literature is not poor and meagre enough for that; and our dear Sister Mary Francis Clare, whose books sell by hundreds of thousands, should not feel it any thing more than a useful mortification, if there happens to be one old man who stands aloof from the crowd of her flatterers, and refuses to puff what he regards as her light-weighted wares.

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- 14.—*Father Fitzroy; or, the Martyr of a Secret. A Tale of the Irish Famine.* From the French of Raoul de Navery. New York: O'Shea. 1872. 16mo. pp. 324.

THIS story is written with power, and in parts is full of interest and pathos. But we know not why it is called "the Martyr of a Secret," for the priest who, of course, could not reveal the secret of a horrible murder, communicated to him in confession, did not die of it; and if he had, it would have hardly been a martyrdom. He suffered intensely, no doubt, for he burned to bring the murderer to justice, or to avenge his brother who was murdered; but suffering does not make one a martyr. If the priest had been interrogated and put to death by authority for refusing to reveal the secret confided to him in sacramental confession, he would have been a martyr. But there was nothing of the sort. The priest lived to

hang the murderer of his brother, after having converted him, for in a moment of forgetfulness he confessed his crime to the priest outside of the confessional, who immediately arrested him and delivered him to justice. Upon the whole, the author's morality is of a very mixed and confused character, like that of a great many French Catholics, and some not French, who have received a fine literary education, but have never learned the catechism. The author piles up the agony too high, and the story is too painful for any body to read that does not need the most harrowing scenes imaginable to give him a sensation.

* * * WE cannot send out this second number of the revived Series of our REVIEW, without thanking both our old and new friends for the cordial welcome which they have given to our announcement of its revival, after a suspension of eight years. I supposed myself forgotten, as it were, dead and buried in the public estimation, for eight years in the fast life of modern society is a long time for people to remember any thing; but it seems that the Catholic public had forgotten only my errors and mistakes, and have given me greater encouragement than I dared hope for. The REVIEW has already a larger number of subscribers than the average number that it had in its palmiest days, and that of their own motion unsolicited by canvassers. This proves that the want of such a periodical as ours is expected to be, is deeply felt by intelligent Catholics. This would be highly gratifying to me, if I did not feel that I shall be hardly able to satisfy the expectation of the Catholic public. A man in the seventieth year of his age can hardly have the elasticity and vigor of a man in his forty-second, and I am no exception to the general rule, suffering as I am from bodily infirmity still more than from age. But I have this advantage; I have grown more detached from the world, more independent of it, and less sensitive alike to its censures and its applause. I am thankful to be permitted in these times which try the faith of Catholics, to raise my voice, feeble though it be, in defence of the rights of the church and civil society against their enemies, and I count on the prayers of my old and new friends to strengthen me for the battle.
